

that he would be leading his troops to needless slaughter, and did not speak. He repeated the question, and without opening my lips I bowed in answer. In a determined voice Pickett said: "Sir, I shall lead my division forward." He then remounted his horse and rode back to his command. I mounted my horse and rode to a point where I could observe the troops as they marched forward. Colonel Alexander had set aside a battery of seven guns to advance with Pickett, but General Pendleton, from whom they were borrowed, recalled them just before the charge was ordered. Colonel Alexander told me of the seven guns which had been removed, and that his ammunition was so low he could not properly support the charge. I ordered him to stop Pickett until the ammunition could be replenished, and he answered, "There is no ammunition with which to replenish." In the hurry he got together such guns as he could to move with Pickett.


It has been said that I should have exercised discretion and should not have sent Pickett on his charge. It has been urged that I had exercised discretion on previous occasions. It is true that at times when I saw a certainty of success in another direction, I did not follow the orders of my general, but that was when he was not near and could not see the situation as it existed. When your chief is away, you have a right to exercise discretion; but if he sees everything that you see, you have no right to disregard his positive and repeated orders. I never exercised discretion after discussing with General Lee the points of his orders, *and* when, after discussion, he had ordered the execution of his policy. I had offered my objections to Pickett's battle and had been overruled, and I was in the immediate presence of the commanding general when the order was given for Pickett to advance. [See p. 355.]

That day at Gettysburg was one of the saddest of my life. I foresaw what my men would meet and would gladly have given up my position rather than share in the responsibilities of that day. It was thus I felt when Pickett at the head of 4900 brave men marched over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his descent of the slope. As he passed me he rode gracefully, with his jaunty cap raked well over on his right ear and his long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. He seemed rather a holiday soldier than a general at the head of a column which was about to make one of the grandest, most desperate assaults recorded in the annals of wars. Armistead and Garnett, two of his brigadiers, were veterans of nearly a quarter of a century's service. Their minds seemed absorbed in the men behind, and in the bloody work before them. Kemper, the other brigadier, was younger but had experienced many severe battles. He was leading my old brigade that I had drilled on Manassas plains before the first battle on that noted field. The troops advanced in well-closed ranks and with elastic step, their faces lighted



MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM D. PENDER,  
WOUNDED JULY 2, DIED JULY 18.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.






with hope. Before them lay the ground over which they were to pass to the point of attack. Intervening were several fences, a field of corn, a little swale running through it and then a rise from that point to the Federal stronghold. As soon as Pickett passed the crest of the hill, the Federals had a clear view and opened their batteries, and as he descended the eastern slope of the ridge his troops received a fearful fire from the batteries in front and from Round Top. The troops marched steadily, taking the fire with great coolness. As soon as they passed my batteries I ordered my artillery to turn their fire against the batteries on our right then raking my lines. They did so, but did not force the Federals to change the direction of their fire and relieve our infantry. As the troops were about to cross the swale I noticed a considerable force of Federal infantry moving down as though to flank the left of our line. I sent an officer to caution the division commanders to guard against that move, at the same time sending another staff-officer with similar orders so as to feel assured the order would be delivered. Both officers came back bringing their saddles, their horses having been shot under them. After crossing the swale, the troops kept the same steady step, but met a dreadful fire at the hands of the Federal sharpshooters; and as soon as the field was open the Federal infantry poured down a terrific fire which was kept up during the entire assault. The slaughter was terrible, the enfilade fire of the batteries on Round Top being very destructive. At times one shell would knock down five or six men. I dismounted to relieve my horse and was sitting on a rail fence watching very closely the movements of the troops. Colonel Freemantle, who had taken a position behind the Third Corps where he would be out of reach of fire and at the same time have a clear view of the field, became so interested that he left his position and came with speed to join me. Just as he came up behind me, Pickett had reached a point near the Federal lines. A pause was made to close ranks and mass for the final plunge. The troops on Pickett's left, although advancing, were evidently a little shaky. Colonel Freemantle, only observing the troops of Pickett's command, said to me, "General, I would not have missed this for anything in the world." He believed it to be a complete

success. I was watching the troops supporting Pickett and saw plainly they could not hold together ten minutes longer. I called his attention to the wavering condition of the two divisions of the Third Corps, and said they



would not hold, that Pickett would strike and be crushed and the attack would be a failure. As Pickett's division concentrated in making the final assault, Kemper fell severely wounded. As the division threw itself against the Federal line Garnett fell and expired. The Confederate flag was planted in the Federal line, and immediately Armistead fell mortally wounded at the feet of the Federal soldiers. The wavering divisions then seemed appalled, broke their ranks, and retired. Immediately the Federals swarmed around Pickett, attacking on all sides, enveloped and broke up his command, having killed and wounded more than two thousand men in about thirty minutes. They then drove the fragments back upon our lines. As they came back I fully expected to see Meade ride to the front and lead



BRIGADIER-GENERAL LEWIS A. ARMISTEAD, C. S. A.,  
KILLED JULY 3. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


his forces to a tremendous counter-charge. Sending my staff-officers to assist in collecting the fragments of my command, I rode to my line of batteries, knowing they were all I had in front of the impending attack, resolved to drive it back or sacrifice my last gun and man. The Federals were advancing a line of skirmishers which I thought was the advance of their charge. As soon as the line of skirmishers came within reach of our guns, the batteries opened again and their fire seemed to check at once the threatened advance. After keeping it up a few minutes the line of skirmishers disappeared, and my mind was relieved of the apprehension that Meade was going to follow us.

General Lee came up as our troops were falling back and encouraged them as well as he could; begged them to re-form their ranks and reorganize their forces, and assisted the staff-officers in bringing them all together again. It was then he used the expression that has been mentioned so often:

"It was all my fault; get together, and let us do the best we can toward saving that which is left us."

As our troops were driven back from the general assault an attack was made on my extreme right by several squadrons of cavalry, which succeeded in breaking through our line of pickets. They were met by a counter-move of the 9th Georgia and the well-directed fire of Captain Bachman's battery and driven back, the 11th and 59th Georgia joining in the counter-move.





THE CHARGE OF PICKETT, PETTIGREW, AND TRIMBLE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH FROM THE UNION POSITION.



Finding that Meade was not going to follow us, I prepared to withdraw my line to a better defensive position. The batteries were withdrawn well over Seminary Ridge, and orders were sent to the right for McLaws's and Hood's divisions to be withdrawn to corresponding positions. The armies remained in position, the Confederates on Seminary Ridge extending around Gettysburg, the left also drawn back, the Federals on Cemetery Ridge, until the night of the 4th, when we took up the march in retreat for Virginia.

That night, while we were standing round a little fire by the roadside, General Lee said again the defeat was all his fault. He said to me at another time, "You ought not to have made that last attack." I replied, "I had my orders, and they were of such a nature there was no escape from them." During that winter, while I was in east Tennessee, in a letter I received from him he said, "If I only had taken your counsel even on the 3d, and had moved around the Federal left, how different all might have been."

The only thing Pickett said of his charge was that he was distressed at the loss of his command. He thought he should have had two of his brigades that had been left in Virginia; with them he felt that he would have broken the line.

While I was trying to persuade General Lee to turn the Federal left on the 1st of July, Halleck telegraphed Meade as follows:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 1st, 1863.

"The movements of the enemy yesterday indicate his intention to either turn your left, or to cover himself by the South Mountain and occupy Cumberland Valley. Do not let him draw you too far to the east."

Again on the same day:

". . . Your tactical arrangements for battle seem good, so far as I can judge from my knowledge of the character of the country; but in a strategic view, are you not too far east, and may not Lee attempt to turn your left and cut you off from Frederick? Please give your full attention to this suggestion. . . ."

The next day, just thirty minutes before my assault, General Meade telegraphed General Halleck at 3 P. M.:

". . . If I find it hazardous to do so [meaning to attack], or am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. . . ."

From this we know that the ground of the Gettysburg cemetery could have been occupied without the loss of a man, yet even at this late day, some of the Virginians, not satisfied with the sacrifice already made, wish that I, who would and could have saved every man lost at Gettysburg, should now be shot to death.

If we had made the move around the Federal left, and taken a strong position, we should have dislodged Meade without a single blow; but even if we had been successful at Gettysburg, and had driven the Federals out of their stronghold, we should have won a fruitless victory, and returned to Virginia conquered victors. The ground they occupied would have been worth no more to us than the ground we were on. What we needed was a battle that



would give us decided fruits, not ground that was of no value. I do not think there was any necessity for giving battle at Gettysburg. All of our cavalry was absent, and while that has been urged by some as a reason why the battle should have been made at once, to my mind it was one of the strongest reasons for delaying the battle until everything was well in hand. The cause of the battle was simply General Lee's determination to fight it out from the position in which he was at that time. He did not feel that he was beaten on the second day, but that he was the victor, and still hoped he would be able to dislodge Meade; but he made a mistake in sending such a



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE E. PICKETT, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

small number of men to attack a formidable force in a position of great natural strength, reënforced by such temporary shelter as could be collected and placed in position to cover the troops. Lee's hope in entering the campaign was that he would be in time to make a successful battle north of the Potomac, with such advantages as to draw off the army at Vicksburg as well as the Federal troops at other points.

I do not think the general effect of the battle was demoralizing, but by a singular coincidence our army at Vicksburg surrendered to Grant on the 4th, while the armies of

Lee and Meade were lying in front of each other, each waiting a movement on the part of the other, neither victor, neither vanquished. This surrender, taken in connection with the Gettysburg defeat, was, of course, very discouraging to our superior officers, though I do not know that it was felt as keenly by the rank and file. For myself, I felt that our last hope was gone, and that it was now only a question of time with us. When, however, I found that Rosecrans was moving down toward Georgia against General Bragg, I thought it possible we might recover some of our lost prospects by concentrating against Rosecrans, destroying his army, and advancing through Kentucky.

General Lee evidently felt severely mortified and hurt at the failure, so much so that at times he was inclined to listen to some of those who claimed to be his friends, and to accept their proposition to find a scapegoat. He resisted them, however, and seemed determined to leave the responsibility on his own hands.



For several reasons I will take occasion here to answer some serious charges that have been made against me by men who claim to have been the friends of General Lee.

Mr. Jefferson Davis, in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government" (p. 441, Vol. II.), quotes from a memorial address the old story of the Rev. W. N. Pendleton:

"The ground south-west of the town was carefully examined by me after the engagement on July 1st. Being found much less difficult than the steep ascent fronting the troops already up, its practicable character was reported to our commanding general. He informed me that he had ordered Longstreet to attack on that front at sunrise the next morning. And he added to myself, 'I want you to be out long before sunrise, so as to reëxamine and save time.'

"He also desired me to communicate with General Longstreet as well as with himself. The reconnoissance was accordingly made as soon as it was light enough on the 2d, and made through a long distance—in fact, very close to what there was of the enemy's line. No insuperable difficulty appearing, and the marching up—far off, the enemy's reënforcing columns being seen, the extreme desirableness of immediate attack there was at once reported to the commanding general; and, according to his wish, message was also sent to the intrepid but deliberate corps commander, whose sunrise attack there had been ordered. There was, however, unaccountable delay. My own messages went repeatedly to General Lee, and his I know was urgently pressed on General Longstreet until, as I afterward learned from officers who saw General Lee—as I could not at the time—he manifested extreme displeasure with the tardy corps commander. That hard-fighting soldier, to whom it had been committed there to attack early in the day, did not in person reach the commanding general and with him ride to a position whence to view the ground and see the enemy's arriving masses, until 12 o'clock, and his column was not up and ready for the assault until 4 P. M. All this, as it occurred under my personal observation, it is nothing short of imperative duty that I should thus fairly state."

Mr. Davis indorses the statement thus:

"For the reasons set forth by General Pendleton, whose statement in regard to a fact coming under his personal observation none who knew him will question, preparations for a general engagement were unfortunately delayed until the afternoon instead of being made at sunrise; then troops had been concentrated, and Round Top, the commanding position unoccupied in the morning, had received the force which inflicted such disaster on our assaulting columns. The question as to the responsibility for this delay has been so fully discussed in the 'Southern Historical Society Papers' as to relieve me from the necessity of entering into it."

As General Pendleton's lecture was the capital upon which it was proposed to draw funds for a memorial church, it was natural, perhaps, that Mr. Davis should, *as a sentiment*, claim the statements made as beyond question. Most Virginia writers on this subject have taken up and followed the false scent announced by General Pendleton. Outside that State, I believe Mr. Davis and General Wilcox are the only persons who do not spurn it as false. Facts connected with this battle have been so distorted and misrepresented that a volume of distinct maps must be written in order to make a demonstration, to the letter, of all its features.

General C. M. Wilcox, in an article in the number of the "Southern Historical Society Papers" for September, 1877, refers to the order for early attack, viz.:

"It has been asserted that General Longstreet was ordered to attack at daylight or early the next morning. Of this I have no knowledge personally, but am inclined to believe that he was so ordered."



But from the *official accounts* of Generals Pendleton and Wilcox <sup>1</sup> we see that the right of General Lee's army was not deployed as far as the Fairfield road on the 1st of July, that General Pendleton did not pass beyond this road, and only noted the location of the ridge on the right from his position on the Fairfield road especially as likely to be important "toward a flank movement." With this idea in his mind he leaves us to infer that he left our right and moved over to our left to supervise the posting of artillery battalions just then coming up. Soon after General Pendleton passed from about the Fairfield road to our left, the division of General R. H. Anderson,—of the Third Corps,—led by the brigade of General C. M. Wilcox, filed off to the right from the Chambersburg road, marched in an oblique direction toward the Fairfield road, where it was halted for the night, lying in bivouac till the next day, the brigade of Wilcox being on picket or guard service during the night about a mile farther to the right. In the absence of other evidence, one might be at a loss to know which of these accounts was intended in a Pickwickian sense, but the account of General R. H. Anderson, who was guileless and truthful, supports the official reports. General A. A. Humphreys (of the other side), late chief of the United States Corps of Engineers, a man whose entire life and service were devoted to official accuracy, gives similar evidence in his official report. <sup>2</sup>

All the subordinate reports on the Confederate side confirm the account by General Anderson, while the reports of subordinate officers on the Federal side conform to that of General Humphreys. It is conclusive therefore that the Confederates occupied no ground east of the Fairfield road till R. H. Anderson's division advanced on the morning of the 2d at 10 to find its position on the right of Hill's corps, after a clever fight between the 3d Maine and 1st U. S. Sharp-shooters against the 10th and 11th Alabama regiments.

When it is remembered that my command was at the close of the first day's fight fifteen to twenty miles west of the field, that its attack as ordered was to be made along the east side of the Emmitsburg road, that no part of General Lee's army touched that road till 9 A. M. of the 2d, that up to that hour it was in possession of the Federals, and that their troops had been marching in by that road from early on the 1st till 8 A. M. on the 2d, it will be seen that General Pendleton's reconnoissance on the 1st was made, if made at all, by his passing through the Federal lines on the afternoon of the 1st and again on the morning of the 2d.

General Wilcox confesses want of personal information of the order for daylight or early attack, but expresses his confidence that the order was given. That is, he, occupying our extreme right on the 1st, on picket at a point considerably west of the Emmitsburg road, believes that General Lee ordered troops some fifteen or twenty miles off, and yet on the march, to pass his picket guard in the night to the point of attack, east of the Emmitsburg road, through the Federal lines, in order to make a daylight attack east of the road. While I am prepared to admit that General Lee ordered, at times,

<sup>1</sup> "Official Records," Vol. XXVII., Part II., pp. 346, 616.

<sup>2</sup> "Official Records," Vol. XXVII., Part I., p. 529.



desperate battles, I cannot admit that he, blindfold, ever led or ordered his next in rank, also blindfold, into night marches through the enemy's lines to gain position and make a battle at daylight next morning.

In articles formerly published on this charge of General Pendleton, masses of evidence were adduced showing that my column when ordered to the right, east of the Emmitsburg road, was conducted by General Lee's engineer officer; that when halted under the conduct of that officer I doubled the rear division on the leading one so as to save time; that my arrangements were promptly made, and that my attack was made many hours before any of our other troops were ready to obey their orders to coöperate. As I was the only one prepared for battle, I contended against the Federal army throughout the contest with two divisions and some misguided brigades sent to cover my left.

Colonel Taylor, of General Lee's staff, takes exception to the delay in the attack of Pickett on the last day under the impression that, had I attacked earlier and before Edward Johnson was driven from the Federal right, the latter might have held his ground longer and to some advantage to the Confederates. He seems to lose sight of the fact that General Lee, not I, was commanding our left under Johnson, and that he alone could order concert of action. On the 2d, notwithstanding his orders to move in concert with my attack at 4 p. m., Johnson did not go in till 8 at night, long after my battle was ended. Colonel Taylor thinks the forlorn-hope should have gone in sooner. The universal opinion now is that it should not have gone in at all; and, as already stated, that was the opinion General Lee expressed soon after the battle.

Some of our North Carolina troops seem to consider the less conspicuous part given them a reflection upon them as soldiers of true mettle and dash. This sensitiveness is not well founded. Every officer of experience knows that the best of veteran soldiers, with bloody noses from a fresh battle, are never equal to those going in fresh in their first stroke of the battle. Had Pickett's men gone through the same experience as the other troops on the 1st, they could not have felt the same zest for fighting that they did coming up fresh and feeling disparaged that the army had won new laurels in their absence. There is no doubt that the North Carolinians did as well as any soldiers could have done under the circumstances. I can truthfully attest that the old North State furnished as fine and gallant troops as any that fought in the Confederate ranks — and that is saying as much as can be said for soldiers. They certainly made sufficient sacrifice, and that was all we had left to do on that day.

During the Franco-Prussian war I kept a map of the field of operations with colored pegs, that were moved from day to day to indicate the movements of the two armies. Bazaine had been driven to shelter at Metz, McMahon had been driven back to the route leading from Paris to Metz and seemed in doubt whether he would go to Paris or to Bazaine's relief. He suffered himself to be forced north of the route between these points. On the morning that the wires brought us that information, two or three of the French Creoles of New Orleans visited my office to ask my views of the



movements then proceeding. I replied, "McMahon's army will be prisoners of war in ten days." They were very indignant and stated that I was a Republican and in sympathy with the Prussians. My reply was that I had only given them my solution of a military problem. The Prussians were on the shorter route to Paris or to Metz, so that if McMahon should attempt to move in either direction the Prussians, availing themselves of the shorter lines, would interpose and force McMahon to attack; but as he had already been so beaten and demoralized, that he could not be expected to make a successful attack and would therefore be obliged to surrender. If he had gone direct to Paris before giving up his shorter route, it is possible that he could have organized a succoring army for the relief of Metz.

Had we interposed between Meade and Washington our army in almost as successful prestige as was that of the Prussians, Meade would have been obliged to attack us wherever we might be pleased to have him. He would have been badly beaten like the French, and the result would have been similar. I do not mean to say that two governments would have been permanently established; for I thought before the war, and during its continuance, that the people would eventually get together again in stronger bonds of friendship than those of their first love.

#### THE CHARGE OF PICKETT, PETTIGREW, AND TRIMBLE.†

BY J. B. SMITH.

IN an address delivered by Colonel Andrew Cowan to his comrades at Gettysburg on the 3d of July, 1886, he, like nearly every other speaker and writer, ascribes all the praise of the Confederate charge of the third day to Pickett's division. He says: "Beyond the wall nothing but the gray-clad Virginians." He speaks of no other troops except Pickett's. Some writers have gone so far as to say Pickett made the immortal charge with five thousand Virginians, etc. Pickett's division was fresh, not having engaged the enemy on the first or second day, while the other troops of the assaulting body fought on the previous days with unsurpassed bravery, and some of the brigades were almost annihilated.

The grand assaulting column was formed in three divisions, and the divisions were commanded and led to the slaughter by Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble.

General George E. Pickett's division, composed of three brigades commanded by Generals Richard B. Garnett, Lewis A. Armistead, and James L. Kemper, was 4900 strong. Garnett fell during the progress of the charge while at the head of his column urging his men on. Armistead led his men through the terrific storm of battle to the base of the Federal works, and there he placed his cap on his sword and sealed the wall, appealing to his troops to follow him. A few of his disorganized men imitated his heroic example, and died at his feet. General Kemper was wounded in the charge.

General J. Johnston Pettigrew's command embraced the following brigades: Archer's Tennessee brigade, commanded by Colonel Fry, of the 13th Alabama; Pettigrew's North Carolina brigade, Jo Davis's Mississippi brigade, and Brockenbrough's brigade of Virginians, aggregating five thousand troops. All were of Heth's division of A. P. Hill's corps. General Pettigrew was wounded in the charge, but he did not quit the field, and remained in command until he fell at Falling Waters.

I will now notice the conduct of Archer's Tennessee brigade. It opened the battle on the first day and lost its brave and gallant commander. While leading his men he was captured by a flank movement made by the enemy. The brigade suffered heavy losses in other ways on that day. When the grand assault was made on the 3d, the 1st and 7th Tennessee regiments made the first breach in the Federal works on Cemetery Hill, and they were the only organized regiments that entered into and beyond the enemy's walls.

The 14th Tennessee, after losing heavily on the first day, went into the grand charge with 375 men, and planted its colors on the stone wall and left them there. The heroic conduct of the 13th Alabama in that awful and trying scene has been carefully written up, and the record is in the archives of the Southern Historical Society, in its native State, and will be loved and admired as long as heroism is admired. It was Archer's worn, tattooed, and bleeding brigade that fought the last

† From the "Bivouac" of March, 1887, and editorially revised.—EDITORS.



battle north of the Potomac — the battle of Falling Waters — where the lamented Pettigrew fell.

Davis's Mississippi brigade, that fought so gallantly on the first day, and crossed bayonets with the Iron Brigade, had a prominent part in the grand charge. The 2d Mississippi of that brigade lost half of its men on that day, but was still intact, ready and willing to fight, and its courage in the great charge has become a matter of history. Its battle-flag is in the possession of the old color-bearer, who lives at Blossom Prairie, Texas, and has the names of more than a score of battles stamped on it.

Scales's and Lane's North Carolina brigades, commanded by General Isaac R. Trimble, belonged to General W. D. Pender's division of A. P. Hill's corps, and were 2500 strong. General Pender was mortally wounded on the second day. When General Lee saw the men of Scales's brigade, bleeding from wounds received on the first day, he said, "Many of these poor fellows should go to the rear." When a brigade would fight under such circumstances as Scales's did, it ought not to be robbed of its military fame. General Trimble was wounded in the charge.

PRAIRIE GROVE, TEX.

## A REPLY TO GENERAL LONGSTREET.

BY WILLIAM ALLAN, COLONEL, C. S. A.

GENERAL LONGSTREET'S account of Gettysburg [see pp. 244, 339] is notable for its mistakes as well as for its attitude toward General Lee and others.

*First.* The statement that General Lee passed over more deserving officers from other States in order to give the command of his corps to Virginians is an unworthy attack upon a man who was as singularly free from such prejudices as he was from self-seeking, either during the war or after it. Lee said in a letter to President Davis, October 2d, 1862, at the close of the Antietam campaign:

"In reference to commanders of corps with the rank of lieutenant-general, of which you request my opinion, I can confidently recommend Generals Longstreet and Jackson, in this army. My opinion of the merits of General Jackson has been greatly enhanced during this expedition. He is true, honest, and brave; has a single eye to the good of the service, and spares no exertion to accomplish his object. Next to these two officers I consider General A. P. Hill the best commander with me. He fights his troops well and takes good care of them. At present I do not think that more than two commanders of corps are necessary for this army."

This was Lee's judgment after a campaign in which both the Hills and McLaws had served, and long before there was any question of making either of them a lieutenant-general. It would be about as just to accuse Lee of undue partiality to Georgia in making Longstreet his senior lieutenant, as it is to accuse him of partiality to Virginia in selecting A. P. Hill rather than D. H. Hill or McLaws for the command of his Third Corps.

*Second.* In regard to the battle of Gettysburg: The first day's fight was brought on unexpectedly to Lee. In the absence of Stuart he was not aware of the proximity of the Federal army. The first day's operations were very successful. Two of the seven infantry corps of the Federal army were virtually demolished, having been defeated and driven in disorder completely from the field, leaving many killed and wounded and several thousand prisoners to the victors.

*Third.* It was at the close of this day's work that General Lee, in view of its results, and of the indications it gave of the position of the Federal army, decided to follow up the fight. General Longstreet advised a movement across Meade's front

to threaten his left and rear. Such a movement would have been difficult in the absence of Stuart; it could not have been executed in the position then occupied by the army with sufficient promptness to surprise Meade; and if successful it simply would have forced the Federal army back to some position nearer Baltimore and Washington where the issue of battle was still to be tried. General Longstreet begs the question when he assumes that Meade would then have been obliged to attack at a disadvantage. General Lee decided that this plan did not promise as good results as to follow up the partial victory already gained. More than one-fourth of the Federal army was beaten. (Of the First and Eleventh corps that had numbered 20,931 on June 30th, not 5700 were in line on July 2d.) That army was not concentrated, and hours must elapse before its full strength could be marshaled for battle. The absent portions would reach the field jaded by forced marches, to meet the depressing news of the defeat of their comrades. Doubt and uncertainty would prevail, increased perhaps by the fact that the present Federal commander was so new in his place. Lee's troops were much more nearly up, only Pickett's division and Law's brigade being out of reach. Not to press the Union army was to lose the greater part of the advantage of the first day's victory. The Federals would soon recover from their depression if not pressed, and his own troops would be disappointed. Lee believed if he could attack early on the second day he would have but part of the Federal army to deal with, and that if he could repeat his success of the first day the gain would be great. He therefore determined upon attack. On the night of the 1st (not on the forenoon of the 2d, as General Longstreet has it) he decided, after a conference with Ewell and his division commanders, to make the attack early next day from his right with Longstreet's two divisions that were within reach, this attack to be supported by Hill and Ewell. (See Ewell's and Early's reports: Early's paper in "Southern Historical Society Papers," Vol. IV., p. 214; and Long's "Memoirs of Lee.")

*Fourth.* General Longstreet would have us infer that he was not ordered by General Lee to attack early on the second day; but that his memory is at



fault on this point has been abundantly shown by Generals Fitz Lee, Pendleton, Early, Wilcox, and many others. No testimony on this point is more direct and conclusive than that of General A. L. Long, then military secretary to General Lee. He says in his recently published "Memoirs of R. E. Lee" (page 277), that on the evening of the 1st, when General Lee had decided not to renew the attack on Cemetery Hill that day, he said (in Long's presence) to Longstreet and Hill: "Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable." Long continues: "In the conversation that succeeded he [Lee] directed them to make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt action the next day." Long shows plainly that General Lee's design was to attack the troops in front before the whole Federal army could get up, and he described graphically the impatience Lee showed next morning, as early as 9 A. M., at Longstreet's delay. General Longstreet is wrong, too, in giving the impression that his divisions were fifteen or twenty miles away on the night of the 1st, for in his official report he says that "McLaws's division . . . reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division [except Law's brigade] got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night." Hood says he was with his staff "in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak" on the 2d, and his troops were close behind. Kershaw (of McLaws's division) says in his official report that on the 1st of July they "marched to a point on the Gettysburg road some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M."

General Longstreet, to explain his delay, besides the above reasons scrapes together a number of others,—such as the presence of some Federal scouts and pickets west of the Emmitsburg road, the movement of Sickles's rear-guard along that road, the presence of one of General Lee's engineers (who had been sent to give information, not to command his corps). No time need be wasted on these. The fact is that General Longstreet, though knowing fully the condition of things on the night of the 1st, knowing that Lee had decided to attack that part of the Federal army in his front, knowing that every hour strengthened Meade and diminished the chances of Confederate success, and knowing that his corps was to open the battle and deliver the main assault, consumed the time from daylight to nearly 4 P. M., on July 2d, in moving his troops about four miles, over no serious obstacle, and in getting them into battle. Meantime on the Federal side Hancock's corps, which had camped three miles from Gettysburg, reached the field by 6 or 7 A. M.; Sickles's two brigades that had been left at Emmitsburg came up by 9 A. M.; the rear of the Fifth Corps by midday, and the Sixth Corps, after a march of

thirty-two miles in thirty hours, by 2 P. M. Had Longstreet attacked not later than 9 or 10 A. M., as Lee certainly expected, Sickles's and Hancock's corps would have been defeated before part of the Fifth and the Sixth corps arrived. Little Round Top (which, as it was, the Fifth Corps barely managed to seize in time) would have fallen into Confederate possession; and even if nothing more had been done this would have given the field to the Confederates, since the Federal line all the way to Cemetery Hill was untenable with Round Top in hostile hands.

*Fifth.* That Longstreet's attack when made was poorly seconded by the other corps may be true, and thus another chance of winning a complete victory on July 2d was lost, but this does not change the fact that the first and great opportunity of that day for the Confederates was lost by Longstreet's delay.

*Sixth.* Victory on the third day was for the Confederates a far more difficult problem than on the second, but it was still within their reach. But one need not be surprised at the failure of Pickett's attack after reading of the hesitation, the want of confidence and hearty coöperation, with which General Longstreet directed it. Lee never intended that Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble should fight unsupported by the remainder of the army. He expected "that with proper concert of action . . . we should ultimately succeed." (Lee's report.) Longstreet was directed to use his whole corps, and when he felt embarrassed by the Federal forces on or near the Round Tops he was given a division and a half from A. P. Hill's corps, with power to call for more. General Long says: "The original intention of General Lee was that Pickett's attack should be supported by the divisions of McLaws and Hood, and General Longstreet was so ordered." ("Memoirs of Lee," p. 294. See also statements of Colonels Venable and Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee," p. 108.) Lee's efforts for a concerted attack were ineffectual. Pickett was overwhelmed not by troops in front but by those on his flanks, especially by those on his right flank, where Wilcox was sent forward too late to be of use, and where he was too weak to have effected much at best. Yet Longstreet did not use any part of Hood's and McLaws's divisions to support Pickett, or to make a diversion in his favor, or to occupy the troops on his flank which finally defeated him. These divisions were practically idle, except that one of Hood's brigades was occupied in driving off the Federal cavalry which made a dash on that flank. Longstreet, in a word, sent forward one-third of his corps to the attack, but the remainder of his troops did not coöperate. And yet he reproaches Lee for the result!

MCDONOGH, MD., February 16th, 1887.





CHARGE OF  
ALEXANDER'S ARTILLERY.  
SEE PAGE 360.

## THE GREAT CHARGE AND ARTILLERY FIGHTING AT GETTYSBURG.

BY E. PORTER ALEXANDER, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.

THE Reserve Artillery of Longstreet's corps, in the Gettysburg campaign, consisted of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, then under Major Eshleman, nine guns, and my own battalion of twenty-six guns. Besides these, the artillery of the corps comprised Cabell's, Henry's, and Dearing's battalions of eighteen guns each. The latter battalions were usually attached, on the march, respectively to McLaws's, Hood's, and Pickett's divisions of infantry.

On the first of July, 1863, the Reserve Artillery was encamped near Greenwood, and we had no idea that the great battle of the campaign had already opened about eighteen miles away. Early in the night, however, rumors reached us that Hill's corps had been heavily engaged, and that Ewell's had come to his assistance; that the enemy had been driven some distance, but had finally made a stand in a very strong position. These rumors were soon followed by orders for the artillery to march at 1 o'clock for the front. There was little time for sleep before taking the road, and I think but few improved even that little. There was the usual lively interest, of course, to hear of the personal fortunes of friends in the two corps which had been engaged. Who was killed and who safe? Then there was no one so dull as not to appreciate the tremendous gravity to us of the results of the battle which the next day was to bring. We had penetrated farther into the enemy's country than ever before. Our only communication with our arsenals and depots was by an unguarded wagon-road to Staunton, Virginia, about two hundred miles, over mountains and across unbridged rivers; much of it through a hostile country, and all of it liable to cavalry raids by the enemy. But we felt that we were now, somehow, nearer the enemy's heart than we had ever been before,—within easy reach of some vital part,—and that a blow struck now must have many times the effect it would have if given in Virginia against only an invading army. Our confidence in Lee was, of course, supreme, and the opportune arrival of Ewell to Hill's aid gave fresh confirmation of



the skill that would direct our efforts. There seemed to be a prevalent feeling that fortune now favored us and that victory or defeat now depended solely on ourselves.

Except in equipment, I think a better army, better nerved up to its work, never marched upon a battle-field. But many of our infantry still carried smooth-bore muskets, and our artillery ammunition was inferior, especially that of the rifles. The Confederacy did not have the facilities for much nice work of that sort, and we had to take what we could get without rigid inspection. How our rifled batteries always envied our friends in the opposition their abundant supply of splendid ammunition! For an unreliable fuse or a rifle-shell which "tumbles" sickens not only the gunner but the whole battery, more than "misfires" at large game dishearten a sportsman. There is no encouragement to careful aiming when the ammunition fails, and the men feel handicapped. But for all our confidence that Providence had now at last consented to "come down and take a proper view of the situation," as one of our good chaplains used to pray, there was a very natural anxiety to know how the enemy had fought the day before at Gettysburg. As we met the wounded and staff-officers who had been in the action, I remember many questions asked on that subject. There was no great comfort to be derived from the answers, which were generally in profane simile. Indeed, I have heard survivors of the war say since that some of the Federal fighting that day equaled or surpassed any they ever saw from first to last.

We marched quite steadily, with a good road and a bright moon, until about 7 A. M. on the 2d, when we halted in a grassy open grove about a mile west of Seminary Ridge, and fed and watered. Here, soon afterward, I was sent for by General Longstreet, and, riding forward, found him with General Lee on Seminary Ridge. Opposite, about a mile away, on Cemetery Ridge, overlooking the town, lay the enemy, their batteries making considerable display, but their infantry, behind stone walls and ridges, scarcely visible. In between us were only gentle rolling slopes of pasture and wheat-fields, with a considerable body of woods to the right and front. The two Round Tops looked over everything, and a signal-flag was visible on the highest. Instinctively the idea arose, "If we could only take position here and have them attack us through this open ground!" But I soon learned that we were in no such luck—the boot, in fact, being upon the other foot.

It was explained to me that our corps was to assault the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to reconnoiter it and then to take charge of all the artillery of the corps and direct it in the attack, leaving my own battalion to the command of Major Huger. I was particularly cautioned, in moving the artillery, to keep it out of sight of the signal-station upon Round Top.†

†This suggests the remark that I have never understood why the enemy abandoned the use of military balloons early in 1863, after having used them extensively up to that time. Even if the observers never saw anything, they would have been worth all they cost for the annoyance and delays they caused us in trying to keep our move-

ments out of their sight. That wretched little signal-station upon Round Top that day caused one of our divisions to lose over two hours, and probably delayed our assault nearly that long. During that time a Federal corps arrived near Round Top and became an important factor in the action which followed.—E. P. A.





CONFEDERATE ARTILLERY AT DINNER.

I immediately started on my reconnoissance, and in about three hours had a good idea of all the ground, and had Cabell's, Henry's, and my own battalions parked near where our infantry lines were to be formed and the attack begun. Dearing's battalion with Pickett's infantry was not yet up, and the Washington Artillery was left in reserve.

Through some blunder, part of our infantry had been marched on a road that brought them in sight of Round Top, and instead of taking to the fields and hollows, they had been halted for an hour, and then had been counter-marched and sent around by a circuitous road, via Black Horse Tavern, about five miles out of the way, thereby losing at least two hours.

We waited quite a time for the infantry, and I think it was about 4 o'clock when at last the word was given for Hood's division to move out and endeavor to turn the enemy's left, while McLaws awaited the development of Hood's attack, ready to assault the Peach Orchard. Henry's battalion moved out with Hood and was speedily and heavily engaged; Cabell was ready to support him, and at once went into action near Snyder's house, about seven hundred yards from the Peach Orchard.

The Federal artillery was ready for us and in their usual full force and good practice. The ground at Cabell's position gave little protection, and he suffered rapidly in both men and horses. To help him I ran up Huger with 18 guns of my own 26, to Warfield's house, within 500 yards of the Peach Orchard, and opened upon it. This made fifty-four guns in action, and I hoped they would crush that part of the enemy's line in a very short time,



but the fight was longer and hotter than I expected. So accurate was the enemy's fire, that two of my guns were fairly dismounted, and the loss of men was so great that I had to ask General Barksdale, whose brigade was lying down close behind in the wood, for help to handle the heavy 24-pounder howitzers of Moody's battery. He gave me permission to call for volunteers, and in a minute I had eight good fellows, of whom, alas! we buried two that night, and sent to the hospital three others mortally or severely wounded. At last I sent for my other two batteries, but before they arrived McLaws's division charged past our guns, and the enemy deserted their line in confusion. Then I believed that Providence was indeed "taking the proper view," and that the war was very nearly over. Every battery was limbered to the front, and the two batteries from the rear coming up, all six charged in line across the plain and went into action again at the position the enemy had deserted. I can recall no more splendid sight, on a small scale,—and certainly no more inspiring moment during the war,—than that of the charge of these six batteries. An artillerist's heaven is to follow the routed enemy, after a tough resistance, and throw shells and canister into his disorganized and fleeing masses. Then the explosions of the guns sound louder and more powerful, and the very shouts of the gunners, ordering "Fire!" in rapid succession, thrill one's very soul. There is no excitement on earth like it. It is far prettier shooting than at a compact, narrow line of battle, or at another battery. Now we saw our heaven just in front, and were already breathing the very air of victory. Now we would have our revenge, and make them sorry they had staid so long. Everything was in a rush. The ground was generally good, and pieces and caissons went at a gallop, some cannoneers mounted, and some running by the sides—not in regular line, but a general race and scramble to get there first.

But we only had a moderately good time with Sickles's retreating corps after all. They fell back upon fresh troops in what seemed a strong position extending along the ridge north of Round Top. Hood's troops under Law gained the slope of Little Round Top, but were driven back to its base. Our infantry lines had become disjointed in the advance, and the fighting became a number of isolated combats between brigades. The artillery took part wherever it could, firing at everything in sight, and a sort of pell-mell fighting lasted until darkness covered the field and the fuses of the flying shells looked like little meteors in the air. But then both musketry and artillery slackened off, and by 9 o'clock the field was silent. It was evident that we had not finished the job, and would have to make a fresh effort in the morning. The firing had hardly ceased when my faithful little darkey, Charlie, came up hunting for me, with a fresh horse, affectionate congratulations on my safety, and, what was equally acceptable, something to eat. Negro servants hunting for their masters were a feature of the landscape that night. I then found General Longstreet, learned what I could of the fortunes of the day on other parts of the field, and got orders for the morning. They were, in brief, that our present position was to be held and the attack renewed as soon as Pickett arrived, and he was expected early.





CONFEDERATES WAITING FOR THE END OF THE ARTILLERY DUEL.

There was a great deal to do meanwhile. Our sound horses were to be fed and watered, those killed and disabled were to be replaced from the wagon-teams, ammunition must be replenished, and the ground examined and positions of batteries rectified. But a splendid moon made all comparatively easy, and greatly assisted, too, in the care of the wounded, many of whom, both our own and the enemy's, lay about among our batteries nearly all night. About 1 o'clock I made a little bed of fence-rails, as preferable to the trampled ground in the Peach Orchard, and got two hours' sleep. At 3 I began to put the batteries in position again and was joined by the Washington Artillery, which had been in reserve the day before. As daylight came I found I had placed about twenty guns so that the enemy's batteries on Cemetery Hill enfiladed the line, and I had a panic, almost, for fear the enemy would discover my blunder and open before I could rectify it. They could not, perhaps, see down into the valley as early as I could see them, and all was right before they opened. They never could have resisted the temptation to such pot-shooting. Apparently to feel us, they fired a few shots, and hit one or two men and some horses; but we did not respond, wanting to save our ammunition for the real work, and we were grateful to them for their moderation, our ground being very unfavorable as regarded shelter.

Early in the morning General Lee came around, and I was then told that we were to assault Cemetery Hill, which lay rather to our left. This necessitated a good many changes of our positions, which the enemy did not altogether approve of, and they took occasional shots at us, though we shifted about, as



inoffensively as possible, and carefully avoided getting into bunches. But we stood it all meekly, and by 10 o'clock, Dearing having come up, we had seventy-five guns in what was virtually one battery, so disposed as to fire on Cemetery Hill and the batteries south of it, which would have a fire on our advancing infantry. Pickett's division had arrived, and his men were resting and eating. Along Seminary Ridge, a short distance to our left, were sixty-three guns of A. P. Hill's corps, under Colonel R. L. Walker. As their distance was a little too great for effective howitzer fire, General Pendleton offered me the use of nine howitzers belonging to that corps. I accepted them, intending to take them into the charge with Pickett; so I put them in a hollow behind a bit of wood, with no orders but to wait there until I sent for them. About 11, some of Hill's skirmishers and the enemy's began fighting over a barn between the lines, and gradually his artillery and the enemy's took part, until over a hundred guns were engaged, and a tremendous roar was kept up for quite a time. But it gradually died out, and the whole field became as silent as a churchyard until 1 o'clock. The enemy, aware of the strength of his position, simply sat still and waited for us. It had been arranged that when the infantry column was ready, General Longstreet should order two guns fired by the Washington Artillery.† On that signal all our guns were to open on Cemetery Hill and the ridge extending toward Round Top, which was covered with batteries. I was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order to charge. I accordingly took position, about 12, at the most favorable point, just on the left of the line of guns and with one of Pickett's couriers with me. Soon after I received the following note from Longstreet:

"COLONEL: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the moment offers."

This note rather startled me. If that assault was to be made on General Lee's judgment it was all right, but I did not want it made on mine. I wrote back to General Longstreet to the following effect:

"GENERAL: I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and, if the result is unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort. And even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very bloody cost."

† In the "United Service Magazine" for August, 1885, Lieutenant-Colonel William Miller Owen, of the Washington Artillery, says:

"Returning to the position of the Washington Artillery, we all quietly awaited the order to open the ball. At 1:30 P. M. a courier dashed up in great haste, holding a little slip of paper, torn evidently from a memorandum-book, on which, written in pencil and addressed to Colonel Walton, was the following:

"HEADQUARTERS, July 3d, 1863. Colonel: Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy on the

rocky hill. Most respectfully, J. LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General Commanding."

"The order to fire the signal-gun was immediately communicated to Major Eshleman, commanding the Washington Artillery, and the report of the first gun rang out upon the still summer air. There was a moment's delay with the second gun, a friction-primer having failed to explode. It was but a little space of time, but a hundred thousand men were listening. Finally a puff of smoke was seen at the Peach Orchard, then came a roar and a flash, and 138 pieces of Confederate artillery opened upon the enemy's position, and the deadly work began with the noise of the heaviest thunder."

EDITORS.



To this presently came the following reply :

"COLONEL: The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy's off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the moment arrives advise General Pickett, and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack."

I hardly knew whether this left me discretion or not, but at any rate it seemed decided that the artillery must open. I felt that if we went that far we could not draw back, but the infantry must go too. General A. R. Wright, of Hill's corps, was with me looking at the position when these notes were received, and we discussed them together. Wright said, "It is not so hard to *go* there as it looks; I was nearly there with my brigade yesterday. The trouble is to *stay* there. The whole Yankee army is there in a bunch."

I was influenced by this, and somewhat by a sort of camp rumor which I had heard that morning, that General Lee had said that he was going to send every man he had upon that hill. At any rate, I assumed that the question of supports had been well considered, and that whatever was possible would be done. But before replying I rode to see Pickett, who was with his division a short distance in the rear. I did not tell him my object, but only tried to guess how he felt about the charge. He seemed very sanguine, and thought himself in luck to have the chance. Then I felt that I could not make any delay or let the attack suffer by any indecision on my part. And, that General Longstreet might know my intention, I wrote him only this: "GENERAL: When our artillery fire is at its best, I shall order Pickett to charge."

Then, getting a little more anxious, I decided to send for the nine howitzers and take them ahead of Pickett up nearly to musket range, instead of following close behind him as at first intended; so I sent a courier to bring them up in front of the infantry, but under cover of the wood. The courier could not find them. He was sent again, and only returned after our fire was opened, saying they were gone. I afterward learned that General Pendleton had sent for a part of them, and the others had moved to a neighboring hollow to get out of the line of the enemy's fire at one of Hill's batteries during the artillery duel they had had an hour before.

At exactly 1 o'clock by my watch the two signal-guns were heard in quick succession. In another minute every gun was at work. The enemy were not slow in coming back at us, and the grand roar of nearly the whole artillery of both armies burst in on the silence, almost as suddenly as the full notes of an organ would fill a church. [See p. 371.]

The artillery of Ewell's corps, however, took only a small part, I believe, in this, as they were too far away on the other side of the town. Some of them might have done good service from positions between Hill and Ewell, enfilading the batteries fighting us. The opportunity to do that was the single advantage in our having the exterior line, to compensate for all its disadvantages. But our line was so extended that all of it was not well studied, and the officers of the different corps had no opportunity to examine each other's ground for chances to coöperate.



The enemy's position seemed to have broken out with guns everywhere, and from Round Top to Cemetery Hill was blazing like a volcano. The air seemed full of missiles from every direction. The severity of the fire may be illustrated by the casualties in my own battalion under Major Huger.

Under my predecessor, General S. D. Lee, the battalion had made a reputation at the Second Manassas and also at Sharpsburg. At the latter battle it had a peculiarly hard time fighting infantry and superior metal nearly all day, and losing about eighty-five men and sixty horses. Sharpsburg they

called "artillery hell." At Gettysburg the losses in the same command, including the infantry that volunteered to help serve the guns, were 144 men and 116 horses, nearly all by artillery fire. Some parts of the Federal artillery suffered in the same proportion under our fire. I heard of one battery losing 27 out of 36 horses in 10 minutes.



MAJOR-GENERAL CADMUS M. WILCOX, C. S. A.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Before the cannonade opened I had made up my mind to give Pickett the order to advance within fifteen or twenty minutes after it began. But when I looked at the full development of the enemy's batteries, and knew that his infantry was generally protected from our fire by stone walls and swells of the ground, I could not bring

myself to give the word. It seemed madness to launch infantry into that fire, with nearly three-quarters of a mile to go at midday under a July sun. I let the 15 minutes pass, and 20, and 25, hoping vainly for something to turn up. Then I wrote to Pickett: "If you are coming at all you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself." Five minutes after sending that message, the enemy's fire suddenly began to slacken, and the guns in the cemetery limbered up and vacated the position.

We Confederates often did such things as that to save our ammunition for use against infantry, but I had never before seen the Federals withdraw their guns simply to save them up for the infantry fight. So I said, "If he does not run fresh batteries in there in five minutes, this is our fight." I looked anxiously with my glass, and the five minutes passed without a sign of life on the deserted position, still swept by our fire, and littered with dead men and horses and fragments of disabled carriages. Then I wrote Pickett, urgently: "For God's sake, come quick. The eighteen guns are gone; come quick, or my ammunition won't let me support you properly."

I afterward heard from others what took place with my first note to Pickett.

Pickett took it to Longstreet, Longstreet read it, and said nothing. Pickett said, "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet, knowing it had to be, but



unwilling to give the word, turned his face away. Pickett saluted and said, "I am going to move forward, sir," galloped off to his division and immediately put it in motion.†

Longstreet, leaving his staff, came out alone to where I was. It was then about 1:40 P. M. I explained the situation, feeling then more hopeful, but afraid our artillery ammunition might not hold out for all we would want. Longstreet said, "Stop Pickett immediately and replenish your ammunition." I explained that it would take too long, and the enemy would recover from the effect our fire was then having, and we had, moreover, very little to replenish with. Longstreet said, "I don't want to make this attack. I would stop it now but that General Lee ordered it and expects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed."

I listened, but did not dare offer a word. The battle was lost if we stopped. Ammunition was far too low to try anything else, for we had been fighting three days. There was a chance, and it was not my part to interfere. While Longstreet was still speaking, Pickett's division swept out of the wood and showed the full length of its gray ranks and shining bayonets, as grand a sight as ever a man looked on. Joining it on the left, Pettigrew stretched farther than I could see. General Dick Garnett, just out of the sick ambulance, and buttoned up in an old blue overcoat, riding at the head of his brigade passed us and saluted Longstreet. Garnett was a warm personal friend, and we had not met before for months. We had served on the plains together before the war. I rode with him a short distance, and then we wished each other luck and a good-bye, which was our last.

Then I rode down the line of guns, selecting such as had enough ammunition to follow Pickett's advance, and starting them after him as fast as possible. I got, I think, fifteen or eighteen in all, in a little while, and went with them. Meanwhile, the infantry had no sooner debouched on the plain than all the enemy's line, which had been nearly silent, broke out again with all its batteries. The eighteen guns were back in the cemetery, and a storm of shell began bursting over and among our infantry. All of our guns — silent as the infantry passed between them — reopened over their heads when the lines had got a couple of hundred yards away, but the enemy's artillery let us alone and fired only at the infantry. No one could have looked at that advance without feeling proud of it.

But, as our supporting guns advanced, we passed many poor, mangled victims left in its trampled wake.‡ A terrific infantry fire was now opened upon Pickett, and a considerable force of the enemy moved out to attack the right flank of his line. We halted, unlimbered, and opened fire upon it. Pickett's men never halted, but opened fire at close range, swarmed over the fences and among the enemy's guns — were swallowed up in smoke, and that

† See General Longstreet's statement on pp. 344, 345.—EDITORS.

‡ I remember one with the most horrible wound that I ever saw. We were halted for a moment by a fence, and as the men threw it down for the guns to pass, I saw in one of the corners a man sitting

down and looking up at me. A solid shot had carried away both jaws and his tongue. I noticed the powder smut from the shot on the white skin around the wound. He sat up and looked at me steadily, and I looked at him until the guns could pass, but nothing, of course, could be done for him.—E. P. A.



was the last of them. The conflict hardly seemed to last five minutes before they were melted away, and only disorganized stragglers pursued by a moderate fire were coming back. Just then, Wilcox's brigade passed by us, moving to Pickett's support. There was no longer anything to support, and with the keenest pity at the useless waste of life, I saw them advance. The men, as they passed us, looked bewildered, as if they wondered what they were expected to do, or why they were there. However, they were soon halted and moved back. They suffered some losses, and we had a few casualties from canister sent at them at rather long range.

From the position of our guns the sight of this conflict was grand and thrilling, and we watched it as men with a life-and-death interest in the result. If it should be favorable to us, the war was nearly over; if against us, we each had the risks of many battles yet to go through. And the event culminated with fearful rapidity. Listening to the rolling crashes of musketry, it was hard to realize that they were made up of single reports, and that each musket-shot represented nearly a minute of a man's life in that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if 100,000 men were engaged, and that human life was being poured out like water. As soon as it appeared that the assault had failed, we ceased firing in order to save ammunition in case the enemy should advance. But we held our ground as boldly as possible, though we were entirely without support, and very low in ammunition. The enemy gave us an occasional shot for a while and then, to our great relief, let us rest. About that time General Lee, entirely alone, rode up and remained with me for a long time. He then probably first appreciated the full extent of the disaster as the disorganized stragglers made their way back past us. The Comte de Paris, in his excellent account of this battle, remarks that Lee, as a soldier, must at this moment have foreseen Appomattox—that he must have realized that he could never again muster so powerful an army, and that for the future he could only delay, but not avert, the failure of his cause. However this may be, it was certainly a momentous thing to him to see that superb attack end in such a bloody repulse. But, whatever his emotions, there was no trace of them in his calm and self-possessed bearing. I thought at the time his coming there very imprudent, and the absence of all his staff-officers and couriers strange. It could only have happened by his express intention. I have since thought it possible that he came, thinking the enemy might follow in pursuit of Pickett, personally to rally stragglers about our guns and make a desperate defense. He had the instincts of a soldier within him as strongly as any man. Looking at Burnside's dense columns swarming through the fire of our guns toward Marye's Hill at Fredericksburg, he had said: "It is well war is so terrible or we would grow too fond of it." No soldier could have looked on at Pickett's charge and not burned to be in it. To have a personal part in a close and desperate fight at that moment would, I believe, have been at heart a great pleasure to General Lee, and possibly he was looking for one. We were here joined by Colonel Fremantle of Her Majesty's Coldstream Guards, who was visiting our army. He afterward published an excellent account of the battle in "*Blackwood*," and described



many little incidents that took place here, such as General Lee's encouraging the retreating stragglers to rally as soon as they got back to cover, and saying that the failure was his fault, not theirs. Colonel Fremantle especially noticed that General Lee reproved an officer for spurring a foolish horse, and advised him to use only gentle measures. The officer was Lieutenant F. M. Colston of my staff, whom General Lee had requested to ride off to the right and try to discover the cause of a great cheering we heard in the enemy's lines. We thought it might mean an advance upon us, but it proved to be only a greeting to some general officer riding along the line.

That was the end of the battle. Little by little we got some guns to the rear to replenish and refit, and get in condition to fight again, and some we held boldly in advanced positions all along the line. Sharp-shooters came out and worried some of the men, and single guns would fire on these, sometimes very rapidly, and manage to keep them back; some parts of the line had not even a picket in front. But the enemy's artillery generally let us alone, and I certainly saw no reason to disturb the *entente cordiale*. Night came very slowly, but came at last; and about 10 the last gun was withdrawn to Willoughby Run, whence we had moved to the attack the afternoon before.

Of Pickett's three brigadiers, Garnett and Armistead were killed and Kemper dangerously wounded. Fry, who commanded Pettigrew's brigade, which adjoined Garnett on the left, and in the charge was the brigade of direction for the whole force, was also left on the field desperately wounded. Of all Pickett's field-officers in the three brigades only one major came out unhurt. The men who made the attack were good enough: the only trouble was, there were not enough of them.

Next day, July 4th, we took a pretty fair position, except that it had no right flank, and awaited the enemy, who we thought would be inspired by the day to attack us. Meanwhile the wounded and the trains were started back to the Potomac, and at night, in a pouring rain and over roads that were almost gulfs of mud, the army followed. Providence had evidently not yet taken a "proper view of the situation." We had not finished the war, but had to go back to Virginia and start afresh. Yet the *morale* of the army seemed not at all affected. The defeat was attributed entirely to the position, and, if anything, it rather gave to the men confidence in what position could do for them if they had it on their side. Had Meade attacked us at Downsville, where we were stopped for several days by high water in the Potomac, I believe we should have repulsed him easily, barring exhaustion of ammunition.

The retreat was a terrible march for the artillery, crippled as we were by the loss of so many horses in battle, and the giving out of many more on the stony roads for the lack of horseshoes. We were compelled to trespass on the reluctant hospitality of the neighboring farmers, and send squads in every direction to get horses. Wherever found they were to be bought, whether the owner desired to sell or not. Of course our only money was Confederate bills, but we explained to the farmers that these would be as good as greenbacks if only they would make their own Government stop



fighting us. Such transactions we called "pressing" for short; and, by the way, we often practiced it both at home and abroad, but our own people took it more complacently than did the "Dutch" farmers of Pennsylvania.

Near Hagerstown I had an experience with an old Dunkard which gave me a high and lasting respect for the people of that faith. My scouts had had a horse transaction with this old gentleman, and he came to see me about it. He made no complaint, but said it was his only horse, and as the scouts had told him we had some hoof-sore horses we should have to leave behind, he came to ask if I would trade him one of those for his horse, as without one his crop would be lost.

I recognized the old man at once as a born gentleman in his delicate characterization of the transaction as a trade. I was anxious to make the trade as square as circumstances would permit. So I assented to his taking a foot-sore horse, and offered him besides payment in Confederate money. This he respectfully but firmly declined. Considering how the recent battle had gone, I waived argument on the point of its value, but tried another suggestion. I told him that we were in Maryland as the guests of the United States; that after our departure the Government would pay all bills that we left behind, and that I would give him an order on the United States for the value of his horse and have it approved by General Longstreet. To my surprise he declined this also. I supposed then that he was simply ignorant of the bonanza in a claim against the Government, and I explained that; and, telling him that money was no object to us under the circumstances, I offered to include the value of his whole farm. He again said he wanted nothing but the foot-sore horse. Still anxious that the war should not grind this poor old fellow in his poverty, I suggested that he take two or three foot-sore horses which we would have to leave anyhow, when we marched. Then he said, "Well, sir, I am a Dunkard, and the rule of our church is an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, and a horse for a horse, and I can't break the rule."

I replied that the Lord, who made all horses, knew that a good horse was worth a dozen old battery scrubs; and after some time prevailed on him to take two, by calling one of them a gift. But that night, about midnight, we were awakened by approaching hoofs and turned out expecting to receive some order. It was my old Dunkard leading one of his foot-sores. "Well, sir," he said, "you made it look all right to me to-day when you were talking; but after I went to bed to-night I got to thinking it all over, and I don't think I can explain it to the church, and I would rather not try." With that he tied old foot-sore to a fence, and rode off abruptly. Even at this late day it is a relief to my conscience to tender to his sect this recognition of their integrity and honesty, in lieu of the extra horse which I vainly endeavored to throw into the trade. Their virtues should commend them to all financial institutions in search of incorruptible employees.





HAND-TO-HAND FOR RICKETT'S GUNS ON  
THE EVENING OF THE SECOND DAY.  
SEE P. 313.

## THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG.†

BY HENRY J. HUNT, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A., CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, A. P.

**I**N view of the successes gained on the second day, General Lee resolved to renew his efforts. These successes were:

1st. *On the right*, the lodgment at the bases of the Round Tops, the possession of Devil's Den and its woods, and the ridges on the Emmitsburg road, which gave him the coveted positions for his artillery.

2d. *On the left*, the occupation of part of the intrenchments of the Twelfth Corps, with an outlet to the Baltimore pike, by which all our lines could be taken in reverse.

3d. *At the center*, the partial success of three of Anderson's brigades in penetrating our lines, from which they were expelled only because they lacked proper support. It was thought that better concert of action might have made good a lodgment here also.

Both armies had indeed lost heavily, but the account in that respect seemed in favor of the Confederates, or at worst balanced. Pickett's and Edward Johnson's divisions were fresh, as were Posey's and Mahone's brigades of R. H. Anderson's, and William Smith's brigade of Early's division. These could be depended upon for an assault; the others could be used as supports, and to follow up a success. The artillery was almost intact. Stuart had arrived with his cavalry, excepting the brigades of Jones and Robertson, guarding the communications; and Imboden had also come up. General Lee, therefore, directed the renewal of operations both on the right and left. Ewell had been ordered to attack at daylight on July 3d, and during the night reënforced Johnson with Smith's, Daniel's, and O'Neal's brigades. Johnson had made his preparations, and was about moving, when at dawn Williams's artillery opened upon him, preparatory to an assault by Geary and Ruger for the recovery of their works. The suspension of this fire was followed by an immediate advance by both sides. A conflict ensued which lasted with varying success until near 11 o'clock, during which the Confederates were driven

† Continued from p. 313.—EDITORS.



out of the Union intrenchments by Geary and Ruger, aided by Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps. They made one or two attempts to regain possession, but were unsuccessful, and a demonstration to turn Johnson's left caused him to withdraw his command to Rock Creek. At the close of the war the scene of this conflict was covered by a forest of dead trees, leaden bullets proving as fatal to them as to the soldiers whose bodies were thickly strewn beneath them.

Longstreet's arrangements had been made to attack Round Top, and his orders issued with a view to turning it, when General Lee decided that the assault should be made on Cemetery Ridge by Pickett's and Pettigrew's divisions, with part of Trimble's. Longstreet formed these in two lines—Pickett on the right, supported by Wilcox; Pettigrew on the left, with Lane's and Scales's brigades under Trimble in the second line. Hill was ordered to hold his line with the remainder of his corps,—six brigades,—give Longstreet assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained. Finally a powerful artillery force, about one hundred and fifty guns, was ordered to prepare the way for the assault by cannonade. The necessary arrangements caused delay, and before notice of this could be received by Ewell, Johnson, as we have seen, was attacked, so that the contest was over on the left before that at the center was begun. The hoped-for concert of action in the Confederate attacks was lost from the beginning.

On the Federal side Hancock's corps held Cemetery Ridge with Robinson's division, First Corps, on Hays's right in support, and Doubleday's at the



STUART'S BRIGADE RENEWING THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK ON CULP'S HILL, MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY.





THE 29TH PENNSYLVANIA FORMING LINE OF BATTLE ON CULP'S HILL AT 10 A. M., JULY 3.

angle between Gibbon and Caldwell. General Newton, having been assigned to the command of the First Corps, *vice* Reynolds, was now in charge of the ridge held by Caldwell. Compactly arranged on its crest was McGilvery's artillery, forty-one guns, consisting of his own batteries, reënforced by others from the Artillery Reserve. Well to the right, in front of Hays and Gibbon, was the artillery of the Second Corps under its chief, Captain Hazard. Woodruff's battery was in front of Ziegler's Grove; on his left, in succession, Arnold's Rhode Island, Cushing's United States, Brown's Rhode Island, and Rorty's New York. In the fight of the preceding day the two last-named batteries had been to the front and suffered severely. Lieutenant T. Fred Brown was severely wounded, and his command devolved on Lieutenant Perrin. So great had been the loss in men and horses that they were now of four guns each, reducing the total number in the corps to twenty-six. Daniels's battery of horse artillery, four guns, was at the angle. Cowan's 1st New York battery, six rifles, was placed on the left of Rorty's soon after the cannonade commenced. In addition, some of the guns on Cemetery Hill, and Rittenhouse's on Little Round Top, could be brought to bear, but these were offset by batteries similarly placed on the flanks of the enemy, so that on the Second Corps line, within the space of a mile, were 77 guns to oppose nearly 150. They were on an open crest plainly visible from all parts of the opposite line. Between 10 and 11 A. M., everything looking favorable at Culp's Hill, I crossed over to Cemetery Ridge, to see what might be going on at other points. Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for



two miles was covered by batteries already in line or going into position. They stretched — apparently in one unbroken mass — from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were planted thick with cannon. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, if ever, abroad. What did it mean? It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our




BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE S. GREENE.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

batteries and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire. With such an object the cannonade would be long and followed immediately by the assault, their whole army being held in readiness to follow up a success. From the great extent of ground occupied by the enemy's batteries, it was evident that all the artillery on our west front, whether of the army corps or the reserve, must concur as a *unit*, under the chief of artillery, in the defense. This is provided for in all well-organized armies by special

rules, which formerly were contained in our own army regulations, but they had been condensed in successive editions into a few short lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because, like the rudimentary toe of the dog's paw, they had become, from lack of use, mere survivals — unintelligible except to the specialist. It was of the first importance to subject the enemy's infantry, from the first moment of their advance, to such a cross-fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in such condition as to make them an easy prey. There was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to General Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold their fire for fifteen or twenty minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive to us — but slowly, so that when the enemy's ammunition was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the assault. I had just given these orders to the last battery on Little Round Top, when the signal-gun was fired, and the enemy opened with all his guns. From that point the scene was indescribably grand. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accom-





GETTYSBURG FROM CULP'S HILL. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN ABOUT 1886.

paniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the cannonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train had gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them; then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Taneytown pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had "decamped," in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out. In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position occupied by General Newton behind McGilvery's batteries, from which we had a fine view as all our own guns were now in action.

Most of the enemy's projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates—a mere waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek shelter. And just here an incident already published may be repeated, as it illustrates a peculiar feature of civil war. Colonel Long, who was at the time on General Lee's staff, had a few years before served in my mounted battery expressly to receive a course of instruction in the use of field-artillery. At Appomattox we spent several hours together, and in the course of conversation I told him I was not satisfied with the conduct of this cannonade which I had heard was under his direction, inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction; that his fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was scattered over






MONUMENT OF THE 2D MASSACHUSETTS INFANTRY, FACING THE EAST BASE OF CULP'S HILL.

ing him "over and over." He fell behind the rear rank, apparently dead, and a ridge of earth where he had been lying reminded me of the backwoods practice of "barking" squirrels. Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to General Meade to advise its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault which would certainly follow. The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead. Being told that the general had gone to the cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not there, and on telling General Howard my object, he concurred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault. On my way to the Taneytown road to meet the fresh batteries which I had ordered up, I met Major Bingham, of Hancock's staff, who informed me that General Meade's aides were seeking me with orders to "cease firing"; so I had only anticipated his wishes. The batteries were found and brought up, and Fitzhugh's, Weir's, and Parsons's were put in near the clump of trees. Brown's and Arnold's batteries had been so crippled that they were now withdrawn, and Brown's was replaced by Cowan's. Meantime the enemy advanced, and McGilvery opened a destructive oblique fire, reënforced by that of Rittenhouse's six rifle-guns from Round Top, which were served with remarkable accuracy, enflading Pickett's lines. The Confederate approach was magnificent, and excited our admiration; but the story of that charge is so well

the whole field. He was amused at the criticism and said: "I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered, wondered what you would think about it!"

I now rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the crest, in open ranks, waiting events. As I passed along, a bolt from a rifle-gun struck the ground just in front of a man of the front rank, penetrated the surface and passed under him, throw-




SLOCUM'S HEADQUARTERS, POWER'S HILL.



known that I need not dwell upon it further than as it concerns my own command. The steady fire from McGilvery and Rittenhouse, on their right, caused Pickett's men to "drift" in the opposite direction, so that the weight of the assault fell upon the positions occupied by Hazard's batteries. I had counted on an artillery cross-fire that would stop it before it reached our lines, but, except a few shots here and there, Hazard's batteries were silent

until the enemy came within canister range. They had unfortunately exhausted their long range projectiles during the cannonade, under the orders of their corps commander, and it was too late to replace them. Had my



MENCHEY'S SPRING, BETWEEN CULP'S HILL AND THE CEMETERY GATE.

instructions been followed here, as they were by McGilvery, I do not believe that Pickett's division would have reached our line. We lost not only the fire of one-third of our guns, but the resulting cross-fire, which would have doubled its value. The prime fault was in the obscurity of our army regulations as to the artillery, and the absence of all regulations as to the proper relations of the different arms of service to one another.

On this occasion it cost us much blood, many lives, and for a moment endangered the integrity of our line if not the success of the battle. Soon after Pickett's repulse, Wilcox's, Wright's, and Perry's brigades were moved forward, but under the fire of the fresh batteries in Gibbon's front, of McGilvery's and Rittenhouse's guns and the advance of two regiments of Stannard's Vermont brigade, they soon fell back. The losses in the batteries of the Second Corps were very heavy. Of the five battery commanders and their successors on the field, Rorty, Cushing, and Woodruff were killed, and Milne was mortally and Sheldon severely wounded at their guns. So great was the destruction of men and horses, that Cushing's and Woodruff's United States, and Brown's and Arnold's Rhode Island batteries were consolidated to form two serviceable ones.

The advance of the Confederate brigades to cover Pickett's retreat showed that the enemy's line opposite Cemetery Ridge was occupied by infantry.



SPANGLER'S SPRING, EAST OF CULP'S HILL.



Our own line on the ridge was in more or less disorder, as the result of the conflict, and in no condition to advance a sufficient force for a counter-assault. The largest bodies of organized troops available were on the left, and General Meade now proceeded to Round Top and pushed out skirmishers to feel the enemy in its front. An advance to the Plum Run line, of the troops behind it, would have brought them directly in front of the numerous batteries which crowned the Emmitsburg Ridge, commanding that line and all the intervening ground; a farther advance, to the attack, would have brought them under additional heavy flank fires. McCandless's brigade,



COLONEL ELIAKIM SHERRILL, COMMANDING  
THE THIRD BRIGADE OF HAYS'S DIVISION,  
SECOND CORPS. KILLED JULY 3, 1863.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

supported by Nevin's, was, however, pushed forward, under cover of the woods, which protected them from the fire of all these batteries; it crossed the Wheat-field, cleared the woods, and had an encounter with a portion of Benning's brigade, which was retiring. Hood's and McLaws's divisions were falling back under Longstreet's orders to their strong position, resting on Peach Orchard and covering Hill's line. It needs but a moment's examination of the official map to see that our troops on the left were locked up. As to the center, Pickett's and Pettigrew's assaulting divisions had formed no part of A. P. Hill's line, which was virtually intact. The idea that there must have been "a gap of at least a mile" in that line, made by throwing forward these divisions, and that a prompt advance

from Cemetery Ridge would have given us the line, or the artillery in front of it, was a delusion. A prompt counter-charge after a combat between two small bodies of men is one thing; the change from the defensive to the offensive of an army, after an engagement at a single *point*, is quite another. *This* was not a "Waterloo defeat" with a fresh army to follow it up, and to have made such a change to the offensive, on the assumption that Lee had made no provision against a reverse, would have been rash in the extreme. An advance of 20,000 men from Cemetery Ridge in the face of the 140 guns then in position would have been stark madness; an immediate advance from any point, in force, was simply impracticable, and before due preparation could have been made for a change to the offensive, the favorable moment — had any resulted from the repulse — would have passed away.

Whilst the main battle was raging, sharp cavalry combats took place on both flanks of the army. On the left the principal incident was an attack made by order of General Kilpatrick on infantry and artillery in woods and behind stone fences, which resulted in considerable losses, and especially in the death of General Farnsworth, a gallant and promising officer who had but a few days before been appointed brigadier-general and had not yet received his commission. On the right an affair of some magnitude took






PICKETT'S CHARGE, I.—LOOKING DOWN THE UNION LINES FROM THE "CLUMP OF TREES."

General Hancock and staff are seen in the left center of the picture.—This and the two pictures that follow are from the Cyclorama of Gettysburg, by permission of the National Panorama Company.

place between Stuart's command of four and Gregg's of three brigades; but Jenkins's Confederate brigade was soon thrown out of action from lack of ammunition, and two only of Gregg's were engaged. Stuart had been ordered to cover Ewell's left and was proceeding toward the Baltimore pike, where he hoped to create a diversion in aid of the Confederate infantry, and in case of Pickett's success to fall upon the retreating Federal troops. From near Cress's Ridge, two and a half miles east of Gettysburg, Stuart commanded a view of the roads in rear of the Federal lines. On its northern wooded end he posted Jackson's battery, and took possession of the Rummel






PICKETT'S CHARGE, II.—THE MAIN COLLISION TO THE RIGHT OF THE "CLUMP OF TREES."  
FROM THE CYCLORAMA OF GETTYSBURG.

In this hand-to-hand conflict General Armistead, of Pickett's Division, was killed, and General Webb, of Gibbon's Division, was wounded.

farm-buildings, a few hundred yards distant. Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were on his left, covered by the wood, Jenkins and Chambliss on the right, along the ridge. Half a mile east on a low parallel ridge, the southern part of which bending west toward Cress's Ridge furnished excellent positions for artillery, was the Federal cavalry brigade of McIntosh, who now sent a force toward Rummel's, from which a strong body of skirmishers was thrown to meet them, and the battery opened. McIntosh now demanded reinforcements, and Gregg, then near the Baltimore pike, brought him Custer's brigade and Pennington's and Randol's batteries. The artillery soon drove the Confederates out of Rummel's, and compelled Jackson's Virginia battery to leave the ridge. Both sides brought up reinforcements and the battle swayed from side to side of the interval. Finally the Federals were pressed back, and Lee and Hampton, emerging from the wood, charged, sword in hand, facing a destructive artillery fire—for the falling back of the cavalry had uncovered our batteries. The assailants were met by Custer's and such other mounted squadrons as could be thrown in; a *mêlée* ensued, in which Hampton was severely wounded and the charge repulsed. Breathed's and McGregor's Confederate batteries had replaced Jackson's, a sharp artillery duel took place, and at nightfall each side held substantially its original ground. Both sides claim to have held the Rummel house. The advantage was decidedly with the Federals, who had foiled Stuart's plans.






PICKETT'S CHARGE, III.—(CONTINUATION OF THE PICTURE ON P. 378.)  
FROM THE GETTYSBURG CYCLOPAMA.

Thus the battle of Gettysburg closed as it had opened, with a very creditable cavalry battle.

General Lee now abandoned the attempt to dislodge Meade, intrenched a line from Oak Hill to Peach Orchard, started all his *impedimenta* to the Potomac in advance, and followed with his army on the night of July 4th, via Fairfield. This compelled Meade to take the circuitous routes through the lower passes; and the strategic advantage to Lee and disadvantage to Meade of Gettysburg were made manifest.

General Meade has been accused of slowness in the pursuit. The charge is not well founded; he lost no time in commencing, or vigor in pushing, it. As early as the morning of the 4th he ordered French at Frederick to seize and hold the lower passes, and he put all the cavalry except Gregg's and McIntosh's brigades in motion to harass the enemy's anticipated retreat, and to destroy his trains and bridges at Williamsport. It stormed heavily that day, and the care of the wounded and burial of the dead proceeded whilst the enemy's line was being reconnoitered. As soon, on the 5th, as it was certain that Lee was retreating, Gregg was started in pursuit on the Chambersburg pike, and the infantry—now reduced to a little over 47,000 effectives, short of ammunition and supplies—by the lower passes. The Sixth Corps taking the Hagerstown road, Sedgwick reported the Fairfield pass fortified, a large force present, and that a fight could be had; upon which, on the 6th, Meade halted the rest of the infantry and ordered two corps to his support, but soon learning that although the pass could be carried it would cause too much delay, he resumed the march, leaving McIntosh and a brigade of the Sixth






INSIDE EVERGREEN CEMETERY, CEMETERY HILL. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.


Corps to follow the enemy through the Fairfield pass. On the evening of the 4th — both armies being still in position at Gettysburg — Kilpatrick had a sharp encounter with the enemy in Monterey pass, and this was followed by daily cavalry combats on the different routes, in which much damage was done to trains and many captures of wagons, caissons, and prisoners effected. On the 5th, whilst Lee was moving through the passes, French destroyed the pontoon-bridge at Falling Waters. On the 6th — as Meade was leaving Gettysburg — Buford attacked at Williamsport and Kilpatrick toward Hagerstown, on his right, but as Imboden's train guard was strong, Stuart was up, and Longstreet close by, they had to withdraw. [See p. 427.] The enemy proceeded to construct a new bridge and intrench a strong line covering Williamsport and Falling Waters. There were heavy rains on the 7th and 8th, but the infantry corps reached Middletown on the morning of the 9th, received supplies, crossed the mountains that day, and at its close the right was at Boonsboro', and the left at Rohrerstown, on the roads to Hagerstown and Williamsport. By this time the Potomac was swollen and impassable. On the 10th Meade continued his advance, and received information that the enemy had occupied a line extending from near Falling Waters, through Downsville to Funkstown, which he was intrenching. This at 1 P. M. he reported to Halleck, informing him at the same time that his cavalry had driven that of Lee to within a mile of Funkstown, and that he would next day move cautiously until he had developed the enemy's force and position. Halleck, at 9 P. M., sent him a cipher dispatch as follows:

"I think it will be best for you to postpone a general battle till you can concentrate all your forces and get up your reserves and reinforcements; I will push on the troops as fast as they arrive. It would be well to have staff-officers at the Monocacy, to direct the troops arriving where to go, and to see that they are properly fitted out. They should join you by forced marches. Beware of partial combats. Bring up and hurl upon the enemy all your forces, good and bad."









Meade, fully alive to the importance of striking Lee before he could cross the Potomac, disregarded this, advanced on the 11th, and on the 12th pushed forward reconnoissances to feel the enemy. After a partial examination made by himself and his chiefs of staff and of engineers, which showed that its flanks could not be turned, and that the line, so far as seen by them, presented no vulnerable points, he determined to make a demonstration in force on the next morning, the 13th, supported by the whole army, and

to attack if a prospect of success offered. On assembling his corps commanders, however, he found their opinion so adverse that he postponed it for further examination, after which he issued the order for the next day, the 14th. On advancing that morning, it was found that the enemy had abandoned his line and crossed the river, partly by fording, partly by a new bridge.

A careful survey of the enemy's intrenched line after it was abandoned justified the opinion of the corps commanders against an attack, as it showed that an assault would have been disastrous to us. It proved also that Meade in overriding that opinion did not shrink from a great responsibility, notwithstanding his own recent experience at Gettysburg, where all the enemy's attacks on even partially intrenched lines had failed. If he erred on this occasion it was on the side of temerity.

But the hopes and expectations excited by the victory of Gettysburg were as unreasonable as the fears that had preceded it; and great was the disap-


**REFERENCES.**

Confederate.	Infantry.	Union.

Longstreet's C'ps... L.  
Ewell's Corps... E.  
A. P. Hill's C'ps... H.  
Stuart's Cavalry... S.

1st Corps... 1  
2d Corps... 2  
3d Corps... 3  
5th Corps... 5  
6th Corps... 6  
11th Corps... 11  
12th Corps... 12  
Cavalry... 13

SCALE OF MILES  
1 2 3





pointment that followed the "escape" of Lee's army. It was promptly manifested, too, and in a manner which indicates how harshly and unjustly the Army of the Potomac and its commanders were usually judged and treated; and what trials the latter had to undergo whilst subjected to the meddling and hectoring of a distant superior, from which they were not freed until the general-in-chief accompanied them in the field. On the day following Lee's withdrawal, before it was possible that all the circumstances could be known, three dispatches passed between the respective headquarters.

*First.* Halleck to Meade July 14th (in part):

"I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active and energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore."

*Second.* Meade to Halleck July 14th:

"Having performed my duty conscientiously and to the best of my ability, the censure of the President conveyed in your dispatch of 1 P. M. this day, is, in my judgment, so undeserved that I feel compelled most respectfully to ask to be immediately relieved from the command of this army."

*Third.* Halleck to Meade July 14th:

"My telegram stating the disappointment of the President at the escape of Lee's army was not intended as a censure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit. It is not deemed a sufficient cause for your application to be relieved." ☆

Whatever the object of these dispatches of General Halleck, they are perfectly consistent with a determination on the part of the War Department to

☆ At the end of July the following letters passed between Halleck and Meade:

"[UNOFFICIAL.] HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, July 28th, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, WARRENTON, VA. GENERAL: I take this method of writing you a few words which I could not well communicate in any other way. Your fight at Gettysburg met with universal approbation of all military men here. You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better, than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before. You may well be proud of that battle. The President's order or proclamation of July 4th showed how much he appreciated your success. And now a few words in regard to subsequent events. You should not have been surprised or vexed at the President's disappointment at the escape of Lee's army. He had examined into all the details of sending you reinforcements to satisfy himself that every man who could possibly be spared from other places had been sent to your army. He thought that Lee's defeat was so certain that he felt no little impatience at his unexpected escape. I have no doubt, General, that you felt the disappointment as keenly as any one else. Such things sometimes occur to us without any fault of our own. Take it all together, your short campaign has proved your superior generalship, and you merit, as you will receive, the confidence of the Government and the gratitude of the country. I need not assure you, General, that I have lost none of the confidence which I felt in you when I recommended you for the command. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK."

"[UNOFFICIAL.] HEADQUARTERS, A. P., July 31, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, General-in-Chief. MY DEAR

GENERAL: I thank you most sincerely and heartily for your kind and generous letter of the 28th inst., received last evening. It would be wrong in me to deny that I feared there existed in the minds both of the President and yourself an idea that I had failed to do what another would and could have done in the withdrawal of Lee's army. The expression you have been pleased to use in a letter, *to wit*, a feeling of disappointment, is one that I cheerfully accept and readily admit was as keenly felt by myself as any one. But permit me, dear General, to call your attention to the distinction between disappointment and dissatisfaction. The one was a natural feeling in view of the momentous consequences that would have resulted from a *successful* attack, but does not necessarily convey with it any censure. I could not view the use of the latter expression in any other light than as intending to convey an expression of opinion on the part of the President, that I had failed to do what I might and should have done. Now let me say in the frankness which characterizes your letter, that perhaps the President was right. If such was the case, it was my duty to give him an opportunity to replace me by one better fitted for the command of the army. It was, I assure you, with such feelings that I applied to be relieved. It was not from any personal considerations, for I have tried in this whole war to forget all personal considerations, and I have always maintained they should not for an instant influence any one's action. Of course you will understand that I do not agree that the President was right—and I feel sure when the true state of the case comes to be known, however natural and great may be the feeling of disappointment, that no blame will be attached to any one. Had I attacked Lee the day I proposed to do so, and in the ignorance that then existed of his position, I have every reason to believe the attack would have been unsuccessful and would have resulted disastrously. This opinion is founded on the judgment of numerous





CONFEDERATE PRISONERS ON THE BALTIMORE PIKE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

discredit under all circumstances the Army of the Potomac and any commander identified with it,—and that was the effect in this case.

The losses of both armies were very large. The revised returns show for the Army of the Potomac: killed, 3072; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5434,—total, 23,003; and for the Army of Northern Virginia: killed, 2592; wounded, 12,709; missing, 5150,—total, 20,451. But the returns for the latter army are not complete; some commands are not reported, and in others the regimental show larger losses than do the brigade returns from which the foregoing numbers are compiled.

As to the comparative strength of the two armies on the field of battle, we have no satisfactory data. The last Confederate return was for May 31st, showing "Present for duty, under arms," 59,484, infantry. The morning report of the Army of the Potomac for June 30th shows "Present for duty, equipped," 77,208, infantry. Neither return is worth much except as a basis

distinguished officers, after inspecting Lee's vacated works and position. Among these officers I could name Generals Sedgwick, Wright, Slocum, Hays, Sykes, and others.

"The idea that Lee had abandoned his lines early in the day that he withdrew, I have positive intelligence is not correct, and that not a man was withdrawn until after dark. I mention these facts to remove the impression which newspaper correspondents have given the public: that it was only necessary to advance to secure an easy victory. I had great responsibility thrown on me: on one side were the known and important fruits of victory, and on the other, the equally important and terrible consequences of a defeat. I considered my position at Williamsport very different from that at Gettysburg. When I left Frederick it was with the firm determination to attack and fight Lee without regard to time or place as soon as I could come in contact with him. But, after defeating him and requiring him to abandon his schemes of invasion, I did

not think myself justified in making a blind attack, simply to prevent his escape, and running all the risks attending such a venture. Now, as I said before, in this perhaps I erred in judgment, for I take this occasion to say to you, and through you to the President—that I have no pretensions to any superior capacity for the post he has assigned me to—that all I can do is to exert my utmost efforts and do the best I can; but that the moment those who have a right to judge my actions think or feel satisfied either that I am wanting, or that another would do better, that moment I earnestly desire to be relieved, not on my own account, but on account of the country and the cause. You must excuse so much egotism, but your kind letter in a measure renders it necessary. I feel, General, very proud of your good opinion, and assure you I shall endeavor in the future to continue to merit it. Reciprocating the kind feeling you have expressed, I remain, General, most truly and respectfully yours, GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General."

EDITORS.



for guessing; the long marches, followed by the forced ones of July 1-2, of the Army of the Potomac left thousands of stragglers on the roads. These totals are of little importance; they would have been of some significance had the larger army been defeated; but it was not. At the "points of contact" the Confederates were almost always the stronger. On July 1st 18,000 Federal combatants contended against at least 25,000 Confederates, and got the worst of it. On July 2d Longstreet's 15,000 overcame Sickles's 10,000, and had to halt when a larger force was opposed to them. Williams's Twelfth Corps retook its works from a larger body of Ewell's troops, for at the contested point they were opposed by an inferior number; and then held them, for Johnson's superior force was as much hampered here by the nature of the ground as was Meade's on the left, the evening before. In many respects the Confederates had the advantage: they had much better ground for their artillery; they were fresher; they were all veterans; they were better organized; they were commanded by officers who had been selected for their experience and abilities, and in whom they had implicit confidence. These were enormous advantages, sufficient to counterbalance the difference of numbers, which, if any existed, was small; and whilst all the Confederate army, except here and there a brigade, were fought to the utmost, the strongest Federal corps (the Sixth) was hardly in action, the total loss of its eight brigades being but two hundred and forty-two killed, wounded, and missing. But the Southerners were subjected here to the disadvantages that the Northerners had to contend with in Virginia: they were surrounded by enemies, not friends who supplied them with aid and information; and they were not by choice, but by necessity, the assailants on the chosen ground of their opponents.

Right gallantly did they act their part, and their failure carried no discredit with it. Their military honor was not tarnished by their defeat, nor their spirit lowered, but their respect for their opponents was restored to what it had been before Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

#### GENERAL HANCOCK AND THE ARTILLERY AT GETTYSBURG.

I. BY FRANCIS A. WALKER, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

GENERAL HUNT, in his article on "The Third Day at Gettysburg" [see p. 375], criticises General Hancock's conduct of his artillery, on the ground that his directing the Second Corps batteries to continue firing throughout the Confederate cannonade was both an encroachment upon his own (General Hunt's) proper authority, as chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, and an act of bad policy. On the latter point he says:

"Had my instructions been followed here, as they were by McGilvery, I do not believe that Pickett's division would have reached our line. We lost not only the fire of one-third of our guns, but the resulting cross-fire, which would have doubled its value."

This, it will be seen, constitutes a very severe impeachment. I have had much correspondence and conversation with General Hancock on the subject; and, as the heroic leader of the Second

Corps can no longer reply for himself, I beg leave to speak on his behalf.

In the first place, two antagonistic theories of authority are advanced. General Hancock claimed that he commanded *the line of battle* along Cemetery Ridge. General Hunt, in substance, alleges that General Hancock commanded the infantry of that line, and that he himself commanded the artillery. Winfield S. Hancock did not read his commission as constituting him a major-general of infantry, nor did he believe that a line of battle was to be ordered by military specialists. He knew that by both law and reason the defense of Cemetery Ridge was intrusted to him, subject to the actual, authentic orders of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, but not subject to the discretion of one of General Meade's staff-officers. General Meade could, under the President's order, have



placed a junior at the head of the Second Corps, but whomsoever he did place over the corps became thereby invested with the whole undiminished substance, and with all the proper and ordinary incidents of command.

So much for the question of authority. On the question of policy there is only to be said that a difference of opinion appears between two highly meritorious officers—one, the best artillerist of the army, the other, one of the best, if not the best, commander of troops in the army—as to what was most expedient in a given emergency. Unquestionably it would have been a strong point for us if, other things being equal, the limber chests of the artillery had been full when Pickett's and Pettigrew's divisions began their great charge. But would other things have been equal? Would the advantage so obtained have compensated for the loss of *morale* in the infantry which might have resulted from allowing them to be scourged, at will, by the hostile artillery? Every soldier knows how trying and often how demoralizing it is to endure artillery fire without reply.

Now, on the question thus raised, who was the better judge, General Hunt or General Hancock? Had Henry J. Hunt taken command of a brigade

of infantry in 1861, had he for nearly two years lived with the infantry, marching with them, camping among them, commanding them in numerous actions, keeping close watch of their temper and spirit, observing their behavior under varying conditions and trials, I believe that by the 3d of July, 1863, he would have become one of the most capable and judicious corps commanders of the army. But in so doing he would necessarily have forfeited nearly all of that special experience which combined with his high intelligence and great spirit to make him one of the best artillerists whom the history of war has known. Certainly a service almost wholly in the artillery could not yield that intimate knowledge of the temper of troops which should qualify him, equally with Hancock, to judge what was required to keep them in heart and courage under the Confederate cannonade at Gettysburg, and to bring them up to the final struggle, prepared in spirit to meet the fearful ordeal of Longstreet's charge. Hancock had full authority over that line of battle; he used that authority according to his own best judgment, and he beat off the enemy. That is the substance of it.

BOSTON, January 12th, 1887.

#### II. REJOINDER BY HENRY J. HUNT, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

GENERAL F. A. WALKER, of General Hancock's staff, comments on my expressed belief that, had my instructions for the cannonade of July 3d been carried out by Captain Hazard, commander of the artillery of the Second Corps, the Confederate assault would not have reached our lines, and considers this "a very severe impeachment" of General Hancock's conduct of his artillery. I fully appreciate and honor the motive of General Walker's courteous criticism, and his very kind references to myself, but he writes under misapprehensions which are widespread and misleading, and which, as they place me in a false position, I beg leave to explain.

General Hancock's claim that he commanded all the troops of every description posted on his part of Cemetery Ridge is perfectly valid. It cannot be disputed, and I never questioned it; but all commands must be exercised subject to the established principles for the government of armies. Under these, commanders of special arms issue their own orders direct to their subordinates serving with army corps, who must submit them to the corps commanders with whom they serve. The latter, being supreme on their own lines, can modify or countermand these orders, but by doing so they make themselves responsible for the result. Thus all conflicts or theories as to authority are avoided. Our "Regulations" (Scott's), adopted in 1821, read:

"The superior officer of the corps of engineers, or of the artillery, serving with one of the army corps . . . will receive the orders of the commandant thereof, to whom the said superior officer of engineers or of artillery will communicate any orders he may receive from his own particular commandant-in-chief, attached to general headquarters."

Separate paragraphs provided rules for the military "staff" and administration,—the latter including the supply departments. "Staff-officers" are forbidden to give orders except in the names of their generals. From this rule administrative officers are specially exempted, their chiefs directing their respective departments in their own names, but subject to the control of the generals under whom they serve.

All these regulations are essential to the management of a large army, but are only partly applicable to a two-company post, the school in which most of our officers, both of the war office and of the regiments, were trained. So in the "Regulations" of 1861-3, they were all condensed into one short paragraph:

"Staff-officers and commanders of artillery, engineers, and ordnance, report to their immediate commanders the state of the supplies and whatever concerns the service under their direction, and receive their orders, and communicate to them the orders they receive from their superiors in their own corps."

Closely examined, this is correct, but it is obscure and misleading. It lumps together officers of the staff and of administration as "staff-officers," and so connects them with those of the special arms as seemingly to confirm the erroneous idea that engineer officers are staff-officers, and of course that artillery officers must be the same. It is an odd notion, which could not find a lodgment in any other army than our own, that an artillery commandant-in-chief, himself a "corps commander," and provided with a staff of his own, is "one of the staff-officers" who runs about a battle-field carrying "the actual and authentic orders" of the general-in-chief to other corps com-



manders. A "staff-officer" is an officer attached to the person or headquarters of a general as his aide or assistant.

To illustrate the general principle as to the service of the special arms, I quote from the "Instructions of Frederick the Great" to his artillery. He was himself, by the way, an "artillery specialist" of the highest order, yet I have never heard it suggested that this unfitted him for "ordering a line of battle." He was also a disciplinarian of the sternest school, yet he "almost preached insubordination" in order to reduce to a minimum the mischief that meddling with the artillery by any general, even the general-in-chief, might occasion. He says:

"It sometimes happens that the general in command, or some other general, is himself forgetful, and orders the fire to be opened too soon, without considering what injurious consequences may result from it. In such case the artillery officer must certainly obey, but he should fire as slowly as possible, and point the pieces with the utmost accuracy, in order that his shots may not be thrown away."

As to the other question, that of policy, each general must decide it for himself, and General Hancock presumably acted according to his best judgment in the emergency suddenly presented to him when the cannonade opened. I do not know his reasons for countermanding my orders, and therefore cannot discuss them, even were I disposed to do so. As to the hypothetical case presented by General Walker, the possible effect of the enemy's cannonade on the *morale* of our troops, and his question, "Who was the better judge, General Hunt or General Hancock?" I may be permitted to reply, that a corps commander ought to be, so far as his own corps is concerned. It is, however, one of the necessary duties of an

artillery commander to study the qualities of the other arms, for these must be considered in organizing and distributing the artillery, and are, as we see in this very case, important elements in determining its service. I had studied the Army of the Potomac, believed in its high qualities, and when, for special reasons, I instructed our batteries to withhold their fire for a given period, I knew the severity of the trial to which I was subjecting all the troops. I knew, also, that while the batteries would be the direct object of the enemy's fire, their men must stand idle at the guns and bear its full fury, while the infantry, lying on the reverse slope of the ridge and out of the enemy's sight, would be partly sheltered from it. Yet I felt no misgiving as to the fortitude of my cannoneers, and no doubt as to that of the infantry. I think I was justified by the event, for the troops on General Hancock's line, where my instructions were not followed, and those on General Newton's line (on Hancock's immediate left), where they were followed, were equal in "heart and courage" for the "fearful ordeal of Longstreet's charge." The object of my orders, however, was to spare them this ordeal altogether by breaking up the charge before it reached our lines. Had my orders been fully carried out, I think their whole line would have been—as half of it was—driven back before reaching our position, and this would have given us our only chance for a successful counter-attack. As it was, the splendid valor of Pickett's division alone enabled the Confederates, although defeated, to preserve their *morale* intact. Had they been repulsed without coming into immediate contact with our infantry, their *morale* would have been seriously impaired, their sense of superiority humbled.

## REPELLING LEE'S LAST BLOW AT GETTYSBURG.

I. BY EDMUND RICE, BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. S. A.


THE brigades of Harrow, Webb, and Hall, of Gibbon's division, Hancock's corps, occupied the crest on Cemetery Ridge on July 3d. The right of Hall's and the left of Webb's brigades were in a clump of trees, called by the enemy the salient of our position, and this grove was the focus of the most fearful cannonade that preceded Pickett's charge. One regiment, the 72d Pennsylvania, in Webb's command, was a little in rear of the left of its brigade; two regiments, the 19th Massachusetts and 42d New York, Colonel A. F. Devereux commanding, of Hall's brigade, were in rear of the right of their brigade.

From the opposite ridge, three-fourths of a mile away, a line of skirmishers sprang lightly forward out of the woods, and with intervals well kept moved rapidly down into the open fields, closely followed by a line of battle, then by another, and by yet a third. Both sides watched this never-to-be-forgotten scene,—the grandeur of attack of so many thousand men. Gibbon's division, which was to stand the brunt of the assault, looked with admiration on the different lines of Confederates,

marching forward with easy, swinging step, and the men were heard to exclaim: "Here they come!" "Here they come!" "Here comes the infantry!"

Soon little puffs of smoke issued from the skirmish line, as it came dashing forward, firing in reply to our own skirmishers in the plain below, and with this faint rattle of musketry the stillness was broken; never hesitating for an instant, but driving our men before it, or knocking them over by a biting fire as they rose up to run in, their skirmish line reached the fences of the Emmitsburg road. This was Pickett's advance, which carried a front of five hundred yards or more. I was just in rear of the right of the brigade, standing upon a large boulder, in front of my regiment, the 19th Massachusetts, where, from the configuration of the ground, I had an excellent view of the advancing lines, and could see the entire formation of the attacking column. Pickett's separate brigade lines lost their formation as they swept across the Emmitsburg road, carrying with them their chain of skirmishers. They pushed on toward the crest, and merged into one crowding, rushing line,





GROUND OVER WHICH PICKETT, PETTIGREW, AND TRIMBLE CHARGED. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SINCE THE WAR.

On the left of the picture (which shows the view from the Union lines) is seen the clump of trees which was the point of direction for Pickett's men; also the monument of Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division (Second

Corps), near which General Alexander S. Webb was wounded. General Armistead, of Pickett's division, was killed in the middle foreground of the picture; Codori's house is seen on the right [see also map, p. 344].—EDITORS.

many ranks deep. As they crossed the road, Webb's infantry, on the right of the trees, commenced an irregular, hesitating fire, gradually increasing to a rapid file firing, while the shrapnel and canister from the batteries tore gaps through those splendid Virginia battalions.

The men of our brigade, with their muskets at the ready, lay in waiting. One could plainly hear the orders of the officers as they commanded, "Steady, men, steady! Don't fire!" and not a shot was fired at the advancing hostile line, now getting closer every moment. The heavy file firing on the right in Webb's brigade continued.

By an undulation of the surface of the ground to the left of the trees, the rapid advance of the dense line of Confederates was for a moment lost to view; an instant after they seemed to rise out of the earth, and so near that the expression on their faces was distinctly seen. Now our men knew that the time had come, and could wait no longer. Aiming low, they opened a deadly concentrated discharge upon the moving mass in their front. Nothing human could stand it. Staggered by the storm of lead, the charging line hesitated, answered with some wild firing which soon increased to a crashing roll of musketry, running down the whole length of their front, and then all that portion of Pickett's division which came within the zone of this terrible close musketry fire appeared to melt and drift away in the powder-smoke of both sides. At this juncture some one behind me gave the quick, impatient order: "Forward, men! Forward! Now is your chance!"

I turned and saw that it was General Hancock, who was passing the left of the regiment. He checked his horse and pointed toward the clump of trees to our right and front. I construed this into an order for both regiments—the 19th Massachusetts and the 42d New York—to run for the trees, to prevent the enemy from breaking

through. The men on the left of our regiment heard the command, and were up and on the run forward before the 42d New York, which did not hear Hancock's order until Colonel Devereux repeated it, had a chance to rise. The line formation of the two regiments was partially broken, and the left of the 19th Massachusetts was brought forward, as though it had executed a right half-wheel. All the men who were now on their feet could see, to the right and front, Webb's wounded men with a few stragglers and several limbers leaving the line, as the battle-flags of Pickett's division were carried over it. With a cheer the two regiments left their position in rear of Hall's right, and made an impetuous dash, racing diagonally forward for the clump of trees. Many of Webb's men were still lying down in their places in ranks, and firing at those who followed Pickett's advance, which, in the meantime, had passed over them. This could be determined by the puffs of smoke issuing from their muskets, as the first few men in gray sprang past them toward the cannon, only a few yards away. But for a few moments only could such a fire continue, for Pickett's disorganized mass rolled over, beat down, and smothered it.

One battle-flag after another, supported by Pickett's infantry, appeared along the edge of the trees, until the whole copse seemed literally crammed with men. As the 19th and 42d passed along the brigade line, on our left, we could see the men prone in their places, unshaken, and firing steadily to their front, beating back the enemy. I saw one leader try several times to jump his horse over our line. He was shot by some of the men near me.

The two regiments, in a disorganized state, were now almost at right angles with the remainder of the brigade,—the left of the 19th Massachusetts being but a few yards distant,—and the officers



and men were falling fast from the enfilading fire of the hostile line in front, and from the direct fire of those who were crowded in among the trees. The advance of the two regiments became so thinned that for a moment there was a pause. Captain Farrell, of the 1st Minnesota, with his company, came in on my left. As we greeted each other he received his death-wound, and fell in front of his men, who now began firing. As I looked back I could see our men, intermixed with those who were driven out of the clump of trees a few moments before, coming rapidly forward, firing, some trying to shoot through the intervals and past those who were in front.


The gap in the line seemed to widen, for the enemy in front, being once more driven by a terrible musketry in their very faces, left to join those who had effected an entrance through Webb's line.

The men now suffered from the enfilading fire of the enemy who were in the copse. Seeing no longer an enemy in front, and annoyed by this galling fire from the flank, the 7th Michigan and 59th New York, followed directly by the 20th Massachusetts and the regiments of Harrow's brigade, left their line, faced to the right, and in groups, without regimental or other organization, joined in the rush with those already at the edge of the clump of trees, all cheering and yelling, "Hurrah! for the white trefoil!" "Clubs are trumps!" "Forward the white trefoil!" [The badge of Gibbon's division—the Second, of the Second Corps—was a white trefoil.—EDITORS.]

This was one of those periods in action which are measurable by seconds. The men near seemed to fire very slowly. Those in rear, though coming up at a run, seemed to drag their feet. Many were firing through the intervals of those in front, in their eagerness to injure the enemy. This manner of firing, although efficacious, sometimes tells on

friend instead of foe. A sergeant at my side received a ball in the back of his neck by this fire. All the time the crush toward the enemy in the copse was becoming greater. The men in gray were doing all that was possible to keep off the mixed bodies of men who were moving upon them swiftly and without hesitation, keeping up so close and continuous a fire that at last its effects became terrible. I could feel the touch of the men to my right and left, as we neared the edge of the copse. The grove was fairly jammed with Pickett's men, in all positions, lying and kneeling. Back from the edge were many standing and firing over those in front. By the side of several who were firing, lying down or kneeling, were others with their hands up, in token of surrender. In particular I noticed two men, not a musket-length away, one aiming so that I could look into his musket-barrel; the other, lying on his back, coolly ramming home a cartridge. A little farther on was one on his knees waving something white in both hands. Every foot of ground was occupied by men engaged in mortal combat, who were in every possible position which can be taken while under arms, or lying wounded or dead.

A Confederate battery, near the Peach Orchard, commenced firing, probably at the sight of Harrow's men leaving their line and closing to the right upon Pickett's column. A cannon-shot tore a horrible passage through the dense crowd of men in blue, who were gathering outside the trees; instantly another shot followed, and fairly cut a road through the mass. My thoughts were now to bring the men forward; it was but a few steps to the front, where they could at once extinguish that destructive musketry and be out of the line of the deadly artillery fire. Voices were lost in the uproar; so I turned partly toward them, raised my sword to attract their attention, and motioned to advance. They surged forward, and just



CEMETERY RIDGE AFTER PICKETT'S CHARGE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.



then, as I was stepping backward with my face to the men, urging them on, I felt a sharp blow as a shot struck me, then another; I whirled round, my sword torn from my hand by a bullet or shell splinter. My visor saved my face, but the shock stunned me. As I went down our

men rushed forward past me, capturing battle-flags and making prisoners.

Pickett's division lost nearly six-sevenths of its officers and men. Gibbon's division, with its leader wounded, and with a loss of half its strength, still held the crest.

## II. FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF NORMAN J. HALL, COLONEL, U. S. V.

"THE object [of the heavy cannonading] was evidently to destroy our batteries and drive the infantry from the slight crest which marked the line of battle, while the concentration of fire upon the hill occupied by the Second [Webb's] and the right of the Third [Hall's] brigades indicated where the real attack was to be made. The experience of the terrible grandeur of that rain of missiles and that chaos of strange and terror-spreading sounds, unexampled, perhaps, in history, must ever remain undescribed, but can never be forgotten by those who survived it. I cannot suffer this opportunity to pass without paying just tribute to the noble service of the officers and men of the batteries that were served within my sight. Never before during this war were so many batteries subjected to so terrible a test. Horses, men, and carriages were piled together, but the fire scarcely slackened for an instant so long as the guns were standing. Lieutenant [A. H.] Cushing, of Battery A, 4th U. S. Artillery, challenged the admiration of all who saw him.☆ Three of his limbers were blown up and changed with the caisson limbers under fire. Several wheels were shot off his guns and replaced, till at last, severely wounded himself, his officers all killed or wounded, and with but cannoneers enough to man a section, he pushed his gun to the fence in front, and was killed while serving his last canister into the ranks of the advancing enemy. Knowing that the enemy's infantry would attack soon, I sent Lieutenant [William R.] Driver, acting assistant adjutant-general, to the Artillery Reserve for batteries, with orders to conduct them to the crest, if they were granted, with all possible speed. He arrived with one, which, though too late for service in arresting the advance of the enemy, yet had the opportunity to do him much damage.

"At 3 o'clock exactly the fire of the enemy slackened, and his first line of battle advanced from the woods in front in beautiful order. About one hundred yards in rear came a second line, and opposite the main point of attack was what appeared to be a column of battalions. . . . The perfect order and steady but rapid advance of the enemy called forth praise from our troops, but gave their line an appearance of being fearfully irresistible. My line was single, the only support (the 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers) having been called away by General Webb before the action had fairly commenced. There was a disposition in the men to reserve their fire for close quarters, but when I observed the movement the enemy was endeavoring to execute, I caused the 7th Michi-

gan and 20th Massachusetts Volunteers to open fire at about two hundred yards. The deadly aim of the former regiment was attested by the line of slain within its range. This had a great effect upon the result, for it caused the enemy to move rapidly at one point, and consequently to crowd in front. Being occasioned at the point where his column was forming, he did not recover from this disorder. The remainder of our line reserved its fire until one hundred yards, some regiments waiting even until but fifty paces intervened between them and the enemy.

"There was but a moment of doubtful contest in front of the position of this brigade. The enemy halted to deliver his fire, wavered, and fled, while the line of the fallen perfectly marked the limit of his advance. The troops were pouring into the ranks of the fleeing enemy that rapid and accurate fire, the delivery of which victorious lines always so much enjoy, when I saw that a portion of the line of General Webb on my right had given way, and many men were making to the rear as fast as possible, while the enemy was pouring over the rails [surmounting a low stone wall.—EDITORS] that had been a slight cover for the troops.

"Having gained this apparent advantage, the enemy seemed to turn again and reengage my whole line. Going to the left, I found two regiments that could be spared from some command there, and endeavored to move them by the right flank to the break; but, coming under a warm fire, they crowded to the slight cover of the rail fence, mixing with the troops already there. Finding it impossible to draw them out and re-form, and seeing no unengaged troops within reach, I was forced to order my own brigade back from the line, and move it by the flank under a heavy fire. The enemy was rapidly gaining a foothold; organization was mostly lost; in the confusion commands were useless, while a disposition on the part of the men to fall back a pace or two each time to load gave the line a retiring direction. With the officers of my staff and a few others, who seemed to comprehend what was required, the head of the line, still slowly moving by the flank, was crowded closer to the enemy, and the men obliged to load in their places. I did not see any man of my command who appeared disposed to run away, but the confusion first caused by the two regiments above spoken of so destroyed the formation in two ranks that in some places the line was several files deep. . . . During this time the 15th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1st Minnesota, and 19th Maine Volunteers from the

☆ Cushing was a brother of Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, famous for his destruction of the Confederate ram *Albemarle*.—EDITORS.



First Brigade [Harrow's] of this division had joined the line, and are entitled to a full share in the credit of the final repulse.

"The line remained in this way for about ten minutes, rather giving way than advancing, when, by a simultaneous effort on the part of all the officers I could instruct, aided by the general advance of many of the colors, the line closed with the enemy, and after a few minutes of desperate, often hand-to-hand fighting, the crowd—for such

had become that part of the enemy's column that had passed the fence—threw down their arms and were taken prisoners of war, while the remainder broke and fled in great disorder. The Second Brigade had again joined the right of my line, which now occupied the position originally held by that command. Generals Garnett and Armistead [of Pickett's Division] were picked up near this point, together with many colonels and officers of other grades."

III. FROM THE REPORT OF ALEXANDER S. WEBB, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

"ABOUT 1 P. M. the enemy opened with more than twenty batteries upon our line; by 2:45 o'clock had silenced the Rhode Island battery and all the guns but one of Cushing's battery, and had plainly shown by his concentration of fire on this and the Third Brigade that an important assault was to be expected. I had sent, at 2 P. M., Captain Banes, assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, for two batteries to replace Cushing's and Brown's. Just before the assault, Captain Wheeler's [Cowan's] battery, First New York Artillery [First New York Independent Battery], had gotten in position on the left, in the place occupied by the Rhode Island battery, which had retired with a loss of all its officers but one.

"At 3 o'clock the enemy's line of battle left the woods in our front, moved in perfect order across the Emmitsburg road, formed in the hollow in our immediate front several lines of battle, under a fire of spherical case from Wheeler's [Cowan's] battery and Cushing's gun, and advanced for the assault. The 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers were advanced to the wall on the right of the 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers. Three of Cushing's guns were run down to the fence, carrying with them their canister. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers were held in reserve under the crest of the hill. The enemy advanced steadily to the fence, driving off a portion of the 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers. General Armistead passed over the fence with probably over one hundred of his command, and with several battle-flags. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers were ordered up to hold the crest, and advanced to within forty paces of the enemy's line. Colonel R. P. Smith, commanding the 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers, threw two

companies of his command behind the stone wall on the right of Cushing's battery, fifty paces retired from the point of attack. This disposition of his troops was most important. Colonel Smith showed true military intelligence on the field. The 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers and most of the 71st Pennsylvania Volunteers, even after the enemy were in their rear, held their position. The 72d Pennsylvania Volunteers fought steadily and persistently, but the enemy would probably have succeeded in piercing our lines had not Colonel Hall advanced with several of his regiments to my support. Defeated, routed, the enemy fled in disorder. General Armistead was left, mortally wounded, within my lines, and forty-two of the enemy who crossed the fence lay dead.

"This [Webb's] brigade captured nearly 1000 prisoners, 6 battle-flags (4 have been turned in), and picked up 1400 stand of arms and 903 sets of accouterments. . . . The conduct of this brigade was most satisfactory; officers and men did their whole duty. The 69th Pennsylvania Volunteers lost all its field-officers, but held its ground; the cover in its front was not well built, and it lost many men lying on the ground; still, I saw none retire from the fence. A portion of the 106th Pennsylvania Volunteers, left behind the previous evening under Captain Ford, took part in repelling the assault. I lost gallant officers and men; they need no tribute from me; a nominal list has been sent in. . . . Lieutenant A. H. Cushing, 4th United States Artillery, fell, mortally wounded, at the fence by the side of his guns. Cool, brave, competent, he fought for an hour and a half after he had reported to me that he was wounded in both thighs."

IV. BY L. E. BICKNELL, LIEUTENANT, 1ST MASS. SHARP-SHOOTERS.

UPON the excursion of Massachusetts veterans to Gettysburg, I found a monument in Ziegler's Grove to the 88th Pennsylvania Volunteers. It marks the spot where our infantry were being rapidly cut down by the enemy's sharp-shooters in their front on the morning of the 3d of July, the third day's fight. In fact, when, with twenty of the 1st Company of Massachusetts sharp-shooters, I entered the grove, our infantry were virtually driven from it. We held the grove, to the right and left of the monument, until the heavy cannonading checked the sharp-shooting. A shattered remnant of some regiment, perhaps the one which had suf-

fered so in front of and in the grove, lay along the remnants of a stone wall in our rear, and during the heavy cannonading which preceded the many others sought the seeming shelter of the grove.

Just before the grand charge, at the request of General Alexander Hays, who commanded the Third Division, Second Corps, I gathered up all these men who lay in the grove, and General Hays formed them in line to the right of the Bryan House, which is the first house to the left of the monument on the line of battle as you go toward Round Top. At the time of the battle the grove extended to this house. I took position, with the



remnant of my squad of sharp-shooters, on the right of this line.

While the enemy were advancing to the Emmitsburg road, General Hays drilled the line in the manual of arms, allowed them to fire left oblique while the enemy were closing with our line to the left of the Bryan House, and then swung them down by a left wheel to the lane which then ran from the Bryan House to the Emmitsburg road, across which lane they then fired. The moment chosen for the left wheel or flanking movement was just as the last division of the charging column was crossing the Emmitsburg road, moving direct for Ziegler's Grove. As the entire front of the Second Corps to the left of the Bryan House was already covered, and in many places penetrated, this fresh division would probably have forced our line back and gained the shelter of Ziegler's Grove had it not been subjected to our flank fire, which destroyed its formation and sent its shattered and disordered masses along the other side of the lane and in front of the Third Division of the Second Corps.

I finally drew back our line a little from the fence to prevent our rear being gained by the enemy moving north on the Emmitsburg road, and also to uncover a gun (or two guns, I forget which) that had, during the melee, been got in position at the head of the lane near the Bryan House. As the enemy crowded forward into the lane, the fire of these guns ended the contest.

The "clump of trees" upon Bachelder's chart is near the point where Stannard struck the right flank. Ziegler's Grove, farther north, is the clump of trees where I was, and to which I refer, and to which General Longstreet refers in his letter to me mentioned further on. It is the blow upon the left flank, and not upon the right flank, to which we all refer.

That there might not be any mistake I sent General Longstreet a chart of the battle-field furnished me by the Gettysburg Battle-Field Memorial Association, on which I marked the lane running down from Ziegler's Grove to the Emmitsburg road.

I have not yet learned what regiments, or frag-

General Franklin Sawyer, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 8th Ohio Volunteers, in the history of the regiment, gives the following description of Pettigrew's column in the assault:

"They moved up splendidly, deploying into column as they crossed the long, sloping interval between the Second Corps and their base. At first it looked as if their line of march would sweep our position, but as they advanced their direction lay considerably to our left; but soon a strong line, with flags, directed its march immediately upon us. . . . We changed our front, and, taking position by a fence, facing the left flank of the advancing column of rebels, the men were ordered to fire into their flank at will. Hardly a musket had been fired at this time. The front of the column was nearly up the slope, and within a few yards of the line of the Second Corps' front and its batteries, when suddenly a terrific fire from every available gun from the Cemetery to Round Top Mountain burst upon them. The distinct, graceful lines of the rebels underwent an instantaneous transformation. They were at once enveloped in a dense cloud of smoke and dust. Arms, heads, blankets, guns, and knapsacks were thrown and tossed into the clear air. Their track, as they

advanced, was strewn with dead and wounded. A moan went up from the field, distinctly to be heard amid the storm of battle; but, on they went, too much enveloped in smoke and dust now to permit us to distinguish their lines or movements, for the mass appeared more like a cloud of moving smoke and dust than a column of troops. Still it advanced amid the now deafening roar of artillery and storm of battle. Suddenly the column gave way, the sloping landscape appeared covered all at once with the scattered and retreating foe. A withering sheet of missiles swept after them, and they were torn and tossed and prostrated as they ran. It seemed as if not one would escape. Of the mounted officers who rode so grandly in the advance, not one was to be seen on the field; all had gone down. The 8th [Ohio] advanced and cut off three regiments, or remnants of regiments, as they passed us, taking their colors, and capturing many prisoners. The colors captured were those of the 34th North Carolina, 38th Virginia, and one that was taken from the captor, Sergeant Miller, Company G, by a staff-officer, the number of the regiment not being remembered. The battle was now over. The field was covered with the slain and wounded, and everywhere were to be seen white handkerchiefs held up asking for quarter."

EDITORS.

ments of regiments, composed the line swung down, but they were strangers to me and I have just learned that the 39th, 111th, 125th, and 126th New-York were added to the Third Division, Second Corps, *on the march to Gettysburg*. I left the army after the battle, and so had no opportunity to learn afterward.

With regard to the blow struck on Pettigrew's

left by the 8th Ohio Regiment, the Ohio men say that they lay *west* of the Emmitsburg road. If so, they must have been north and in front of the right of Ziegler's Grove, as we faced. }

After we had swung down on the left flank to the lane we were struck by A. P. Hill's men, who faced Ziegler's Grove upon our right and rear so forcibly that I had given the order to "Left wheel backwards, firing," and the order was being executed when Hill's men abandoned our rear. It is my strong impression that the Ohio regiment pitched into Hill's men, who were pitching into our flank and rear. I remember distinctly that our artillerists at our right, seeing our imminent danger, poured in the grape and canister upon our rear assailants in a lively manner.

General Longstreet writes to me from Atlanta, Georgia, January 4th, 1884:

"The move of which you speak I remember quite well, and my impression is that it was made against Pickett's men.

"At its first appearance I sent orders for a counter-move. I think the order was sent by Colonel Osman Latrobe, now of Baltimore. Colonel Latrobe can probably give you more definite information of the troops you may have struck.

"At the first appearance of the troops in this move I recognized it as one that would break up my assault, but I looked on the movements of the Third Corps—A. P. Hill's—as certain to break the intended flank move.

"Soon after the flank movement was disclosed, a severe fire from artillery, etc., coming in across our line from the right as we advanced, hurt our supporting columns badly.

"If you struck their left you may claim to have put in very heavy blows at the critical moment, for the breaking up of the supporting force broke up the attack or hope of success from it. We could not look for anything from Pickett except to break your line. The supports were to secure the fruits of that break."





FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE.

### FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE AND DEATH.

BY H. C. PARSONS, CAPTAIN, 1ST VERMONT CAVALRY.

ON the eve of the battle of Gettysburg Captain Elon J. Farnsworth, of the 8th Illinois Cavalry, an aide on General Pleasonton's staff, was promoted for gallantry to be brigadier-general and given command of a brigade in Kilpatrick's division, consisting of the 5th New York, 18th Pennsylvania, 1st Vermont, and 1st West Virginia regiments.

On the evening of the 2d of July we were on Meade's right wing, and by noon of the third day of the battle we went into position on his left wing, near the enemy's artillery line, on the south end of Seminary Ridge. When the cannonading which preceded Pickett's charge opened, General Farnsworth rode to the position marked "A" upon the map [p. 394], and I think Kilpatrick joined him. A long skirmish line of the enemy was at that moment moving toward us. I was commanded to take one squadron, charge as foragers, ride to cover of the stone house (Bushman's), and wait for orders. At our approach the enemy's skirmish line fell back. We rode to the house with the loss of two men. Captain Stone was sent with a squadron to my support. We remained some time at the Bushman house, near the enemy's batteries, and returned under fire without loss.

At 5 o'clock that afternoon we went into position, and were resting behind a battery on the low, wooded hill at the left of Round Top, and separated from it by a narrow valley. The enemy's picket line confronted our own near the base of the hill, but there was no firing. There was an oppressive stillness after the day's excitement. I rode out to the brow of the hill and had an excellent view of the field. Directly in front of us opened the valley toward Gettysburg, with its wheat-fields; at the right, and less than half a mile distant, rose Round Top; in the intervening valley lay the Snyder farm, with low, cross fences. Projecting from Round Top was a hill, perhaps one hundred feet high, on the top of which was a field surrounded by high stone

walls. The slopes of this hill were covered with immense granite bowlders; a road or lane extended from the Emmitsburg pike to its base, and then turned to the left toward Devil's Den. Beyond this road ran a high rail fence, the only openings being at the right and left of the walled field on the hill. Above this, and along the rocky and wooded slopes of Round Top, Law's brigade was firmly intrenched, and pressing him in front and on the right was the Union army. Toward the openings described, the charge that was afterward made was directed. While I was looking out upon the field General Kilpatrick rode near, showing great impatience and eagerness for orders, and an orderly dashed by shouting, "We turned the charge; nine acres of prisoners!"

From this point the position of the troops on the Confederate right appeared to be full of peril. Law's brigade had held an almost untenable but essential position through two hard-fought days, while their batteries and support, nearly a mile in the rear, were at that moment turned upon Merritt's advancing squadrons. The gates to the valley behind Round Top, toward which Longstreet's eye turned so eagerly, were held by them, and the valley in the rear was protected by a single Texas regiment and a weak skirmish line. Kilpatrick had been given large discretion by General Pleasonton when he had been sent in the morning against Lee's right, with Merritt's and Farnsworth's brigades. (Custer had been detached and sent to General Gregg.) Kilpatrick's orders were to press the enemy, to threaten him at every point, and to strike at the first opportunity, with an emphatic intimation that the best battle news could be brought by the wind. His opportunity had now come. If he could bring on a battle, drive back the Texas regiment, and break the lines on the mountain, Meade's infantry on Round Top would surely drive them into the valley, and then the five thousand cavalry in reserve could strike the decisive blow.




The 1st West Virginia was selected to attack the Texas regiment. The Second Battalion of the 1st Vermont was thrown out as skirmishers; the First and Third battalions were held for the charge on the mountain. The 1st West Virginia charged at our left and front down the open valley, nearly in the direction but toward the right of the Bushman house, upon the 1st Texas regiment, which was in line behind a rail fence that had been staked and bound with withes. A thin line shot forward and attempted to throw the rails, tugging at the stakes, cutting with their sabers, and falling in the vain effort. The regiment came on in magnificent style, received a deadly volley, before which it recoiled, rallied, charged the second time, and fell back with great loss.

I was near Kilpatrick when he impetuously gave the order to Farnsworth to make the last charge. Farnsworth spoke with emotion: "General, do you mean it? Shall I throw my handful of men over rough ground, through timber, against a brigade of infantry? The 1st Vermont has already been fought half to pieces; these are too good men to kill." Kilpatrick said: "Do you refuse to obey my orders? If you are afraid to lead this charge, I will lead it." Farnsworth rose in his stirrups—he looked magnificent in his passion—and cried, "Take that back!" Kilpatrick returned his defiance, but, soon repenting, said, "I did not mean it; forget it." For a moment there was silence, when Farnsworth spoke calmly, "General,

if you order the charge, I will lead it, but you must take the responsibility." I did not hear the low conversation that followed, but as Farnsworth turned away he said, "I will obey your order." Kilpatrick said earnestly, "I take the responsibility."

I recall the two young generals at that moment in the shadow of the oaks and against the sunlight—Kilpatrick with his fine features, his blonde beard, his soft hat turned up jauntily, and his face lighted with the joy that always came into it when the charge was sounded; Farnsworth, tall, slight, stern, and pale, but rising with conscious strength and consecration. Kilpatrick was eager for the fray. He believed that cavalry could "fight anywhere except at sea." He was justified by his orders and by results, and he was brave enough to withdraw the hot imputation, even in the presence of a regiment. Farnsworth was courage incarnate, but full of tender regard for his men, and his protest was manly and soldierly.

The direction of our guns was changed; new guns were brought into position. A shell shrieked down the line of my front company a few feet above their heads, covering them with leaves and branches. We rode out in columns of fours with drawn sabers. General Farnsworth, after giving the order to me, took his place at the head of the Third Battalion. In this action I commanded the First Battalion and Major Wells commanded the Third. Captain Cushman and Lieutenant



MAP OF FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE. FROM A SKETCH MAP BY CAPTAIN H. C. PARSONS.

NOTE.—The reader is referred to the map on page 344 for the full position of Kilpatrick's Cavalry division, and Merritt's brigade of Buford's division.—EDITORS.



Watson rode with me; General Farnsworth and Adjutant-General Estes rode with Major Wells.

As the First Battalion rode through the line of our dismounted skirmishers, who were falling back, they cried to us to halt. As we passed out from the cover of the woods the 1st West Virginia was retiring in disorder on our left. A frantic horse with one leg torn off by a cannon-ball rushed toward us as if for protection. We rode through the enemy's skirmish line across the fields, over the low fences, past the Snyder house, and down the road. The sun was blinding; Captain Cushman shaded his eyes with his hand and cried, "An ambuscade!" We were immediately upon the enemy, within thirty paces, and the deadly volley, which is referred to in the Confederate reports, was fired, but it passed over our heads; although they report that half our saddles were emptied, not a man was shot, yet the fire was the close and concentrated volley of a regiment. Captain (afterward Colonel) Jones, who commanded on the right of the 4th Alabama, says: "I was ordered to face about to resist cavalry; we marched rapidly to the rear over the rocks, and the Vermonters were upon us before we could form. They were within a few paces when we gave the order to fire. . . . The whole regiment fired, but when the smoke cleared I only saw one horse fall. A private at my left said, 'Captain, I shot that black.' I said, 'Why didn't you shoot his rider?' He replied, 'Oh, we'll get him anyhow; but I'm a hunter, and for three years I haven't looked at a deer's eye—I couldn't stand it.'"

Taken by surprise, they had shot over us; the next, a random volley, was effective. With the head of the column we cleared the wall at the right and formed under cover of the hill. The rear companies fell back and formed behind a cross fence and in the edge of timber. In the meantime the most important movement of the day was being made. The Third Battalion, under Major Wells,—a young officer who bore a charmed life and was destined to pass through many daring encounters to the rank of brigadier-general,—moved out in splendid form to the left of the First Battalion and swept in a great circle to the right, around the front of the hill and across our track; then, guiding to the left across the valley and up the side of the low hill at the base of Round Top, they charged along the wall, and between it and the mountain, directly in the rear of several Confederate regiments in position and between them and the 4th Alabama. It was a swift, resistless charge over rocks, through timber, under close enfilading fire. Colonel A. W. Preston had taken my Second Squadron and rode with part of the Second Battalion in support.† The direction was toward Devil's Den. At the foot of the declivity the column turned left and passed a battery, receiving the fire of its support, then divided into three parties. One swept across the open field and upon the rear of the Texas skirmish line, carrying

in a part of this line as prisoners, and one rode through into the Union lines. Farnsworth's horse had fallen; a trooper sprang from the saddle, gave the general his horse, and escaped on foot. Captain Cushman and a few others, with Farnsworth, turned back and rode at full gallop toward the point of entering. My First Squadron was again ordered forward. The enemy's sharp-shooters appeared in the rocks above us and opened fire.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL ELON J. FARNSWORTH.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

We rode obliquely up the hill in the direction of Wells, then wheeling to the left, between the picket line and the wall. As we turned, Corporal Sperry fell at my side. Part of my men turned back with prisoners. The head of the column leapt the wall into the open field. Farnsworth, seeing our horsemen, raised his saber and charged as if with an army; at almost the same moment his followers, and what remained of the First Battalion, cut their way through the 15th Alabama, which was wheeling into position at a run and offered little resistance. We charged in the same general direction, but on opposite sides of the wall that runs parallel with the Round Top range, and within two hundred paces of each other. Sergeant Duncan, a black-eyed, red-cheeked boy, splendidly mounted, standing in his stirrups, flew past me with his saber raised, shouted, "I'm with you!" threw up his left arm, and fell. My horse recoiled over his dead body, my men swept past, and I was for a moment alone on the field. The enemy ran up crying "Surrender!" as if they did not want to shoot me, but as I raised my saber a gun was planted against my breast and fired; my horse was struck at the same moment and broke frantically through the men, over the wall, and down the hill. Corporal Waller overtook me from the left, and, riding close, supported me on my horse.

† Colonel Preston, in his report, does not refer to the repulse by the 4th Alabama; he refers to Major Wells as leading the Second Battalion, but the latter says he was with the Third.—EDITORS.



As we rode on, he told me how Farnsworth and Cushman had fallen together.

I have spoken of the battalions as distinct. They were not, nor were the companies. At the sharp turn at the top of the hill, Captain Cushman and Sergeant Stranahan, who commanded Company L after Watson's horse was shot, kept straight on with part of his company, and rode in the main charge. A number of my men had turned back with prisoners, so that not over fifty men, <sup>†</sup> including those with Farnsworth, cut their way through in the outward charge.

The whole number who rode with Farnsworth was about three hundred. Their casualties were sixty-five. They brought in over one hundred prisoners; they rode within the Confederate lines nearly two miles; they received at short range the direct or enfilading fire of three regiments of infantry and of a battery of artillery; they drew two regiments out of line and held them permanently in new positions, breaking the Confederate front and exposing it to an infantry charge if one had been immediately ordered. Their assault was so bold that the Confederates received it as the advance of a grand attack, and, finding themselves exposed to infantry in front and cavalry in the rear, they were uncertain of their position. Why no advantage was taken of this it is not for us to explain. Why the infantry, when they heard fighting in Law's rear, or when, afterward, we delivered to their skirmish line our prisoners, did not advance and drive his brigade into the valley where it would have been exposed to a general flank attack, has never been explained; but it was not "a charge of madmen with a mad leader." We believed, and yet believe, that Farnsworth's charge was wisely ordered, well timed, well executed, and effective. <sup>‡</sup>

The behavior of the horses in this action was admirable. Running low and swift, as in a race; in their terror surrendering to their masters, and guiding at the slightest touch on the neck; never

<sup>†</sup> The officers of the 15th Alabama say there were not over ten men with Farnsworth when he fell. His horse dashed through their lines riderless. Colonel Oates kept for a long time the star cut from Farnsworth's coat, hoping some time to return it to his family, but it was accidentally lost or destroyed.—H. C. P.

<sup>‡</sup> A strange story which appears in all the Confederate reports shows how a mistake may make history. It is stated that Farnsworth wore a linen coat and a havelock; that he fought desperately with his revolver after he was down, and that he blew out his brains rather than surrender.

When Farnsworth was notified of his promotion <sup>¶</sup> on the field it was impossible to secure a new uniform, but Pleasonton, as a token of esteem, divided his own wardrobe with him. Farnsworth wore in the action Pleasonton's blue coat, with a single star, and a soft black hat; he fell with his saber raised, and as if dead; and when his remains were taken from the field

<sup>¶</sup> Major Clifford Thomson, of General Pleasonton's staff, writes to the editors: "Farnsworth's commission was dated June 29th, four days before his death. As he had been on

refusing a fence or breaking from the column; crowding together and to the front, yet taking or avoiding the obstacles with intelligence, they carried their riders over rocks and fallen timber and fences that the boldest hunter would hardly attempt to-day; and I doubt if there was a single fall of man or horse, except from the shot of the enemy. I may be permitted a remorseful tribute. My powerful bay had been disabled in the action at Hanover, and I was riding my bugler's horse, a gentle sorrel, scarred and stiff with long service. When I saw the work before us I condemned him, and would have ordered some trooper to change if it had not seemed like exposing another's life,—and yet, how he sprang into the charge! How he leaped the four walls! How he cleared Farrington's horse as it rolled over in the rocks! And how gently he carried me from the field, although blood spurted from his side at every step. Four better horses passed him in the race, but only to fall or carry their riders to death! And when I was lifted down into unconsciousness, my last recollection was of his great eyes turned upon me as in sympathy and reproof.

There was no charging of cannon, no sabering of men. Farnsworth and his troopers understood that they were to draw the enemy's fire, to create a diversion, preparatory to the main movement. They were to ride as deep into the enemy's lines as possible, to disclose his plan and force his positions. The taking of the prisoners on the return was the accident, not the order, of the charge. There was no encouragement of on-looking armies, no cheer, no bravado; and each man felt, as he tightened his saber belt, that he was summoned to a ride to death.

Farnsworth fell in the enemy's lines with his saber raised, dead with five mortal wounds, and without fame. So fell this typical volunteer soldier of America—a man without military training or ambition, yet born with a genius for war which carried him to high command and to the threshold of a great career.


by Doctors Edson and Wood there were five mortal wounds in his body and no wound in his head. Captain Cushman wore a white duck "fighting jacket," trimmed with yellow braid. To my objection, he answered, "A lady sent this to me, and said it was made with her own hands, and no rebel bullet could pierce it. It may be a good day to try magic mail." While we sat behind the guns in the heat he threw a silk handkerchief over his cap, pinning it to the visor. This he forgot to remove; he, and not Farnsworth, rode in the charge on the 4th Alabama; he rode with Farnsworth in the charge on the 15th Alabama; he fell at Farnsworth's side, terribly wounded in the face, and fought with his revolver until he fainted. He was a notably handsome officer, and it was clear that he was mistaken throughout the fight for General Farnsworth. Captain Cushman lay insensible and apparently dead until the next day, but finally revived, only to die in his next battle.—H. C. P.

detached service, it had not reached him, being carried among Pleasonton's headquarters papers until after the battle."—EDITORS.



## THE CAVALRY BATTLE NEAR GETTYSBURG.

BY WILLIAM E. MILLER, CAPTAIN, 3D PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.



MONUMENT ON THE FIELD OF THE CAVALRY  
FIGHT BETWEEN THE FORCES OF GREGG  
AND STUART. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, after participating in the different cavalry engagements from Brandy Station to Upperville, was the last regiment to cross the Potomac into Maryland by the pontoon-bridge at Edwards's Ferry, except McCandless's brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves. Well do the men of Gregg's cavalry command remember the evening of the 27th of June, 1863, while they were drawn up on the slope of the northern bank of the Potomac awaiting the crossing of McCandless's infantry, which was somewhat delayed on the opposite side. As soon as the band of McCandless's brigade placed foot on the bridge it began to play "Maryland, My Maryland." The men took up the refrain, and it was echoed back by the cavalymen on the northern hillside. The scene was beautiful and touching beyond description, and formed one of the happy incidents that broke the monotony of the long and weary march from Falmouth to Gettysburg.

About dusk "to horse" was sounded, and the division again put in motion. A tedious night's march along a road blockaded with wagons and other impediments brought us to Monocacy Junction, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, between which place and Frederick we halted on Sunday morning, the 28th. A reorganization of the cavalry there took place. General Kilpatrick, who had commanded the Second Brigade of Gregg's division, was promoted to the command of Stahel's division, which was then added to the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac as the Third Division, and Colonel Pennock Huey, with the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, was transferred from Buford's division to the Second Brigade of the Second Division, Huey succeeding Kilpatrick in command of the brigade. [For organization, see p. 437.]

Before leaving Frederick the 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry was ordered to report to General Meade's headquarters, where it remained until after the battle of Gettysburg; it did not rejoin its brigade before the 12th of July, at Boonsboro'. The 1st Massachusetts was also sent on detached service.

While we were halted near Frederick it was discovered that Stuart was making a detour around our army and had crossed the Potomac below Edwards's Ferry. Our cavalry was sent out on all the roads leading from Frederick to the north and east to prevent his gaining information, and to push him as far away as possible, so that he might be delayed in communicating with his chief. On the evening of the 28th McIntosh's brigade was sent eastward on the Baltimore pike, and passing New Market it halted at Ridgeville, and from there scouting parties were sent in every direction. On the morning of the 29th a portion of the 3d Pennsylvania was sent to Lisbon,



and from there one squadron went northward to Woodbine, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. It was ascertained that Stuart was tearing up the tracks near Hood's Mill, the next station east of Woodbine, and that he was moving northward. Information was sent to headquarters, and by 4 o'clock P. M. Gregg's division was concentrated at Mount Airy, north of Ridgeville, where it was supplied with a scanty allowance of rations and forage. Five o'clock found it on the march for Westminster, with the 3d Pennsylvania of McIntosh's brigade in advance. Having been on almost continuous duty, night

and day, since the battle of Brandy Station, on the 9th, the prospect of another night march was, to say the least, discouraging.!

Our march to Westminster was one of unusual severity, for the night was very dark and both men and horses were worn out. The men fell asleep in their saddles, and whenever the column halted the horses would fall asleep too. As the officers were responsible for keeping the column closed up, they had to resort to all sorts of expedients to keep awake, such as pinching themselves, pounding their heads, and pricking themselves with pins. When within about five miles of Westminster it



BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL D. McM. GREGG.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

was discovered that the left of the line was not up. A halt was ordered, and, on sending back, the fact was disclosed that the artillerymen and battery horses were sound asleep, and that, whilst the portion of the column in front of them had been moving on, that in the rear was standing still. As soon as the latter was brought up the whole command moved forward, and at daylight on the 30th the advance, under Captain Charles Treichel, of the 3d Pennsylvania, charged into Westminster and captured a lot of Stuart's stragglers. Here we met with a cordial reception. The majority of the houses were thrown open, and the women, standing on their door-steps and at the windows, waved their handkerchiefs and cheered the old flag. It was noticed, however, that some of the houses remained closed, and upon inquiry it was

!To one not familiar with a cavalry night march in the face of the enemy it may be difficult to comprehend why it should differ materially from an advance by daylight, but to those who have had some experience this is easily understood. On a night march, in order to guard against surprise, flankers are thrown out on either side, who are supposed to keep abreast of the advance-guard. These flankers are under the supervision of the officer in charge of the advance, and no matter how dark the night is he must keep them sufficiently

deployed to protect the column, and yet always have them well in hand. These flankers encounter all sorts of obstacles, such as ditches, ravines, fences, underbrush, woods, etc., and necessarily make slow progress. The time thus occupied compels the main body in the rear to make innumerable stops and starts, which are not only tedious and wearying, but annoying and irksome, and hard upon the horses, often causing the men to grow impatient and the officers to become irritable.—W. E. M.



ascertained that these had in a similar manner been open the day before for the reception of Stuart and his men.

At Manchester a halt of a few hours was made, during which the men consumed what was left of the rations procured at Mount Airy, gave their horses the last grain of feed they had with them, and obtained a little sleep. Mounting again we moved north along the Carlisle pike for half a mile, and then by the Grove Mill road to Hanover Junction, Pennsylvania, on the Northern Central Railroad, where we arrived during the forenoon of July 1st. Our movements at this place illustrate to some extent the uncertainties of the campaign. After a short delay General Gregg received an order to proceed south toward Baltimore. Scarcely was the division drawn out on the road when a second order came directing him to turn about and move north as rapidly as possible toward York. Just as we were starting in the latter direction the final order came to send Huey's brigade back to Manchester, Maryland, and to march with McIntosh's and Irvin Gregg's brigades westward to Gettysburg. After losing some valuable time in consequence of these conflicting orders, we (McIntosh's and Gregg's brigades) advanced over a crooked road to Hanover, where we went into bivouac.

At Hanover we found the streets barricaded with boxes, old carriages and wagons, hay, ladders, barbers' poles, etc., the marks of Kilpatrick's encounter with Stuart on the previous day, for the Third Division, while we were making the detour on the right flank, had taken the direct road from Frederick, and at Hanover had intercepted the line of march of the Confederate cavalry while we had been following it up.

By this time we had become a sorry-looking body of men, having been in the saddle day and night almost continuously for over three weeks, without a change of clothing or an opportunity for a general wash; moreover we were much reduced by short rations and exhaustion, and mounted on horses whose bones were plainly visible to the naked eye. ‡

Leaving Hanover at 3 o'clock on the morning of July 2d we had proceeded along the Littlestown road for two miles when Dr. T. T. Tate, one of the assistant surgeons of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, who was a citizen of Gettysburg and familiar with the country, advised General Gregg that the shortest route to Gettysburg was by way of the Bonaughtown or Hanover road. The doctor piloted the column across the fields and we reached the Bonaughtown road at McSherrystown. On reaching Geiselman's Woods, Colonel McIntosh, who had been suffering from exhaustion, became very sick. The column was halted, and Dr. Tate took him to Mr. Geiselman's house, where with careful medical attention he was in a short time restored and again

‡ As an evidence of how the division was reduced by hard marching and hard fighting it may be stated that the morning report of the 3d Pennsylvania on the 30th of June — one of the strongest regiments in the division — showed present for duty 29 officers, including field and staff, 365 enlisted men, and 322 serviceable horses. It will thus be manifest that we had seventy-two men whose horses had dropped from the ranks. Many

of these men were traveling along on foot and carrying their saddles in the hope of procuring remounts. The above report was made out at Westminster. Our march from there through the broiling sun and clouds of dust entailed a still larger loss of men and horses from exhaustion, so that by the time we reached Gettysburg the 3d Pennsylvania did not number three hundred officers and men all told. — W. E. M.







erhoff's Ridge, about three-fourths of a mile distant, whereupon Gregg ordered Rank to send them a "feeler," which he did in the most approved style—the two shells bursting in their midst and scattering the party like chaff in a wind storm. The First Brigade was now ordered forward, and on passing beyond Rank's guns the 3d Pennsylvania, being in the advance, was ordered into Cress's Woods, on the right of the road. The squadron of Captain Hess and my own were directed to dismount and advance across Cress's Run to the top of Brinkerhoff's Ridge—Hess on the left, with his left resting on the road and deployed to the right, and Miller [the writer] deployed to the right of Hess. On the left side of the road, connecting with Hess, two battalions of the 1st New Jersey, under Major Janeway and Captain Boyd, and Duvall's Maryland troop were deployed—the whole supported by the Third Battalion of the 1st New Jersey, under Major Beaumont. After crossing Cress's Run and gaining the elevated ground beyond, it was discovered that a stone fence ran along the crest of the ridge, and that some Confederate infantry were advancing from the opposite direction. "Double quick" was ordered, and a race for the fence ensued. The men seeing the importance of the position quickened their steps and arrived at the wall about twenty paces in advance of the enemy. As soon as our men reached the wall they opened fire with their carbines, and drove back their opponents. They punched holes through the wall with their carbines, and behind this formidable breastwork they were enabled, though repeatedly charged, to hold their position until daylight disappeared. Rank's guns in the meantime kept up a lively fire and did effective work. After dark a charge was made against our right which was driven in, but the men, not being discouraged, made a counter-charge and regained their position. Our opponents proved to be Walker's brigade, of Johnson's division, of Ewell's corps, and it was our good fortune to hold them in check long enough to prevent them from participating in the assault on Culp's Hill.

About 10 o'clock the whole division was withdrawn and moved over a country cross-road to the Baltimore pike, where it bivouacked for the night along White Run.

Between 9 and 10 o'clock on the morning of the 3d "to horse" was sounded, and we were again in the saddle. Retracing our steps, we resumed our position on the right, but with a more extended line. Irvin Gregg connected with the right of the infantry line near Wolf's Hill and stretched his line to the Hanover road, while McIntosh moved to and halted at the crossing of the Low Dutch and Hanover roads. Custer's brigade occupied the ground to the right and front of McIntosh. After some delay McIntosh moved forward to relieve Custer, who had been ordered to report to his division commander (Kilpatrick) in the vicinity of Round Top. The 3d Pennsylvania and 1st Maryland were drawn up in column of squadrons in a clover-field in front of and across the road from Lott's house, while the 1st New Jersey was sent to relieve Custer's men on outpost.

General J. E. B. Stuart, who was in command of the Confederate cavalry, now occupied what is known as Cress's Ridge, about three-fourths of a mile



north of Lott's house. On the south-eastern slope of the ridge there were cultivated fields, while its summit was covered with heavy timber. North of this ridge there were open fields, almost surrounded by woods, through which ran a country cross-road leading from the York pike to the Low Dutch road. The place was most admirably adapted to the massing and screening of troops. Behind the woods Stuart, who had come out from the direction of Gettysburg along the York pike, concentrated his forces on what was known as the Stallsmith farm. Gregg's troops were not so favorably situated. Occupying a line about three miles long from Wolf's Hill to Lott's house, through an open country, they were in full view of the enemy. [See maps, pp. 344, 400.]

A party of Confederate skirmishers thrown out in front of Stuart's center occupied the Rummel farm buildings, which were situated in the plain about three-fourths of a mile north-west of the Lott house, and near the base of Cress's Ridge. About 2 o'clock McIntosh, who well understood Stuart's tactics, and had correctly discerned his position, dismounted the 1st New Jersey and moved it forward under Major Beaumont in the direction of Rummel's. To meet this advance the Confederates pushed out a line of skirmishers and occupied a fence south of Rummel's. The 1st New Jersey soon adjusted their line to correspond with that of their antagonists, and firing began. At the same time a Confederate battery appeared on the top of the ridge and commenced shelling. Lieutenant A. C. M. Pennington's battery (M, 2d U. S. Artillery), in position in front of Spangler's house on the Hanover road, instantly replied. The 3d Pennsylvania was ordered forward, and two squadrons under Captains Treichel and Rodgers were moved across to Little's Run (which flowed southward from Rummel's spring-house) and placed to the left of the 1st New Jersey, while Duvall's troop was extended to their left. Captains Walsh and Hess were ordered out the Low Dutch road beyond Lott's woods, with instructions to hold the position and protect the right. My squadron was deployed along the edge of the woods north of Lott's house (near where the cavalry shaft now stands) and extended to the cross-roads running toward Stallsmith's, facing north-west. It will thus be seen that the 3d Pennsylvania was divided — one-half being on the left of the line, whilst the other occupied the right. The 1st Maryland was posted near the Lott house and held in reserve. Captain A. M. Randol's battery (E, 1st U. S. Artillery), stationed across the road from the Howard house, was also ordered forward, and a section under Lieutenant Chester placed in position a little south-west of Lott's house. Pennington and Chester soon silenced the Confederate battery, and finding Rummel's barn filled with sharp-shooters, who were picking off our men, they turned their guns on it and drove them out. In the meantime our front line was advanced and we drove back that of the Confederates, occupying their position. A lull in the firing now ensued, during which Custer's brigade returned. After the engagement had opened McIntosh had discovered that the force in his front was too strong for his command, and consequently he had sent word to General Gregg to that effect, requesting that Irvin Gregg's brigade be forwarded to his support. As this brigade was some distance to the rear, and therefore not immediately avail-





BATTLE BETWEEN THE UNION CAVALRY UNDER GREGG AND THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY UNDER STUART.  
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

able, Gregg, meeting Custer, who was about to begin his march in the opposite direction, had ordered him to return, and at the same time had sent word to Irvin Gregg to concentrate as much of his command as possible in the vicinity of Spangler's house. Custer, eager for the fray, had wheeled about and was soon on the field.

Gregg at this juncture appeared and took command in person. Custer, as soon as he arrived, extended the left of the line along Little's Run with a portion of the 6th Michigan, dismounted, and at the same time Randol placed in position to the left and rear of Chester the second section of his battery under Lieutenant Kinney.

At this stage the ammunition of that portion of the 3d Pennsylvania which was on the left, and of the 1st New Jersey, began to run short, and the 5th Michigan was ordered to relieve them. The latter was dismounted, and whilst it was moving to the front a dismounted regiment from W. H. F. Lee's brigade came to the support of the Confederate skirmishers. A heated contest followed, in which the 1st New Jersey and the 3d Pennsylvania remained to take part. After the firing abated these regiments attempted to withdraw, but they were followed up so closely that they were obliged to face about and resume the conflict. However, they soon drove the enemy back, inflicting severe punishment. The short supply of ammunition of the 5th Michigan having by this time given out, and Major Noah H. Ferry, who was in command of the line, having been killed, the whole line was driven in. Improving this opportunity, Fitz. Lee sent forward the 1st Virginia, which charged our right and center. The 7th Michigan at once moved forward from the direction of the Reeve house in close column of squadrons and advanced to the attack. The right of the 5th Michigan swung back, and the 7th pressed forward to a stone-and-rail fence and opened fire with their carbines. The



1st Virginia advanced with steadiness, and soon the two regiments were face to face, the fence alone separating them. My squadron, which occupied the right center and which up to this time had not been engaged, opened a flank fire on the Virginians, which aided materially in holding them in check. The 1st North Carolina Cavalry and the Jeff Davis Legion coming up to their support, they crowded the 7th Michigan back, and it was obliged to give way, the Confederates following in close pursuit. A more determined and vigorous charge than that made by the 1st Virginia it was never my fortune to witness. But they became scattered by the flank fire they received, together with the shells from our artillery, and were in the end obliged to fall back on their main body.

About half a mile distant from the last-mentioned fence, where the cross-road passes through the woods on the Stallsmith farm, there appeared moving toward us a large mass of cavalry, which proved to be the remaining portions of Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's brigades. They were formed in close column of squadrons and directed their course toward the Spangler house. A grander spectacle than their advance has rarely been beheld. They marched with well-aligned fronts and steady reins. Their polished saber-blades dazzled in the sun. All eyes turned upon them. Chester on the right, Kinney in the center, and Pennington on the left opened fire with well-directed aim. Shell and shrapnel met the advancing Confederates and tore through their ranks. Closing the gaps as though nothing had happened, on they came. As they drew nearer, canister was substituted by our artillerymen for shell, and horse after horse staggered and fell. Still they came on. Our mounted skirmishers rallied and fell into line; the dismounted men fell back, and a few of them reached their horses. The 1st Michigan, drawn up in close column of squadrons near Pennington's battery, was ordered by Gregg to charge. Custer, who was near, placed himself at its head, and off they dashed. As the two columns approached each other the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash, like the falling of timber, betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them. The clashing of sabers, the firing of pistols, the demands for surrender and cries of the combatants now filled the air. As the columns were drawing nearer to each other McIntosh sent his adjutant-general, Captain Walter S. Newhall, to the left with orders to Treichel and Rogers to mount and charge, and also sent Captain S. C. Wagner, of his staff, to rally the headquarters staff, buglers, and orderlies, whilst he himself rode to the Lott house for the 1st Maryland. But Gregg, when he first arrived and looked over the field, had moved the 1st Maryland over to the Low Dutch road, just north of the Hanover road, in order to strengthen his right, and so failing to find this regiment where he had expected, McIntosh gathered up what loose men he could, joined them to his headquarters party and charged. My squadron was still deployed along the edge of Lott's woods. Standing in company with Lieutenant William Brooke-Rawle on a little rise of ground in front of his command, and seeing that the situation was becoming critical, I turned to him



and said: "I have been ordered to hold this position, but, if you will back me up in case I am court-martialed for disobedience, I will order a charge." The lieutenant, always ready to "pitch in," as he expressed it, with an energetic reply convinced me that I would not be deserted. I accordingly directed him to close in the left and Sergeant Heagy the right, while the former should select the proper place for the attack. As soon as his line had rallied, the men fired a volley from their carbines, drew their sabers, sent up a shout, and "sailed in," striking the enemy's left flank about two-thirds down the column. Hart, of the 1st New Jersey, whose squadron was in the woods on my left, soon followed, but directed his charge to the head of the enemy's column. Newhall, when he reached Treichel and Rogers, joined them in their charge, which struck the right flank of the enemy's column, near the color-guard. The standard-bearer, seeing that Newhall was about to seize the colors, lowered his spear, which caught his opponent on the chin, tearing and shattering his lower jaw, and sending him senseless to the earth. Every officer of the party was wounded. My command pressed through the Confederate column, cut off the rear portion and drove it back. In the charge my men became somewhat scattered. A portion of them, however, got into Rummel's lane, in front of the farm-buildings, and there encountered some of Jenkins's men, who seemed stubborn about leaving. † Breathed's battery, unsupported, was only one hundred yards away, but my men were so disabled and scattered that they were unable to take it back.

These flank attacks demoralized the Confederate column. Custer and McIntosh, whose tenacity had kept the head of the column at bay, now got the advantage. Many of the enemy had fallen, Wade Hampton was wounded, and at length the enemy turned. Their column was swept back to its starting-point, and the field was ours.

After the repulse of the enemy's grand charge, McIntosh took the 1st New Jersey and part of the 3d Pennsylvania and Duvall's troop, and established a skirmish line along Little's Run, by Rummel's spring-house and along his lane toward the cross-road, the field of the hand-to-hand contest thus remaining in our possession. The Confederates established their line along the edge of the woods on the summit of Cress's Ridge. Some artillery firing and light skirmishing was kept up until after dark. In the meantime Custer's brigade was relieved and sent to its division. ‡

† Since the war, while going over the field in company with Mr. Rummel, he told me that he had dragged thirty dead horses out of this lane.—W. E. M.

‡ The following incidents will illustrate in some degree with what desperation the men of both sides fought, as well as the character of the struggle. The first two incidents were related by Mr. Rummel, who aided in removing the dead. The last came under my personal notice. On going over the field, Mr. Rummel found two men—one a private in the 3d Pennsylvania, the other a Confederate—who had cut each other down with their sabers, and were lying with their feet together,

their heads in opposite directions, and the blood-stained saber of each still tightly in his grip. At another point he found two men—one a Virginian, the other a 3d Pennsylvania man—who fought on horseback with their sabers until they finally clinched and their horses ran from under them. Their heads and shoulders were severely cut, and when found, their fingers, though stiff in death, were so firmly imbedded in each other's flesh that they could not be removed without the aid of force.

In the midst of the engagement, and immediately in front of Rummel's house, E. G. Eyster of H Company, 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, captured a



With the exception of the Rummel farm buildings, the Confederates held virtually the same line at dark that they held in the morning, but this did not include the field of the main engagement. This was no mere reconnoissance to develop the position or movements of the enemy. Stuart had with him the main strength and the flower of the Confederate cavalry, led by their most distinguished commanders. His force comprised 4 brigades with 20 regiments and battalions and 4 batteries. His avowed object was to strike the rear of the Federal army in coöperation with Pickett's grand attack upon its center. For this movement he succeeded in attaining a most commanding position, and, according to the surmise of Major H. B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, gave to Lee the preconcerted signal for the attack. The field of this cavalry fight was south of the Rummel buildings. To this field Stuart advanced his whole force, engaged in an obstinate and desperate struggle with the Federal cavalry, was driven back out of the field and forced to retire to his original position. At the opening of the engagement Gregg's outposts were on the southern side of the battle-field; at its close they were advanced to its northern side. The losses on both sides show the importance and determined character of the fight. \

dismounted Confederate and covered him with his carbine. Eyster's attention becoming drawn off by the firing around him, the Confederate drew his revolver, shot Eyster's horse, and held the rider a prisoner. Just then Sergeant Gregg of A Company came upon the scene, and with his saber cut the Confederate to the ground. Before Gregg had time to turn another Confederate came up, and, with a right cut, sliced off the top of Gregg's scalp. Gregg, who subsequently rose to a captaincy in his regiment, and who died in 1886, had only to remove his hat to show a head as neatly tonsured as a priest's.

A singular coincidence occurred in connection with the above circumstance. Eyster and Gregg were both taken prisoners in the fight. Gregg, being wounded, was removed in an ambulance, and Eyster, with other prisoners, was compelled

to walk. They were separated on the field. Eyster was sent to prison; Sergeant Gregg was taken to the hospital and was soon afterward exchanged. It so happened that when one came back to the regiment the other was absent, and *vice versa*, so that they never met again until sixteen years afterward at Gettysburg, where the regiment was holding a reunion. In going over the field Eyster was relating the story to Colonel John B. Bachelder, on the very spot where the above scene had occurred, when Gregg came up and they met for the first time since their separation on the ground.—W. E. M.

\ The Union loss, July 3d, was 30, k; 149, w; 75, m,—total, 254. Confederate: 41, k; 50, w; 90 m,—total, 181. The loss in Jenkins's (Confederate) brigade is not included in this computation.—EDITORS.

## MEADE AT GETTYSBURG.

BY FRANCIS A. WALKER, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

**T**HERE is probably no other battle of which men are so prone to think and speak without a conscious reference to the commanding general of the victorious party, as they are regarding Gettysburg. For this there are several reasons.

*First*, General Meade had been in command of the army but three days when the action began.

*Second*, the collision of the two armies on the 1st of July took place while headquarters were at a distance.

*Third*, the battle, on the Union side, was a defensive one. The sword is ever of higher honor than the shield.

*Fourth*, the fact that the Union army occupied a convex line, broke up the battles of the 2d and 3d of July into a series of actions, regarding which it was inevitable that attention should be fixed es-

pecially upon those who commanded at the points successively assaulted.

*Fifth*, the fact that so many eminent officers were killed or severely wounded during the action, had a tendency to concentrate interest upon them. Reynolds, the commander of the left wing, was killed at the first onset. Hancock, the commander of the left center; Sickles, the commander of the Third Corps, and Gibbon, commanding, in Hancock's absence, the Second, were desperately wounded. Such an unusual succession of casualties could not fail to have an effect in distracting attention from the commander-in-chief.

*Sixth*, the people of the North have ever loved to think of Gettysburg as a soldier's battle. In a great measure the wish has been father to the thought. But, indeed, there was something in the



change of tone in the Army of the Potomac, as it turned from the gloomy region of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville to throw itself in the path of the invading army, which justifies that view.

*Seventh*, much of the effect we are considering was due to General Meade's disinclination to assert himself against hostile criticism. He did, indeed, show a proper resentment of the blame thrown upon him for allowing the retreat of Lee; but during the years of life which remained he took little pains to vindicate himself against aspersion and disparagement, or even to put upon record the orders and dispositions of the battle.

It is my purpose to show that at Gettysburg the Army of the Potomac had a commander in every sense; that, in spite of misadventures and miscarriages, the action was fought according to his plans and under his direction as nearly as usually happens in war; and that his presence and watchful care, his moral courage and tenacity of purpose, contributed largely to the result.

When, on the 28th of June, 1863, General Meade relieved General Hooker, who, since the 13th, had been moving northward, interposing the Army of the Potomac continually between the Confederate forces and Washington, the right wing of that army lay at Frederick, Maryland, while the left occupied Boonsboro' and Middletown, and held the passes of the South Mountain. One corps, however, had been detached, but was returning to Frederick. It is in the disposition General Meade made of this corps that we find the chief difference between his conception of the strategy suitable to the campaign then approaching its culmination and that which had been entertained by his predecessor. The absent corps was the Twelfth, under Slocum, which had been pushed toward Harper's Ferry, with a view to advancing thence upon Lee's line of supply, and even following up the rear of the Confederate army. This corps Hooker had desired to reinforce by the large garrison of Harper's Ferry, abandoning that post as useless for strategic purposes. This General Halleck, at Washington, positively refused to permit. Thereupon Hooker ordered the Twelfth Corps back, and requested to be relieved.

When, however, Meade had been placed in command, Halleck conceded to him the power of diminishing the garrison at Harper's Ferry to any extent consistent with holding that post. The new commander was thus in a position to prosecute the contemplated enterprise in Lee's rear. Instead of doing so, he included the Twelfth Corps in his plan for a forward movement of the whole army directly northward, to be undertaken on the 29th and pushed with the utmost vigor till the encounter should take place.

This abandonment of the projected movement

☆ "The wisdom of Hooker's policy in desiring to assail the rebel communications is demonstrated by the fact that Lee immediately turned back. The head of the serpent faced about as soon as its tail was trodden upon." (Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.")

against Lee's line of communication has been severely criticised by General Doubleday. That writer assumes that it was intelligence of Slocum's enterprise which caused Lee to loose his hold upon the Susquehanna and concentrate his forces at Gettysburg. ☆ He adds the opinion that "if he (Lee) had known that Meade was about to withdraw all the troops acting against his line of retreat, he would probably have gone on and taken Harrisburg."

Whatever General Lee might have thought of the projected enterprise under Slocum, had he known of it, he, in fact, knew nothing whatever concerning it. The only intelligence that reached him was that the Union army had crossed the Potomac on the 25th, at Edwards's Ferry, moving toward Frederick and Boonsboro'. It was this, and only this, which determined his march upon Gettysburg.†

More remains to be said. Meade's movement northward from Frederick, with his whole army, was a severer threat to Lee than a persistence in Hooker's plan. The movement against the Confederate communications through Harper's Ferry was correct enough, provided the bulk of the army was to remain at Frederick; but had the army moved northward while Slocum followed up Lee's rear, on the other side of the river and the mountains, there would have been every reason to anticipate essentially the same result as that which followed Hooker's division of his forces at Chancellorsville. On the other hand, Meade, by marching northward, did not relinquish the opportunity of moving to the west against Lee's communications, which could at any time have been done through Mechanicstown (to Hagerstown) just as effectively as from Harper's Ferry. [See map, p. 246.]

How far Meade's better choice was a mere matter of military judgment; how far it was due to the accident that the new commander was himself a Pennsylvanian it is difficult to say. There can, I think, be no doubt that the special instincts of local patriotism had much to do with bringing on and fighting through to a successful conclusion the battle of Gettysburg. It is remarkable that, in the one Pennsylvania battle of the war, the men of that State should have borne so prominent a part. It was a Pennsylvanian who directed the movement on Gettysburg and commanded there in chief. It was a Pennsylvanian who hurried the left wing into action and lost his life in determining that the battle should be fought at Gettysburg, and not on any line more remote. It was a Pennsylvanian who came up to check the rout and hold Cemetery Hill for the Union arms, who commanded the left center in the great battle of the second day, and on the third received and repelled the attack of Pettigrew and Pickett.

For one, I entertain no doubt that the military

† General Lee's official report says: "The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout, on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching the South Mountain."



judgment of General Meade, which dictated his decision on the 28th of June to adopt the direct and more effective plan of moving straight northward from Frederick, instead of persisting in the division of the army which Hooker had initiated, was largely influenced by that intensity of feeling which actuated him as a Pennsylvanian. At such a crisis, stress of feeling drives the intellect to its highest work. So long as moral forces enter into the conduct of war, can we doubt that it was fortunate for the Union arms that they so largely were Pennsylvanians who hurried forward the troops in their long and painful marches northward, and who threw the veteran corps of the Potomac upon the invading army?

Widely spread as the Confederate army was when General Meade took command of the Union forces,—Longstreet at Chambersburg, Ewell at Carlisle and York,—it was a matter of course that the serious collision should be a surprise to one or the other party, and that accident should determine which should encounter its antagonist with the advantage in concentration. It turned out that the collision was a surprise to both commanders, and chance gave the advantage of greater concentration to the Confederates. Meade, leaving Frederick on the 29th, moved rapidly northward, extending his wings sufficiently to cover alike the road by which Lee might attempt to move to Washington and that by which he might march to Baltimore. He could not conjecture where, amid the fiery cloud of Southern raiders extending from the Cumberland Valley to the Susquehanna, was to be found the real nucleus of that formidable army; nor had the Confederate commander furnished any indication of his purpose. But on the same day, General Lee, having the evening before learned of the crossing of the Potomac by Hooker, recalled his advanced divisions from Carlisle and York, and threw forward Hill and Longstreet, with a view to a concentration at Gettysburg. During the 30th the two armies continued rapidly to approach each other, until, on the morning of the 1st of July, a stunning collision took place between the heads of Lee's columns and our left wing under Reynolds. In the two days that had passed, the Union forces had made nearly twice as long marches as the Confederates. The risk that one of Meade's columns would somewhere encounter the enemy in greater force, was an inevitable incident of so impetuous a forward movement.

But while Meade intended, by his rapid advance, to compel Lee to loose his hold upon the Susquehanna, he had wisely determined to fight a de-

fensive battle, and had selected the line of Pipe Creek as that most suitable for covering Washington and Baltimore.

It was the noble impetuosity of Reynolds, pushing forward to support Buford's hard-pressed but stubborn cavalry, which transformed the movement of the left wing from a reconnoissance into an attack upon Lee's advancing columns, and committed the Union army to battle at Gettysburg. The reports which, at noon of the 1st of July, reached the new commander at Taneytown, brought news that Reynolds had fallen, together with intimations of disaster to his adventurous column. The first act of General Meade, as commander-in-chief in the immediate presence of the enemy, was one which exhibited moral courage, insight into character, and rapidity of decision. This was to dispatch Hancock to the front, <sup>¶</sup> with full powers to take command and do whatever might be necessary to save the day, and with instructions to report upon the nature of the position. It is difficult for us, now, to appreciate what this decision meant, on the part of Meade. Himself but three days at the head of the army, he was sending an officer, who had but three weeks before left his division, to assume command of three corps, over two officers who were his seniors. When one remembers how strong is the respect for rank among the higher officers, and how greatly the oldest commander is subject to the public sentiment of his army,—when one recalls that even Grant recognized Burnside's claim to command at the Mine,—this act of General Meade becomes one of the boldest in the history of our war. That it was also one of the most judicious, is abundantly established. No other man except, perhaps, Sheridan, arriving on that field of disaster, could have done what Hancock did in checking the rout, in establishing order, in restoring confidence, and in making the dispositions which caused Lee to postpone his contemplated assault on Cemetery Hill.

The further news of the opening battle brought upon General Meade the necessity for a choice which might well have caused deep anxiety and protracted doubt to a veteran commander. The Fifth and Sixth corps were still far distant from the field; the former about twenty, the latter more than thirty miles away. The fighting of the day had shown the superior concentration of Lee's forces; and all night long his fast-marching divisions would, doubtless, be pressing down the roads leading to Gettysburg, and wheeling into their places in the Confederate line. Two of the

<sup>¶</sup> The Comte de Paris says that Meade "should have gone in person to reconnoiter the localities around which the conflict was carried on, being only separated from it by about thirteen miles." He says that Meade was "unwilling to go," and "declined assuming the responsibility" of deciding whether it was expedient to deliver battle at Gettysburg or fall back to Pipe Creek; that, had he gone forward himself, "the concentration of the army would have been effected with more speed."

The last-indicated advantage certainly is fictitious. Why should the transmission of orders to the more distant points have been more rapid from Gettysburg than

from Taneytown? The manner in which the Fifth and Sixth corps were actually brought up showed no loss of time in effecting "the concentration of the army."

The charge that Meade, in remaining at Taneytown, declined to assume the proper responsibilities of his position, is unfounded and unjust. How could the Union commander know that he might not the very next hour hear of a collision at some other point? His true place, *until he had made up his mind where to concentrate*, was the most central point. To go to Gettysburg was to leave a position which was midway between his two wings, and was also between Gettysburg and the proposed line on Pipe Creek.—F. A. W.



Union corps, the First and Eleventh, had been put nearly *hors de combat*. With only three corps in fair fighting condition which could be upon the ground at daybreak, should the risks of an early morning battle be taken? General Meade's decision was here as brave as it proved fortunate; and his inspired rashness, like that of Reynolds in the morning, was of the kind which wins battles and saves states.

In his dispositions to meet the enemy's attack, on the 2d of July, it seems probable that General Meade, who had come upon the ground after midnight, and, in the cemetery, had met and conferred with Howard, anticipated that the weight of the Confederate force would be thrown upon Cemetery Hill, or else that the enemy would work around our right in order to get possession of the Baltimore pike. The fighting of the previous day had given undue emphasis to the importance of this end of the line. I am disposed to believe that General Meade's somewhat vague orders to Sickles, and his failure personally to inspect the left of the line after daybreak in the morning, ↓ were the result of a conviction that the battle was to be fought upon the center and right.

I have spoken of the orders to Sickles as somewhat vague. It would be more correct to speak of them as lacking emphasis rather than distinctness. Those orders were explicit enough to have been obeyed without difficulty, had proper care been taken to observe them. They were, that Sickles should take up the position from which Geary's division was to withdraw, in order to rejoin its own corps, the Twelfth, on the extreme right. Little Round Top, which forms a natural bastion, enflading the low "curtain" known as Cemetery Ridge, strongly attracted the attention of Hancock on the afternoon of the 1st, and he dispatched that division, the first of the Twelfth Corps to arrive, with instructions to take position on the left of the First Corps and extend its own left to the hill. These instructions Geary had intelligently carried out, some of his regiments passing the night on Little Round Top. The slow development of Sickles's corps ¶ had allowed Geary, in pursuance of his own orders, to withdraw from his position of the night without being actually relieved therein; but a very little of good staff work would have sufficed to show where the line had been. Troops do not occupy ground without leaving palpable evidence of their presence. Meanwhile, the Second Corps had come up and taken position on Cemetery Ridge; the First Corps had been concentrated on the right; and Sickles's orders were repeated to him, by General Meade in person, to extend his command from the left of the Second Corps over the ground previously held

by Geary. Those instructions should have sufficed; and yet the presence of General Meade for but a few moments, at that time, upon that part of the line, would have added an assurance that his plans were being carried out. As it proved, it was left to Meade to ascertain, in the crisis of the battle, that Little Round Top was unoccupied and uncovered. The promptitude and energy of that brilliant young officer, General G. K. Warren, and his instantaneous acceptance of grave responsibility in detaching troops of the Fifth Corps on a hurried march to reinforce Sickles, finally secured that vitally important position.

It does not come within the scope of this paper, nor is it necessary, to comment on the action of General Sickles in advancing his troops to the Emmitsburg road, breaking connection with Hancock on the right, and leaving Little Round Top undefended on his left and rear. There can be no question that he both made a mistake in point of judgment and failed properly to subordinate his views and acts to the instructions of his commander. That he defended the position he had taken with courage and address, and that his splendid troops exhibited unsurpassed gallantry and resolution, must be admitted by even the severest critic. General Meade, who had sought to withdraw the Third Corps from its false position, was compelled to desist when the roar of musketry told that the conflict had begun, and had to content himself with reinforcing the widely extended lines and hastily stopping the gaps through which the Confederates streamed in continually swelling numbers. Few commanders ever showed more resolution in fighting a seemingly lost battle, advanced their reserves more promptly, or stripped other parts of their lines with less hesitation. The Fifth Corps was instantly sent forward; Caldwell's division and Willard's brigade, of the Second Corps, were thrown into the furious fight; General Meade himself brought up the reinforcements from the First and Twelfth corps, which finally completed the new line behind Plum Run, from which the exhausted Confederates fell back at nightfall. If one will compare the energy in which this action was conducted by General Meade with previous experiences of the Army of the Potomac, especially remembering the manner in which Porter was left to be overwhelmed at Gaines's Mill, the disconnected and desultory fighting at Antietam, and the conduct of affairs at Chancellorsville, one cannot fail to acknowledge that never before had the divisions of that army so closely supported each other or been so unreservedly thrown into the fight when and where most needed. ✕

The fall of night found the Potomac army in a situation that demanded the most grave and seri-

↓ General Meade did, indeed, ride over the line on the left, about 1 o'clock; but it was then too dark to see the whole field, or to get a very clear view of anything.—F. A. W.

¶ In his letter to Colonel Benedict, March 16th, 1870, General Meade states that Geary informed him that, "after waiting for some time to be relieved, he sent to General Sickles a staff-officer with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask, if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that General

Sickles would send one of his staff to see the ground and to place troops there on their arrival. He received, for reply, that General Sickles would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came."—F. A. W.

✕ "You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better, than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before."—HALLECK to MEADE, July 28th, 1863.—F. A. W.





MONUMENT TO THE 1ST MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY, ON THE SITE OF SEDGWICK'S HEADQUARTERS.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

ous consideration. We had repulsed the last assaults; but nearly twelve thousand men had fallen in the desperate battle of the afternoon; our whole left had been beaten back to the position assigned it in the morning; the two corps chiefly engaged, the Third and Fifth, had been shockingly depleted; the enemy had taken advantage of the absence of the greater portion of the Twelfth Corps to push around our right and seize a part of our line, holding, thus, an open gateway through which their troops could be advanced to seize the Baltimore pike. It was, indeed, a gloomy hour when General Meade assembled his corps commanders to consult upon the situation and to frame plans for the morrow. Fortunately, the spirit of the army was high and stern; the corps commanders were unanimous in the opinion that the battle should be fought out on existing lines; and the commander-in-chief remained resolute in the face of the terrible responsibilities confronting him.

It has been alleged, with much of circumstance, that General Meade sought to retreat from Gettysburg, and he carried to his grave this arrow ranking in his breast. Had that charge been substantiated it would have answered the double

purpose of diminishing the fame of the commander-in-chief, and of giving to the advance upon the left the high credit of a movement which held the army at Gettysburg and brought about the conflict from which its commander was disposed to slink away.

The day of the 2d of July divides itself, for the present purpose, into three periods: before, during, and after the battle of the afternoon. Regarding the first period, General Butterfield declares that General Meade directed him, as chief-of-staff, to prepare plans for the withdrawal of the army. Were this admitted, it would prove nothing, since every general is bound to consider the contingency of defeat. Moreover, at Gettysburg there was an especial reason for being prepared for a sudden movement to the rear, inasmuch as the position which the army occupied was liable to be turned on the left. There was another weakness of the position calling for special precautions, viz.: the roads by which the Union army would have had to retreat, if beaten, ran back from the line of battle at an acute angle. But Butterfield's statement was directly contradicted by General Meade, ☆ than whom no man was more truthful. It is, moreover, inconsistent with the dispatch sent to Halleck

☆ Before the Committee on the Conduct of the War General Meade testified as follows:

"I have understood that an idea has prevailed that I intended an order should be issued on the morning of the 2d of July, requiring the withdrawal of the army or the

retreat of the army from Gettysburg, which order was not issued owing simply to the attack of the enemy having prevented it. In reply to that, I have only to say that I have no recollection of ever having directed such an order to be issued, or ever having contemplated the issuing of such an order, and that it does seem to me that to any intelligent mind who



at 3 o'clock in the afternoon: "I have delayed attacking, to allow the Sixth Corps and parts of other corps to reach this place and rest the men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack."

The charge that General Meade, during the battle of the afternoon, actually undertook to retreat from the presence of the enemy, is founded upon a statement of General Pleasanton, dated October 16th, 1865, that at 5 o'clock, which was be-

is made acquainted with the great exertions I made to mass my army at Gettysburg on the night of July 1st, it must appear entirely incomprehensible that I should order it to retreat, after collecting all my army there, before the enemy had done anything to require me to make a movement of that kind."

At another time General Meade testified as follows:

"I deny under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be known—I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies, which the future should develop during the course of the day, might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn."

Of the witnesses referred to by General Meade, General Henry J. Hunt denied any knowledge of such an order or of such intention to retreat. See also p. 297.

That part of General Daniel Butterfield's testimony relating to the matter reads as follows:

"General Meade then directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position. I stated to him that it would be necessary that I should know the exact position of the troops."

Question: "What day of the fight was this?"

Answer: "This was in the morning of the 2d of July, before the battle of that day had commenced. I stated to General Meade that I could not prepare the order properly without first going over the field and ascertaining the positions of each division and corps of the army with relation to the roads. General Meade replied that he could not wait for that—that he could show me where the troops were. He then took a pencil and a piece of paper and made a rough sketch, showing the position of the different corps. I stated to him that the order was one requiring a great deal of care in its preparation; that it involved something more than logistics, as we were in the presence of the enemy, and that while preparing it I must not be interrupted by anybody coming to me with dispatches or orders. He said, 'Very well, you shall not be interrupted.' I told him I thought I could not prepare the order without a more accurate sketch, and I would have to send out to the corps commanders to give me a report of the position of their troops in regard to the various roads; that in the meanwhile I could be studying the maps. He said, 'Very well, do so.' I went upstairs, and, after carefully studying the maps, I prepared the order for the withdrawal of the army from the field of Gettysburg. After finishing it I presented it to General Meade, and it met his approval. I then stated to him that it would be a great deal better if that order was to be executed, as it might involve grave consequences if not properly executed, to submit it for careful examination to such general officers as were then present, with a view of giving them an opportunity of finding any fault with it then, so that no misunderstanding should arise from the manner in which it was worded or expressed. He said there was no objection to having it done. I called General Gibbon, who was present, and, I think, General Williams and General Ingalls, and stated to them that I had been directed to prepare this order, and that I would be very much obliged to any of them if they would look it over and point out any faults in it then, rather than after it was put into execution; that I desired it scrutinized carefully with a view of discovering anything in it which might be misunderstood. Some of these officers—I do not remember which; I am very sure General Gibbon was one—I think General Hancock was there, but whether he read it over or not I am not sure—some of

fore Sickles's line had given way, he was directed to collect what cavalry he could and prepare to cover a retreat. This, again, if admitted, would amount to no more than a measure of precaution. But that statement is not only wholly uncorroborated by the official reports of the battle, Pleasanton's included, but it is inconsistent with Pleasanton's own testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in March, 1864, in the course of which, on being asked whether he knew of General Meade "ever having had any idea of retreating from Gettysburg," he replied that he "did not

the officers read it over and said that they thought it was correctly prepared. The corps commanders were then sent for by General Meade to report to headquarters. The order which I had prepared was given to General Williams, and was copied by the clerks, or was in process of being copied by them. As General Sickles rode up to headquarters, in pursuance of the request of General Meade, the battle broke out in front of General Sickles's corps, and there was no council held. General Sickles returned immediately, and every corps commander then rode immediately to his command. Without my memoranda I cannot fix the hour of this occurrence, but it was during the 2d day of July. . . ."

Question: "Did this collision of General Sickles's corps with the enemy prevent the order being executed which you had prepared?"

Answer: "It is impossible for me to state that, because General Meade had not communicated to me his intention to execute the order regardless of the opinion of the corps commanders, or whether he intended to have the order submitted to them. He merely directed me to prepare such an order, which I did. It is for him to say whether he intended to execute it or not. He may have desired it prepared for an emergency without any view of executing it then, or he may have had it prepared with a full view of its execution."

Question: "The collision of Sickles's troops with the enemy broke up the council?"

Answer: "It prevented any consultation of corps commanders at that time. . . ."

General Seth Williams, assistant adjutant-general on Meade's staff, testified:

"In regard to the order of the 2d of July, to the best of my recollection and belief, the chief-of-staff either handed to me or to my clerk an order looking to a contingency which possibly might happen, of the army being compelled to assume a new position. To the best of my belief such an order was prepared, and I presume it may have been signed by me and possibly copies may have been prepared for the corps and other commanders. Orders of such character are usually made out in manifold in order to save time. The particular order in question, however, was never distributed; no vestige of it is to be found among any of the records of my office, and it must have been destroyed within a day or two after it was prepared. I have no reason to suppose other than the fact that the order was given to me or my chief clerk by the chief-of-staff, that General Meade had any knowledge of it. It was not for me to look beyond the orders of the chief-of-staff. Whether or not a copy of that order was given to Major-General Butterfield, who was then acting as chief-of-staff, I am unable to say, and I cannot certainly state whether the rough draft was ever handed back to him. I only know that there is nothing in relation to that order to be found among the records in my charge. The order was never recorded, or issued in any sense. I do not now remember the exact tenor of the order, but to the best of my belief it was an order which, if carried out, would have involved a retrograde movement of the army."

General John Gibbon testified that General Butterfield asked him to read the order for retreat and to compare it with a map. He added:

"General Butterfield did not say General Meade did intend to leave; he merely said something to the effect that it was necessary to be prepared in case it should be necessary to leave, or some remark of that kind. He then showed me the order, and either he read it over and I pointed out the places on the map, or I read it over and he pointed out the places to which each corps was to go. When he got through, I remarked that it was all correctly drawn up."

EDITORS.



remember." What is the degree of probability that a chief of cavalry, who had, on so important an occasion as this, been engaged from 5 until 12 o'clock in bringing up and disposing his troops to cover the retreat of his army, should, first, have omitted to mention it in his official report, and, secondly, have failed to remember it nine months later, in reply to a specific and highly suggestive inquiry?

That on the evening of the 2d, after the battle, General Meade was disinclined to await further attacks in his position, is an imputation which rests upon much higher authority, for it has the word of General Slocum, an officer of honor, dignity of character, and firmness of purpose. Referring to the council of war, General Slocum, in a letter dated February 19th, 1883, makes the following statement: "When each officer had expressed his views General Meade said: 'Well, gentlemen, the question is settled; we will remain here, but I wish to say I consider this no place to fight a battle.'"

I would not speak lightly of any word of General Slocum, but it is far more probable that, at such a distance of time, he was mistaken, than that General Sedgwick had forgotten the incidents of the council when he wrote, on March 10th, 1864, "At no time, in my presence, did the general commanding insist upon or advise a withdrawal of the army."

On the same point, General Gibbon wrote: "I never heard General Meade say one word in favor of a retreat, nor do I believe that he did so." General A. S. Williams testified: "I heard no expression from him which led me to think he was in favor of withdrawing the army from before Gettysburg." At a later date, General Howard wrote to Colonel George Meade, "I did not hear your father utter a word which made me think that he then favored a withdrawal of his troops."

Certainly, if General Meade had such a momentary feeling as General Slocum understood him to express, it was in direct contradiction to his acts and words and bearing throughout those three memorable days. At all other times his spirit was bold and martial. From first to last he bore himself as one who came to fight, who wanted to fight, and who could not have too much fighting on equal terms. Whatever opinion men may hold as to the grade of Meade's generalship, those do him a gross injustice who represent him as ever, in any case, timid, vacillating, or reluctant to encounter the enemy. On the contrary, he was a man in whom high military scholarship and a serious sense of responsibility were often in conflict with "creature pugnacity" and stubbornness of temper.

Of the battle of the third day, the purpose of this paper requires us to say but little. When the lines had been rectified upon the left, and the Round Tops had been made secure, when the

positions of the troops had been readjusted to secure due strength in every part, when all the points from which effective artillery fire could be obtained had been occupied, and when the intruding enemy upon the right had been driven out in the early morning by the energetic attack of the Twelfth Corps, reinforced from the Sixth,—when all this had been done, little remained but to await the assault which it was known General Lee must needs deliver, whether to prosecute his enterprise or to excuse his retreat. All that long morning, amid the dread silence, no man in the Potomac army could conjecture where that assault would be delivered; but no man in all that army doubted that it was to come.

At last the blow fell. As the spear of Menelaus pierced the shield of his antagonist, cut through the shining breastplate, but spared the life, so the division of Pickett, launched from Seminary Ridge, broke through the Union defense, and for the moment thrust its head of column within our lines, threatening destruction to the Army of the Potomac; then the broken brigades fled, with the loss of more than half their numbers, across the plain, which was shrieking with the fire of a hundred guns, and Gettysburg had been fought and won for the Union arms.

Into the questions, whether Meade should not have followed up the repulse of Pickett with a general advance of his own line, or, failing this, have attacked Lee at Falling Waters, on the 13th of July, we have no call to enter. General Meade was here entirely within his competence as the commander of an army. Any officer who is fit to be intrusted with such a charge is entitled to the presumption that, for decisions such as these, he had good and sufficient reasons, whatever may, at the time, have been the opinion of subordinates on whom did not rest the final responsibility of success or failure; yet in fact, in both these decisions General Meade was supported by a preponderance of authoritative opinion among his corps commanders and the staff-officers of greatest reputation.

I believe that, as time goes on and the events of the last days of June and the first days of July, 1863, are more and more carefully studied, in the light of all the facts, and with an impartial and dispassionate spirit, the weighty judgment of the illustrious chief of the Union artillery, General Henry J. Hunt, <sup>1</sup> will be more and more fully approved. "He was right in his orders as to Pipe Creek; right, in his determination under certain circumstances to fall back to it; right, in pushing up to Gettysburg after the battle commenced; right, in remaining there; right, in making his battle a purely defensive one; right, therefore, in taking the line he did; right, in not attempting a counter-attack at any stage of the battle; right, as to his pursuit of Lee."

<sup>1</sup> In his letter to General A. S. Webb, January 19th, 1888, quoted by permission.—F. A. W.



## THE MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY.†

### I. A LETTER FROM GENERAL MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC, PHILADELPHIA, March 16th, 1870.

[Private.]

[COLONEL] G. G. BENEDICT, Burlington, Vt.

DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 13th inst., as also the copies of the "Free Press," with editorials and comments on the address of Colonel [W. W.] Grout before the Officers' Society and Legislature of the State.‡

I have carefully read your articles and feel personally under great obligations to you for the clear and conclusive manner in which you have vindicated the truth of history. I find nothing to correct in your statements except a fact you mention, which is a misapprehension.

I did not invite General Humphreys to be my chief-of-staff till after the battle, because I did not see him after assuming command till I met him on the field, and besides I relied on him as a mainstay in handling the Third Corps, and did not wish to withdraw him from that position.↓

I did ask General [Seth] Williams to assume the duties in addition to those of adjutant-general, but he declined. I also asked General Warren, then my chief-of-engineers, to act temporarily as chief-of-staff, but he also declined taking on himself additional duties. Under these circumstances I asked General Butterfield to remain till I had time to make permanent arrangements [see p. 243]. On the third day General Butterfield, having been disabled by being struck with a fragment of a spent shell, left the army, and a few days afterward General Humphreys accepted my invitation.

My defense against the charges and insinuations of Generals Sickles and Butterfield is to be found in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. I have avoided any controversy with either of these officers—though both have allowed no opportunity to pass unimproved which permitted them to circulate their ex-parte statements, and, as you justly say, to *distort* history for their purposes. Both perfectly understand what I meant by my ante-battle order, referring to Pipe Creek, also my instructions to Butterfield on the morning of the 2d, which he persists in calling an order for retreat, in the face of all my other acts, and of the fact that I did not retreat when I could have done so with perfect ease *at any moment*. Longstreet's advice to Lee [to move from his right upon General Meade's communications] was sound military sense; it was the step I feared Lee would take, and to meet which and be prepared for which was the object of my instructions to Butterfield, which he has so misrepresented. Now, let

me tell you another historical fact. Lieutenant-General Ewell, in a conversation held with me shortly after the war, asked what would have been the effect if at 4 P. M. on the 1st he had occupied Culp's Hill and established batteries on it. I told him that in my judgment, in the condition of the Eleventh and First corps, with their *morale* affected by their withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge with the loss of over half their numbers in killed, wounded, and missing (of the 6000 prisoners we lost in the field nearly all came from these corps



MONUMENT IN THE GETTYSBURG CEMETERY.

in the first day), his occupation of Culp's Hill, with batteries commanding the whole of Cemetery Ridge, would have produced the evacuation of that ridge and the withdrawal of the troops there by the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown and Emmitsburg roads. He then informed me that at 4 P. M. on the 1st he had his corps, 20,000 strong, in column of attack, and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General Lee directing him to assume the defensive and not to advance; that he sent to General Lee urging to be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the reply was a reiteration of the

to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Meade, on assuming command of the army at Frederick, expressed his desire to appoint General Humphreys his chief-of-staff, but that officer wishing to retain command of his division in the Third Corps during the impending battle, the decision was postponed.—EDITORS.

† See also the preceding article.—EDITORS.

‡ The substance of these editorials in the Burlington "Free Press" will be found in the appendix to the second edition of Colonel Benedict's work, "Vermont at Gettysburg."—EDITORS.

↓ According to General A. A. Humphreys's statement



previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had restrained him, he said our troops coming up (Slocum's) were visible, and Lee was under the impression that the greater part of my army was on the ground and deemed it prudent to await the rest of his—as you quote from his report.

But suppose Ewell with 20,000 men had occupied Culp's Hill, and our brave soldiers had been compelled to evacuate Cemetery Ridge and withdraw on the roads above referred to, would the Pipe Creek order have been so very much out of place?

That order was to meet the very contingency here in question, to wit: A part of my army, overwhelmed by superior numbers, compelled to fall back, and a line of battle, formed to the rear of my most advanced position, thus necessitated.

As to General Sickles having by his advance brought on an attack, and thus compelled the battle which decided the war, you have completely answered—and it is a very favorite theory with the partisans of this officer. But these gentlemen ignore the fact that of the 18,000 men killed and wounded on the field during the whole battle more than two-thirds were lost on the second day, and but for the timely advance of the Fifth Corps and the prompt sending a portion on Round Top, where they met the enemy almost on the crest and had a desperate fight to secure the position—I say but for these circumstances, over which Sickles had neither knowledge nor control, the enemy would have secured Round Top, planted his artillery there, commanding the whole battle-field, and what the result would have been I leave you to judge. Now, when I wrote my report of the battle I honestly believed General Sickles did not know where I wished him to go, and that his error arose from a misapprehension of my orders; but I have recently learned from General Geary, who had the day before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who in doing so had seen the great importance of Round Top, and *posted a brigade on it*, that on the morning of the 2d, when he received my order that he would be relieved by the Third Corps and on being relieved would rejoin his own corps (Twelfth) on the right, after waiting for some

time to be relieved he sent to General Sickles a staff-officer with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask, if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that General Sickles would send one of his staff to see the ground, and to place troops there on their arrival. He received for reply that General Sickles would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came, and after waiting till his patience was exhausted General Geary withdrew and joined his corps. Now my first orders to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps division (Geary's) and occupy their position. Here is evidence that he knew the position occupied by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore, when he came to my headquarters at about noon and said he did not know where to go, I answered, "Why you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps." He said they had no position; they were massed, awaiting events. Then it was I told him his *right* was to be *Hancock's left*, his *left* on *Round Top*, which I pointed out. Now his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left and his left one-quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that *key-point unoccupied*, which ought to have been occupied by Longstreet before we could get there with the Fifth Corps. Sickles's movement practically destroyed his own corps, the Third, caused a loss of 50 per cent. in the Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged the Second Corps; as I said before, producing 66 per cent. of the loss of the whole battle; and with what result?—driving us back to the position he was ordered to hold originally. These losses of the first and second day affected greatly the efficiency and *morale* of the army and prevented my having the audacity in the offense that I might otherwise have had.

If this is an advantage—to be so crippled in battle without attaining an object—I must confess I cannot see it.

Pardon my writing with so much prolixity, but your generous defense and the clear view you have taken of the battle have led me to wander thus far.

Very truly yours,

GEO. G. MEADE.

## II. REPLY BY DANIEL E. SICKLES, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.†

ONLY a cursory perusal of General Meade's letter suggests the reason why he wished it treated as confidential. It must have been written without deliberation, without revision, and without comparison with the official records. It contradicts his own official report of the battle made in October, 1863, and his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in March, 1864.

General Meade is altogether mistaken in speaking of charges and insinuations and attacks upon him made by me. I have never spoken of his conduct at Gettysburg except in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in February, 1864. General Meade's testimony was given in the following month and with full

knowledge of all my statements, none of which were contradicted by him when he testified. The report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War justified me and censured General Meade.

It must not be supposed that General Meade had a controversy with me only. Other corps commanders made protests when I was silent. I will only speak now of one or two as examples. Immediately after General Meade's report of the battle of Gettysburg, Major-General Slocum, commanding the right wing of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, in an official communication to General Meade, arraigned him for a series of inaccuracies, to use the mildest phrase, in General Meade's official report of Gettysburg, by which

† From the "New York Times" of August 14th, 1886. Revised by General Sickles for this work, June 26th, 1888.—EDITORS.



grave injustice was done to Major-General Slocum and the corps under his command. After reciting so much of General Meade's report as relates to the operations of his command, General Slocum says: "Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse of the above in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts as set forth in the reports of General Geary and General Williams."

Brigadier-General Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, in an official communication to Major-General Slocum, dated December 26th, 1863, points out four serious misstatements in General Meade's official report relating to the operations of the Twelfth Corps on the 2d of July. The character of these complaints will be understood when I quote from General Williams that they consist "in wholly ignoring the operations of the First Division" and "in repudiating most of the material statements of my report as temporary commander of this army corps"; also "in ignoring the splendid conduct of Greene's brigade, which held our intrenched line on the right," and in giving credit for Greene's fight to Geary's division, which was not in the fight at all, but got lost on the road to Two Taverns. General Williams concludes his protest in these words, referring to General Meade's official report of Gettysburg: "I confess to have read that part of his official report relating to the Twelfth Corps with a mixed feeling of astonishment and regret." ¶

I could amplify similar proofs, showing the characteristic inaccuracy of General Meade in his official reports of his military operations, but will not now trespass upon your space in that direction. General Meade knew nothing of Gettysburg. He so stated to the Committee on the Conduct of the War. He speaks of Gettysburg in these words: "A place I had never seen in my life and had no more knowledge of than you have now" (addressing the committee). This is not said censoriously, for General Meade had only been in command three days and had already chosen another battle-field, on the line of Pipe Clay Creek, twenty miles distant. General Meade was drawn to Gettysburg in spite of his plans, because Lee had chosen Gettysburg as his place of concentration, and because Buford and Reynolds had accepted battle there, forcing General Meade to give up his Pipe Creek line and come to Gettysburg. I assisted in this, first, by moving my corps twelve miles from Emmitsburg to Gettysburg, on the afternoon of July 1st, to help Howard after Reynolds fell; also by my letter to General Meade, written at Gettysburg at 9 o'clock on the night of July 1st, asking his approval of my march, made without orders, and urging him to come to Gettysburg with his army, describing it as "a good place to fight a battle," and pointing out to him that its weak place would be "on his left," as it proved to be the next day, when I was unsupported for two hours in resisting Longstreet's assault. After General Meade had brought his forces up to Gettysburg and had reconnoitered the position, he was dissatisfied, and frequently

spoke of it, during the 2d, as "no place to fight a battle." He so expressed himself in the council of war held on the night of the 2d. After this council had decided to stay and fight it out, General Slocum thus describes what took place: General Meade said, "Well, gentlemen, the question is settled; we will remain here; but I wish to say that I consider this no place to fight a battle." This was after the combats of the 1st and 2d of July, and after twenty thousand Union soldiers had fallen on that field.

General Meade seemed to manifest resentment against every corps commander who had been instrumental in the choice of Gettysburg as our battle-field. He owed his splendid position there to Buford, Reynolds, and Howard, and the divisions of Wadsworth, Doubleday, and Robinson. Yet all of these officers, except Reynolds, who was killed, suffered marks of his displeasure or were mentioned with the scantiest recognition of their heroic conduct. In Howard's case Congress interposed to do him justice, when he received its formal vote of thanks for his choice of our position on Cemetery Ridge, the Gibraltar of Gettysburg.

General Meade was surprised by the attack of Longstreet, on the Union left, on the afternoon of the 2d of July. No preparations whatever were made by the commanding general to meet Longstreet's assault. There was no order of battle. General Meade had not personally reconnoitered the position, though frequently solicited by General Hunt, General Meade's chief of artillery, General Warren, his chief of engineers, and myself, to do so. This appears in the testimony of General Hunt and in the report of General Tremain, my senior aide-de-camp. Not only was no preparation made by General Meade to meet the attack upon his left,—the position I held,—but he deprived me and himself of the most effective support he had on his left flank by the unaccountable withdrawal of Buford's division of cavalry, which held the Emmitsburg road and covered our left flank, including Round Top, until a late hour on the morning of the 2d. Geary's division of infantry had been withdrawn from the left very early in the morning of the 2d. These dispositions imposed upon me, thus weakened by the withdrawal of two divisions, the sole responsibility of resisting the formidable attack of General Lee upon our left flank. The first support that reached me was Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps; it got into position after 5 o'clock in the afternoon, two hours after the battle opened.

The Comte de Paris, in his critical history of the war, incomparably the ablest yet written, thus speaks of the withdrawal of General Buford's division:

"One of those blunders that frequently occur on the battle-field was the means of compromising the safety of the Federal line just in that part which will be the first to be menaced."

This was my front. The Count continues:

"Buford alone covered this flank. Meade only learned this fact at 1 o'clock. He immediately directed Pleason-

¶ See foot-note, p. 316.—EDITORS.



ton not to strip him entirely, but it is too late. Buford is gone; Merritt, who is coming from Emmitsburg, is still far away, and Sickles has therefore only the skirmishers of his infantry to watch the movements of the enemy, whose numerous indications reveal his presence in force on that side. . . . when, shortly after, Sickles, being apprised of the untimely departure of Buford, decided, in order to ward off all surprise, to replace him by causing his whole line of skirmishers to advance as far as the Emmitsburg road. This general, whose military instinct has fathomed the enemy's intentions, justly suspecting that Lee's main effort would shortly be directed against that portion of the Federal line which has been intrusted to him, . . . has charged Colonel Berdan to push forward a reconnaissance. . . . This . . . has revealed the presence of a numerous enemy, who is masking his movements and seems disposed to turn the Federal left. In the meanwhile Sickles, thinking only of the attack with which he believes himself menaced, has requested Meade to send him fresh instructions: . . . receiving no reply, he repairs to headquarters for the purpose of obtaining them. . . . he immediately requests his chief either to ascertain for himself the necessity for making this movement, or to send General Warren to settle the matter in his place. Meade, being under the impression, no doubt, that the attack of the enemy would not be aimed at his left, . . . declined either to leave his headquarters or to separate himself from General Warren."

Unfortunately, General Meade's whole attention, tactically, was fixed upon his right flank. He did not believe that the enemy would attack his left, although Hancock and myself had both of us pointed out that his left was his vulnerable point for attack. Apart from this tactical preoccupation on his right, General Meade, as I have already said, did not like Gettysburg as a battle-field and wanted to get away from it. Hence we can understand, and in another way, the withdrawal of Geary and Buford from the left and his failure to send timely reinforcements to the almost uncovered left flank. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2d, a few moments before Longstreet opened his assault, Meade telegraphed to Halleck: "If satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster." He had already sent Buford there, two hours before. General Meade's chief-of-cavalry, Major-General Alfred Pleasonton, states that in the afternoon of the 2d of July General Meade "gave me the order to get what cavalry and artillery I could as soon as possible, and take up a position in the rear to cover the retreat of the army from Gettysburg. I was thus occupied until 10 o'clock at night, when I was recalled by an order from General Meade."

Meanwhile, although General Meade had no order of battle, although his chief-of-artillery, General Hunt, as he states in his testimony, knew nothing of the intentions of his commanding general, whether to stay or to go, or whether his tactics were offensive or defensive if he staid; while his left flank was being stripped of cavalry and of infantry vital to its protection; while the commander of the Third Corps, General Sickles, was left unsupported and without definite instructions, all was different on the side of the enemy. From early dawn on the morning of the 2d General Lee, with his lieutenants and his staff, was in the saddle carefully reconnoitering our left and making elaborate preparations for the assault made at a later hour. General Lee promulgated his order of battle. He

placed his infantry and his artillery in position. He designated the divisions of his center and left to support Longstreet's assault. These dispositions made by General Lee were disclosed by reconnoissances made by General Birney, one of the greatest soldiers produced by Pennsylvania. Birney commanded my left division. To his vigilance and unerring military intuition General Meade owed the timely warnings, again and again repeated by myself and General Tremain, my senior aide, of the enemy's movements imperiling the left flank of our army. All admonitions were unheeded, derided. General Meade declined to accept any suggestion that his left was in danger of attack.

It is a significant fact, never contradicted, that at the moment when the battle of the 2d began, General Meade was in consultation with his corps commanders, a consultation which I was called away from my front to attend. Finding myself in the presence of the enemy, I asked to be excused from attending the council of war. I was at once peremptorily ordered to repair to General Meade's headquarters. The report of my aide-de-camp that I was momentarily expecting to be engaged with the enemy was disregarded, and the order to leave my command and report to headquarters was made imperative. While I was on my way to headquarters the battle began on my front. General Meade met me at the door of his house, excused me from dismounting, authorized me to return to my command, and said he would follow immediately. This broke up the council, and the corps commanders repaired to their commands. This was at 3 in the afternoon. General Meade soon afterward met me at the front and witnessed the dispositions which I was making, and which he did not modify. And from that hour until 6 o'clock, when I was wounded, I did not receive any order or instruction whatever from General Meade as to the conduct of the battle.

The truth is that when I was summoned to headquarters at 3 o'clock in the afternoon to attend this council of war, I had become weary of so many visits to headquarters during the day. Besides my own repeated requests made in person to General Meade for instructions, General Tremain and Colonel Moore, my aides, had been sent again and again to General Meade with reports of the enemy's movements on his left and with urgent representations from me of the necessity of proper dispositions and of reinforcements.

General Meade states in his confidential letter to Colonel Benedict: "When Sickles came to my headquarters about noon and said he did not know where to go I answered, 'Why, you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps.' He said they had no position; they were massed awaiting events." To this I answer from the record: First, that the Twelfth Corps was never at any time, until the very close of the battle on the 2d of July, in position on the left. The position of the Twelfth Corps during all the day of the 2d was on the right flank, miles away from the left—as far away as Culp's Hill is from Round Top; second, that Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was ordered by General Hancock, on the evening of July 1st, "to the high



ground to the right of and near Round Top mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmitsburg road, as well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown road, to our rear" (see Hancock's Official Report); third, that Birney, "under orders from Major-General Sickles, relieved Geary's division and formed a line resting its left on the Sugar Loaf Mountain (Round Top), and the right thrown in a direct line toward the Cemetery, connecting on the right with the Second Division of this corps. My picket line was in the Emmitsburg road with sharpshooters some three hundred yards in advance." (See Official Report of Major-General Birney, commanding First Division, Third Corps.)

These citations from the official reports of Hancock and Birney prove that only one division (Geary's) of the Twelfth Corps was temporarily on the left; that this division was ordered there by Hancock; that, pursuant to my orders, Birney relieved Geary's division and occupied a position identical with that indicated by Hancock,—to wit, "to the right of and near Round Top mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmitsburg road," etc.

General Meade is as unfortunate in dealing with the Twelfth Corps, in his letter to Benedict seven years after the battle, as he was in dealing with the Twelfth Corps' movements in his official report of Gettysburg. I have already quoted General Williams, commanding the Twelfth Corps, when he exclaimed: "I have read General Meade's report of the operations of the Twelfth Corps with astonishment and regret." I may be permitted to share General Williams's astonishment and regret when I read General Meade's report of the operations of the Third Corps, my own.

General Meade proceeds in his confidential statement to Colonel Benedict: "Then it was I told him his right was to be Hancock's left; his left on Round Top, which I pointed out." To this I answer: First, that this statement is contradicted by General Meade's official report of the battle, and by his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War; second, it is contradicted by the report of his chief-of-artillery, General Hunt; third, it is absurd, topographically and tactically; fourth, my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in February, 1864, presented the facts, which are wholly different from General Meade's statement in the Benedict letter, and which were not denied by him when he testified in the following month. My statement in regard to the operations of the Third Corps at Gettysburg from the beginning to the end was never publicly contradicted by General Meade, so far as I have been informed. Certainly it was never contradicted by him or any one else officially. The War Department records have been ransacked and searched in vain for testimony to uphold these assertions of General Meade in regard to the position of the Third Corps. Failing to find any testimony from the records contradicting my declarations at Gettysburg on the 2d of July last, this confidential letter of General Meade, written in 1870, is brought to light, most impru-

dently, I think, to uphold a contention absolutely unsupported by anything in the official records of the battle.

You have not the space to give me for citations from the testimony of Meade, Hunt, and Sickles before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, nor for extracts from the official reports of Generals Meade, Birney, and Humphreys. It is enough for me to state distinctly, and this can be verified by any one who chooses to consult the record, that General Meade nowhere pretends in his official report, or in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that I was to occupy Round Top. He states that he expected me to occupy Geary's position. Hancock's report proves that Geary was ordered to the right of Round Top,—precisely the ground I held, extending my left to the Devil's Den and my right toward the Emmitsburg road. General Tremain, my aide-de-camp, in compliance with my instructions, pointed out to General Meade, during the morning of the 2d, the importance of Round Top and the need of troops to occupy it; likewise the importance of the Emmitsburg road and the intersecting roads leading to our left, all of which positions, including Round Top, had been stripped of defense by the removal of Buford and his division of cavalry. Against this abandonment of Round Top and the Emmitsburg road I personally protested to General Meade at his headquarters, and so testified to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, uncontradicted by General Meade.

General Meade's statement, I repeat, is absurd, tactically and topographically, because it designates a line and positions for the Third Corps which it could not have occupied by reason of the great extension of the line and the number of troops required to hold Round Top. The distance from Hancock's left to Round Top is stated by the Comte de Paris to be a mile and a quarter, that is to say, 2200 yards. The front of the Second Corps, Hancock's, which was stronger than mine, was only twelve hundred yards, so that my line, if taken according to General Meade's confidential letter, from Hancock's left to and including Round Top, and the necessary force to hold that natural fortress, would have been a mere skirmish line utterly incapable of resisting assaulting columns. Moreover, the direct line from Hancock's left to Round Top was a line through swale, morass, swamp, bowlders, and forest and tangled undergrowth, unfit for infantry, impracticable for artillery, and hopelessly dominated by the ridge in front, which I would have surrendered to Lee without a blow if I had attempted to execute the impossible order General Meade confidentially states to his correspondent that he gave me. Nay, more, if I had occupied the line General Meade represents in 1870 that he told me to take, I would have had no positions whatever for my artillery over one half of my line, and would have surrendered to Lee the positions for his artillery which he states in his official report it was the object of his movement to gain. In other words, the line indicated by General Meade in his confidential letter is one that would have abandoned to the enemy all the vantage-ground he



sought and had to fight for all the afternoon. And this vantage-ground, by which I mean the Emmitsburg road ridge, the Devil's Den, the Emmitsburg road itself, and the intersecting roads leading to our left, once in possession of the enemy without loss, would have enabled him to deliver his assault upon me in the position indicated by General Meade, three hours before it was delivered, and with advantage of position and force that would have given Lee the victory.

General Meade proceeds: "Now, his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left and his left one-quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that key-point unoccupied, which ought to have been occupied by Longstreet before we could get there with the Fifth Corps." To this I answer: First, that I was in the right place to defend Round Top when I put myself in front of it, and I staid there until after 5 o'clock, giving General Meade time to bring up the Fifth Corps from the right, where he had kept it all day; second, that if I had not put my troops in position in front of Round Top, Longstreet would have occupied it at any time during the two hours that elapsed before the Fifth Corps was brought over from the right to occupy it; third, my line was a good one, but there were not troops enough at hand early in the day to hold that line, or any other line, against the forces employed by Lee in the attack. If the reinforcements which came up from 5 o'clock to 6:30 had arrived three hours earlier, Longstreet's assault on the second would have been repulsed as promptly and decisively as on the third day; fourth, look at the ground occupied by my corps, and then compare its advantages over Meade's line, extending from Cemetery Ridge to Round Top,—and the discussion will not last long.

General Meade proceeds: "Sickles's movement practically destroyed his own corps, the Third; caused a loss of 50 per cent. in the Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged the Second Corps, producing 66 per cent. of the loss of the whole battle." To this I answer: First, that the losses of the Fifth Corps in the entire Gettysburg campaign, killed, wounded, captured, and missing, were 2187, out of an aggregate of 12,000, by which it appears—I speak from the official record—that General Meade confidentially more than doubled the loss of the Fifth Corps, an inexcusable disregard of fact with the record before him; second, when General Meade says that the Third Corps was practically destroyed on the 2d of July he is contradicted by the two division commanders, Humphreys and Birney, and by Graham and Carr, and by De Trobriand, Ward, Burling, and Brewster. Not to weary the readers with extracts from the reports of all these distinguished Third Corps commanders, I will cite an example from the report of General Joseph B. Carr. General Carr, in his official report, states: "Notwithstanding my apparently critical position I could and would have maintained it but for an order received direct from Major-General Birney, commanding the corps, to fall back to the crest of the hill in my rear." This was between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening, after I had been wounded. General Carr proceeds:

"At that time I have no doubt I could have charged on the rebels and driven them in confusion, for my line was still perfect and unbroken and my troops in the proper spirit for the performance of such a task. After I had reached the position designated by General Birney, the brigade was rallied by my assistant adjutant-general and aides and moved forward, driving the enemy and capturing many prisoners. I continued to advance until I again occupied the field I had a few moments before vacated. Here my command remained until morning." This was the right of my line.

General Meade declares that my movement produced "66 per cent. of the loss of the whole battle, and with what result? Driving us back to the position he [Sickles] was ordered to hold originally." To this I answer: First, that the position of the troops on our left at the close of the battle on the 2d of July, was not in any particular, in any part of the line on the left, as General Meade confidentially informs Colonel Benedict. On my extreme right, as I have just proved from Carr's report, the Third Corps held its advanced position. On my left, that is to say, on the left flank of the army, General Crawford's splendid division of Pennsylvania Reserves held my advanced position to the stone wall, south of the wheat-field, in advance of Round Top. The other divisions of the Fifth Corps occupied both Round Tops, Little and Big, with the Sixth Corps—the strongest corps in the army, under Sedgwick—in reserve to our left, and the Twelfth Corps, under Williams, brought over from the right, and the First Corps, under Newton, in support; making a total of over 40,000 infantry in position on the left to protect that flank against the assault which General Meade intimates he expected the Third Corps to repel alone. Second, General Meade, in his exaggerated estimate of his losses on July 2d, which he represents as 66 per cent. of the entire loss of his army during the three days of conflict, would seem to hold me not only responsible for the losses in my own corps and for the other corps moved up to save the left and rear of his army, but also for the losses on the right at Culp's Hill. In other words, General Meade's statement is difficult to reconcile with the respect due to his high position and the ample means of information always accessible to him.

The losses on the 2d of July, although large and serious, were inevitable. So far as my observation enabled me to judge, and I was on the line of battle until I was wounded, our losses are attributable only to the assaults, vigorous, persistent, and prolonged, from 3 o'clock until dark, of an ably led enemy, one who had staked everything upon the issue; and the official Confederate reports show that Lee's losses on the 2d of July, especially in the divisions of Hood, McLaws, and Anderson, and in their artillery, were quite as large as ours, and perhaps larger. As I have already shown, if I had received this assault in the position General Meade says he designed I should take, then indeed would my corps have been virtually destroyed and the enemy in possession of our left flank and rear before the troops I have enumerated could have been brought up.



In conclusion allow me to show that General Meade's letter, so far as it relates to the orders and instructions therein alleged to have been given to me, is flatly contradicted by his own official report of the battle and by his sworn testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. In his official report General Meade says that "the Second and Third corps were directed to occupy the continuation of the Cemetery Ridge on the left of the Eleventh Corps." That is the only statement in General Meade's official report to indicate the position of the Third Corps. No mention is made of the occupation of Round Top, which is a mile and more from Cemetery Ridge and in advance of it. Now we will see how guardedly he speaks of it in his testimony: "About 3 or 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon I proceeded from my headquarters to the extreme left in order to see to the posting of the Fifth Corps, also to inspect the position of the Third Corps, about which I was in doubt. General Sickles had said to me earlier in the day that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff-officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as in his judgment he should deem the most suitable. I answered General Sickles: 'Certainly, within the limits of the general instruction I have given you. Any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you,' and I directed Brigadier-General Hunt, my chief-of-artillery, to accompany Sickles and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his judgment."

General Meade's "general instructions" to me were all verbal and extremely vague and indefinite. As I have said, he was wholly preoccupied with his right flank. None of his instructions contemplated the probability of an attack on his left. The only definite instruction that reached me from General Meade before the battle opened on July 2d was that I should relieve Geary's division, which he had ordered over to the right. I at once reported to him that I found no troops on the left, except Buford's cavalry; that Geary's division had not been in position at all; that it was massed to the right of Round Top during the night of the 1st of July, and had moved over to Culp's Hill before I had received his instructions to relieve it. In fact this was the only instruction, general or particular, the only order of any nature or kind, that I had received from General Meade on the 2d of July from daybreak in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening, when I was wounded. I had no communication from General Geary whatever. He had left the field, and there was no staff-officer or representative of General Geary to indicate his position, and for obvious reasons, because he was not in position. He had bivouacked for the night

on the left, and when his corps, under Slocum, went into position on Culp's Hill on the right he followed it.

I am persuaded that Generals Slocum, Howard, Pleasonton, Doubleday, Robinson, Howe, and Williams, and other corps and division commanders of the Army of the Potomac would agree with me in the observation that General Meade was very imperfectly informed as to the movements and operations of his corps, divisions, and brigades of the army, during the first and second days of July, 1863. I am unwilling to attribute to General Meade an intention to do injustice to any of the troops under his command, yet much, very much, injustice was done. No adequate recognition was accorded to the First and Eleventh corps, by whose sacrifices and by the sagacity of whose leaders we seized from the enemy the impregnable position of Cemetery Ridge. The heroic stand made by John Buford on the Cashtown road on the morning of the 1st of July; the brilliant deployments of his cavalry, holding the enemy in check for hours until Reynolds came up with his leading division under Wadsworth, are barely mentioned. In truth the cavalry under Pleasonton and Buford and Gregg and Kilpatrick, to which General Meade owed so much of his success, and the artillery under General Hunt, equally brilliant in its service, received no adequate appreciation. I have already given examples in which whole corps and divisions of infantry are placed in positions by General Meade, in his report, other than those they occupied, so that it will be seen that it is by no means myself alone who complain of injustice at the hands of General Meade. In my belief the forced march I made of twelve miles over a difficult road in the heat of a July afternoon, with troops which had been without rest from the Rappahannock to the heart of Pennsylvania, a march made without orders, on my own responsibility, to help the overtasked troops of Howard — in my belief this was a soldierly act that deserved recognition at the hands of the commanding general. Yet it is not mentioned either in General Meade's official report or in his confidential letter. Why is it that General Meade is so unwilling to praise where praise might be bestowed, and is so lavish of censure where censure might be more gracefully suppressed, even if an error of judgment had been committed by an officer who paid dearly enough for the zeal which exposed himself and his command to the shock of the enemy's assaults? "I am of the opinion," says General Meade in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "that General Sickles did what he thought was for the best, but I differed from him in judgment." Here is no question of orders disobeyed or of instructions disregarded, and here I leave the issue where General Meade puts it. Military critics more competent than I will decide whether General Meade's judgment or my judgment was correct.



## THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG.

BY JOHN D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.



**D**URING the Gettysburg campaign, my command—an independent brigade of cavalry—was engaged, by General Lee's confidential orders, in raids on the left flank of his advancing army, destroying railroad bridges and cutting the canal below Cumberland wherever I could—so that I did not reach the field till noon of the last day's battle. I reported direct to General Lee for orders, and was assigned a position to aid in repelling any cavalry demonstration on his rear. None of a serious character being made, my little force took no part in the battle, but were merely spectators of the scene, which transcended in grandeur any that I beheld in any other battle of the war.

When night closed the struggle, Lee's army was repulsed. We all knew that the day had gone against us, but the full extent of the disaster was only known in high quarters. The carnage of the day was generally

understood to have been frightful, yet our army was not in retreat, and it was surmised in camp that with to-morrow's dawn would come a renewal of the struggle. All felt and appreciated the momentous consequences to the cause of Southern independence of final defeat or victory on that great field.

It was a warm summer's night; there were few camp-fires, and the weary soldiers were lying in groups on the luxuriant grass of the beautiful meadows, discussing the events of the day, speculating on the morrow, or watching that our horses did not straggle off while browsing. About 11 o'clock a horseman came to summon me to General Lee. I promptly mounted and, accompanied by Lieutenant George W. McPhail, an aide on my staff, and guided by the courier who brought the message, rode about two miles toward Gettysburg to where half a dozen small tents were pointed out, a little way from the roadside to our left, as General Lee's headquarters for the night. On inquiry I found that he was not there, but had gone to the headquarters of General A. P. Hill, about half a mile nearer to Gettysburg. When we reached the place indicated, a single flickering candle, visible from the road through the open front of a common wall-tent, exposed to view Generals Lee and Hill seated on camp-stools with a map spread upon their knees. Dismounting, I approached on foot. After exchanging the ordinary salutations General Lee directed me to go back to his headquarters and wait for him. I did so, but he did not make his appearance until about 1 o'clock, when he came riding alone, at a slow walk, and evidently wrapped in profound thought.

When he arrived there was not even a sentinel on duty at his tent, and no one of his staff was awake. The moon was high in the clear sky and the silent scene was unusually vivid. As he approached and saw us lying on the



grass under a tree, he spoke, reined in his jaded horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I hurriedly rose and stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached his side he had succeeded in alighting, and threw his arm across the saddle to rest, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned in silence and almost motionless upon his equally weary horse,—the two forming a striking and never-to-be-forgotten group. The moon shone full upon his massive features and revealed an expression of sadness that I had never before seen upon his face. Awed by his appearance I waited for him to speak until the silence became embarrassing, when, to break it and change the silent current of his thoughts, I ventured to remark, in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue:

"General, this has been a hard day on you."

He looked up, and replied mournfully:

"Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us," and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his reflections, I said no more. After perhaps a minute or two, he suddenly straightened up to his full height, and turning to me with more animation and excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, for he was a man of wonderful equanimity, he said in a voice tremulous with emotion:

"I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did to-day in that grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported as they were to have been,—but, for some reason not yet fully explained to me, were not,—we would have held the position and the day would have been ours." After a moment's pause he added in a loud voice, in a tone almost of agony, "*Too bad! Too bad! OH! Too BAD!*"

I shall never forget his language, his manner, and his appearance of mental suffering. In a few moments all emotion was suppressed, and he spoke feelingly of several of his fallen and trusted officers; among others of Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Garnett, and Kemper of Pickett's division. He invited me into his tent, and as soon as we were seated he remarked:

[Of interest in this connection is a letter written by General Lee to Mr. Davis from Camp Orange on the 8th of August, 1863, and first printed in "A Piece of Secret History," by Colonel C. C. Jones, Jr., in "The Century" (old series) for February, 1876. In this letter General Lee speaks in the highest terms of his army, and says, in part:

"... We must expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater energies, and to prevent our falling into greater disasters. Our people have only to be true and united, to bear manfully the misfortunes incident to war, and all will come right in the end.

"I know how prone we are to censure, and how ready to blame others for the nonfulfillment of our expectations. This is unbecoming in a generous people, and I grieve to see its expression. The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is his removal. This is natural, and in many instances proper. For, no matter what may be the ability of the officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster must sooner or later ensue.

"I have been prompted by these reflections more than once since my return from Penna. to propose to your Exc'y the propriety of selecting another commander for this army. I have seen and heard of expressions of discontent in the public journals at the result of the expedition. I do not know how far this feeling extends in the army. My brother officers have been too kind to report it, and so far the troops have been too generous to exhibit it. It is fair, however, to suppose that it does exist, and success is so necessary to us that nothing should be risked to secure it. I therefore, in all sincerity, request your Exc'y to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? ...

"I have no complaints to make of any one but myself. I have received nothing but kindness from those above me, and the most considerate attention from my comrades and companions in arms. To your Excellency I am specially indebted for uniform kindness and consideration. You have done everything in your power to aid me in the work committed to my charge, without omitting anything to promote the general welfare. ..."



"We must now return to Virginia. As many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home. I have sent for you, because your men and horses are fresh and in good condition, to guard and conduct our train back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, responsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will be harassed by the enemy's cavalry. How many men have you?"

"About 2100 effective present, and all well mounted, including McClanahan's six-gun battery of horse artillery."

"I can spare you as much artillery as you require," he said, "but no other troops, as I shall need all I have to return safely by a different and shorter route than yours. The batteries are generally short of ammunition, but you will probably meet a supply I have ordered from Winchester to Williamsport. Nearly all the transportation and the care of all the wounded will be intrusted to you. You will recross the mountain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport by any route you deem best, and without a halt till you reach the river. Rest there long enough to feed your animals; then ford the river, and do not halt again till you reach Winchester, where I will again communicate with you."

After a good deal of conversation about roads, and the best disposition of my forces to cover and protect the vast train, he directed that the chiefs of his staff departments should be waked up to receive, in my presence, his orders to collect as early next day as possible all the wagons and ambulances which I was to convoy, and have them in readiness for me to take command of them. His medical director [Dr. Lafayette Guild] was charged to see that all the wounded who could bear the rough journey should be placed in the empty wagons and ambulances. He then remarked to me that his general instructions would be sent to me in writing the following morning. As I was about leaving to return to my camp, as late, I think, as 2 A. M., he came out of his tent to where I was about to mount, and said in an undertone: "I will place in your hands by a staff-officer, to-morrow morning, a sealed package for President Davis, which you will retain in your possession till you are across the Potomac, when you will detail a reliable commissioned officer to take it to Richmond with all possible dispatch and deliver it into the President's own hands. And I impress it on you that, whatever happens, this package must not fall into the hands of the enemy. If unfortunately you should be captured, destroy it at the first opportunity."

On the morning of July 4th my written instructions, and a large official envelope addressed to President Davis, were handed to me by a staff-officer.

It was apparent by 9 o'clock that the wagons, ambulances, and wounded could not be collected and made ready to move till late in the afternoon. General Lee sent to me eight Napoleon guns of the famous Washington Artillery of New Orleans, under the immediate command of Major Eshleman, one of the best artillery officers in the army, a four-gun battery under Captain Tanner, and a Whitworth under Lieutenant Pegram. Hampton's cavalry brigade, then under command of Colonel P. M. B. Young, with Captain James F. Hart's four-gun battery of horse artillery, was ordered to cover the rear of all trains





GOOD-BYE!

moving under my convoy on the Chambersburg road. These 17 guns and McClanahan's 6 guns gave us 23 pieces in all for the defense of the trains.

Shortly after noon of the 4th the very windows of heaven seemed to have opened. The rain fell in blinding sheets; the meadows were soon overflowed, and fences gave way before the raging streams. During the storm, wagons, ambulances, and artillery carriages by hundreds—nay, by thousands—were assembling in the fields along the road from Gettysburg to Cashtown, in one confused and apparently inextricable mass. As the afternoon wore on there was no abatement in the storm. Canvas was no protection against its fury, and the wounded men lying upon the naked boards of the wagon-bodies were drenched. Horses and mules were blinded and maddened by the wind and water, and became almost unmanageable. The deafening roar of the mingled sounds of heaven and earth all around us made it almost impossible to communicate orders, and equally difficult to execute them.

About 4 P. M. the head of the column was put in motion near Cashtown, and began the ascent of the mountain in the direction of Chambersburg. I remained at Cashtown giving directions and putting in detachments of guns and troops at what I estimated to be intervals of a quarter or a third of a mile. It was found from the position of the head of the column west of the mountain at dawn of the 5th—the hour at which Young's cavalry and Hart's battery began the ascent of the mountain near Cashtown—that the entire column was seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road and put in motion. As an advance-guard I had placed the 18th Virginia Cavalry, Colonel George W. Imboden, in front with a section of McClanahan's battery.



Next to them, by request, was placed an ambulance carrying, stretched side by side, two of North Carolina's most distinguished soldiers, Generals Pender and Scales, both badly wounded, but resolved to bear the tortures of the journey rather than become prisoners. I shared a little bread and meat with them at noon, and they waited patiently for hours for the head of the column to move. The trip cost poor Pender his life. General Scales appeared to be worse hurt, but stopped at Winchester, recovered, and fought through the war.

After dark I set out from Cashtown to gain the head of the column during the night. My orders had been peremptory that there should be no halt for any cause whatever. If an accident should happen to any vehicle, it was immediately to be put out of the road and abandoned. The column moved rapidly, considering the rough roads and the darkness, and from almost every wagon for many miles issued heart-rending wails of agony. For four hours I hurried forward on my way to the front, and in all that time I was never out of hearing of the groans and cries of the wounded and dying. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate surgical aid, owing to the demands on the hard-working surgeons from still worse cases that had to be left behind. Many of the wounded in the wagons had been without food for thirty-six hours. Their torn and bloody clothing, matted and hardened, was rasping the tender, inflamed, and still oozing wounds. Very few of the wagons had even a layer of straw in them, and all were without springs. The road was rough and rocky from the heavy washings of the preceding day. The jolting was enough to have killed strong men, if long exposed to it. From nearly every wagon as the teams trotted on, urged by whip and shout, came such cries and shrieks as these :

"O God! why can't I die?"

"My God! will no one have mercy and kill me?"

"Stop! Oh! for God's sake, stop just for one minute; take me out and leave me to die on the roadside."

"I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear children, what will become of you?"

Some were simply moaning; some were praying, and others uttering the most fearful oaths and execrations that despair and agony could wring from them; while a majority, with a stoicism sustained by sublime devotion to the cause they fought for, endured without complaint unspeakable tortures, and even spoke words of cheer and comfort to their unhappy comrades of less will or more acute nerves. Occasionally a wagon would be passed from which only low, deep moans could be heard. No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. No heed could be given to any of their appeals. Mercy and duty to the many forbade the loss of a moment in the vain effort then and there to comply with the prayers of the few. On! On! we *must* move on. The storm continued, and the darkness was appalling. There was no time even to fill a canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the drivers and the guards, all were wounded and utterly helpless in that vast procession of misery. During this one night I realized more of the horrors of war than I had in all the two preceding years.



And yet in the darkness was our safety, for no enemy would dare attack where he could not distinguish friend from foe. We knew that when day broke upon us we should be harassed by bands of cavalry hanging on our flanks. Therefore our aim was to go as far as possible under cover of the night. Instead of going through Chambersburg, I decided to leave the main road near Fairfield after crossing the mountains, and take "a near cut" across the country to Greencastle, where daybreak on the morning of the 5th of July found the head of our column. We were now twelve or fifteen miles from the Potomac at Williamsport, our point of crossing into Virginia.

Here our apprehended troubles began. After the advance — the 18th Virginia Cavalry — had passed perhaps a mile beyond the town, the citizens to the number of thirty or forty attacked the train with axes, cutting the spokes out of ten or a dozen wheels and dropping the wagons in the streets. The moment I heard of it I sent back a detachment of cavalry to capture every citizen who had been engaged in this work, and treat them as prisoners of war. This stopped the trouble there, but the Union cavalry began to swarm down upon us from the fields and cross-roads, making their attacks in small bodies, and striking the column where there were few or no guards, and thus creating great confusion. I had a narrow escape from capture by one of these parties — of perhaps fifty men that I tried to drive off with canister from two of McClanahan's guns that were close at hand. They would perhaps have been too much for me, had not Colonel Imboden, hearing the firing turned back with his regiment at a gallop, and by the suddenness of his movement surrounded and caught the entire party.

To add to our perplexities still further, a report reached me a little after sunrise, that the Federals in large force held Williamsport. I did not fully credit this, and decided to push on. Fortunately the report was untrue. After a great deal of desultory fighting and harassments along the road during the day, nearly the whole of the immense train reached Williamsport on the afternoon of the 5th. A part of it, with Hart's battery, came in next day, General Young having halted and turned his attention to guarding the road from the west with his cavalry. We took possession of the town to convert it into a great hospital for the thousands of wounded we had brought from Gettysburg. I required all the families in the place to go to cooking for the sick and wounded, on pain of having their kitchens occupied for that purpose by my men. They readily complied. A large number of surgeons had accompanied the train, and these at once pulled off their coats and went to work, and soon a vast amount of suffering was mitigated. The bodies of a few who had died on the march were buried. All this became necessary because the tremendous rains had raised the river more than ten feet above the fording stage of water, and we could not possibly cross then. There were two small ferry-boats or "flats" there, which I immediately put into requisition to carry across those of the wounded, who, after being fed and having their wounds dressed, thought they could walk to Winchester. Quite a large number were able to do this, so that the "flats" were kept running all the time.





THE RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG.

Our situation was frightful. We had probably ten thousand animals and nearly all the wagons of General Lee's army under our charge, and all the wounded, to the number of several thousand, that could be brought from Gettysburg. Our supply of provisions consisted of a few wagon-loads of flour in my own brigade train, a small lot of fine fat cattle which I had collected in Pennsylvania on my way to Gettysburg, and some sugar and coffee procured in the same way at Mercersburg.

The town of Williamsport is located in the lower angle formed by the Potomac with Conococheague Creek. These streams inclose the town on two sides, and back of it about one mile there is a low range of hills that is crossed by four roads converging at the town. The first is the Greencastle road leading down the creek valley; next the Hagerstown road; then the Boonsboro' road; and lastly the River road. [See map, p. 246.]

Early on the morning of the 6th I received intelligence of the approach from Frederick of a large body of cavalry with three full batteries of six rifled guns. These were the divisions of Generals Buford and Kilpatrick, and Huey's brigade of Gregg's division, consisting, as I afterward learned, of 23 regiments of cavalry, and 18 guns, a total force of about 7000 men.

I immediately posted my guns on the hills that concealed the town, and dismounted my own command to support them—and ordered as many of the wagoners to be formed as could be armed with the guns of the wounded that we had brought from Gettysburg. In this I was greatly aided by Colonel J. L. Black of South Carolina, Captain J. F. Hart commanding a battery from



the same State, Colonel William R. Aylett of Virginia, and other wounded officers. By noon about 700 wagoners were organized into companies of 100 each and officered by wounded line-officers and commissaries and quartermasters,—about 250 of these were given to Colonel Aylett on the right next the river,—about as many under Colonel Black on the left, and the residue were used as skirmishers. My own command proper was held well in hand in the center.

The enemy appeared in our front about half-past one o'clock on both the Hagerstown and Boonsboro' roads, and the fight began. Every man under my command understood that if we did not repulse the enemy we should all be captured and General Lee's army be ruined by the loss of its transportation, which at that period could not have been replaced in the Confederacy. The fight began with artillery on both sides. The firing from our side was very rapid, and seemed to make the enemy hesitate about advancing. In a half hour J. D. Moore's battery ran out of ammunition, but as an ordnance train had arrived from Winchester, two wagon-loads of ammunition were ferried across the river and run upon the field behind the guns, and the boxes tumbled out, to be broken open with axes. With this fresh supply our guns were all soon in full play again. As the enemy could not see the supports of our batteries from the hill-tops, I moved the whole line forward to his full view, in single ranks, to show a long front on the Hagerstown approach. My line passed our guns fifty or one hundred yards, where they were halted awhile, and then were withdrawn behind the hill-top again, slowly and steadily.

Leaving Black's wagoners and the Marylanders on the left to support Hart's and Moore's batteries, Captain Hart having been put in command by Colonel Black when he was obliged to be elsewhere, I moved the 18th Virginia Cavalry and 62d Virginia Mounted Infantry rapidly to the right, to meet and repel five advancing regiments (dismounted) of the enemy. My three regiments, with Captain John H. McNeill's Partisan Rangers and Aylett's wagoners, had to sustain a very severe contest. Hart, seeing how hard we were pressed on the right, charged the enemy's right with his little command, and at the same time Eshleman with his eight Napoleons advanced four hundred yards to the front, and got an enfilading position, from which, with the aid of McClanahan's battery, he poured a furious fire into the enemy's line. The 62d and Aylett, supported by the 18th Cavalry, and McNeill, charged the enemy who fell back sullenly to their horses.

Night was now rapidly approaching, when a messenger from Fitzhugh Lee arrived to urge me to "hold my own," as he would be up in a half hour with three thousand fresh men. The news was sent along our whole line, and was received with a wild and exultant yell. We knew then that the field was won, and slowly pressed forward. Almost at the same moment we heard distant guns on the enemy's rear and right on the Hagerstown road. They were Stuart's, who was approaching on that road, while Fitzhugh Lee was coming on the Greencastle road. That settled the contest. The enemy broke to the left and fled by the Boonsboro' road. It was too dark to follow. When General Fitzhugh Lee joined me with his staff on the field, one of



the enemy's shells came near striking him. General Lee thought it came from Eshleman's battery, till, a moment later, he saw a blaze from its gun streaming away from us.

We captured about 125 of the enemy who failed to reach their horses. I could never ascertain the loss on either side. I estimated ours at about 125. The wagoners fought so well that this came to be known as "the wagoners' fight." Quite a number of them were killed in storming a farm from which sharp-shooters were rapidly picking off Eshleman's men and horses.

My whole force engaged, wagoners included, did not exceed three thousand men. The ruse practiced by showing a formidable line on the left, then withdrawing it to fight on the right, together with our numerous artillery, 23 guns, led to the belief that our force was much greater.

By extraordinary good fortune we had thus saved all of General Lee's trains. A bold charge at any time before sunset would have broken our feeble lines, and then we should all have fallen an easy prey to the Federals. The next day our army arrived from Gettysburg, and the country is familiar with the way it escaped across the Potomac on the night of the 13th of July.

It may be interesting to repeat one or two facts to show the peril in which the army was till the river could be bridged. Over four thousand prisoners taken at Gettysburg were ferried across the river by the morning of the 9th, and I was ordered with a single regiment, the 62d Virginia, to guard them to Staunton and send them on to Richmond. When the general assigned me to this duty he expressed an apprehension that before I could reach Winchester the Federal cavalry would cross at Harper's Ferry, intercept and capture my guard and release the prisoners. Before we had left the river I had an interview with him at his headquarters near Hagerstown, in which he expressed great impatience at the tardiness in building rude pontoons at the river, and calling in Colonel James L. Corley, his chief quartermaster, told him to put Major John A. Harman in charge of the work; remarking that without Harman's extraordinary energy to conduct the work, the pontoons would not be done for several days. Harman took charge that day, and by tearing down warehouses on the canal got joists to build boats with, and in twenty-four hours had enough of them ready to float down to Falling Waters and construct a bridge. As we were talking General Longstreet came into the tent, wet and muddy, and was cordially greeted by General Lee in this wise: "Well, my old war-horse, what news do you bring us from the front?" That cordial greeting between chief and lieutenant is a sufficient answer, in my mind, to the statements of alleged ill feeling between the two men growing out of affairs at Gettysburg. It has been said that if "Stonewall" Jackson had been in command at Gettysburg, Longstreet would have been shot. This is a monstrous imputation upon General Lee, no less than upon Longstreet, and utterly without foundation, in my opinion. They were surely cordial on the 9th of July, 1863.

Before I had gone two miles on my anxious march toward Winchester a courier overtook me with a note from General Lee directing me to return immediately to his headquarters. I halted my column, hurried back, was ferried over the river, and galloped out on the Hagerstown road to where I had



parted from the general that morning. He had left with his staff to ride toward Hagerstown, where a heavy artillery fire indicated an attack by the enemy in considerable force. When I overtook him he said that he understood I was familiar with the fords of the Potomac from Williamsport to Cumberland, and with the roads to them. I replied that I was. He then called up one of his staff, either General Long or General Alexander, I think, and directed him to write down my answers to his questions, and required me to name and describe ford after ford all the way up to Cumberland, and to describe minutely their character, and the roads and surrounding country on both sides of the river, and directed me, after I had given him all the information I could, to send to him my brother and his regiment, the 18th Virginia Cavalry, to act as an advance and guide if he should require it. He did not say so, but I felt that his situation was precarious in the extreme. When about to dismiss me, referring to the freshet in the river he laughingly said: "You know this country well enough to tell me whether it ever quits raining about here? If so, I should like to see a clear day soon." I did not see him again till he left the Shenandoah Valley for the east side of the Blue Ridge.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. JOHNSTON PETTIGREW,  
C. S. A., KILLED IN AN ACTION AT FALL-  
ING WATERS, MD., JULY 14, 1863.  
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

# A PRISONER'S MARCH FROM GETTYSBURG TO STAUNTON.

BY JOHN L. COLLINS, 8TH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.



CONFEDERATE VIDETTE.

ON the 4th, when Lee's movement of withdrawal became known, the cavalry was ordered to throw itself between the Confederate army and the Potomac. To do this the different divisions were headed for the gaps and passes through which the trains sent under escort in advance were escaping over the mountains to Williamsport.

The regiment to which I belonged was in Gregg's division, but having become detached with the rest of the brigade during the three days of the battle, it united with two other brigades under General Kilpatrick

and made an attack upon a Confederate train near Monterey. The fight took place before midnight the first day of the march, the train was burned, the guard was made prisoners, and then our command pushed on after another train that was reported ahead of the one we destroyed. A few whose horses were killed or disabled were ordered back to the division for a remount, instead of being mounted upon the enemy's horses. I disobeyed the orders, and hoping to get one of the enemy's horses I led my own and followed on foot. I soon lost sight of the brigade, however, but toiled along the dark and rough road, until my horse, which at first could walk with only the weight of the saddle, refused to go any farther. As the day was breaking, I was examining and washing the poor creature's wounded shoulder, when I was surprised by about 150 Confederate cavalry, whose approach I had hailed as that of friends. At a motion from their colonel three men dismounted, the foremost of whom held out his hand to me and cheerfully said: "Good morning, sir! I am



sorry to say you are a prisoner." The other two went toward my arms, which were piled on the saddle on the roadside, and, holding them up, exclaimed, "What splendid arms he has!" Surprise and the novelty of the first man's greeting kept me from realizing my position until I saw them take my carbine, saber, and pistol. Then my heart sank.

Those "splendid arms" had been my companions for two years, and two months previously I had been publicly commended for bringing them with me through the enemy's ranks when my horse was shot inside their lines as we charged upon Jackson's men at Chancellorsville. But such is war, and I bade them a sorrowful adieu, as I looked from them to the faces of my captors, some of which showed sympathy, some indifference, while all seemed manly and soldierly. The commander alone took no notice of me or my arms; he gazed up the road through the gray light of the morning as if bent on some bold manoeuvre, and then said to one of his men in a loud voice: "Tell General Lee (Fitzhugh) that there is a regiment of Yankee cavalry half a mile up the road, and ask him if I shall charge them."

The man galloped back, and without waiting for General Lee's orders, the colonel wheeled his men and galloped after him,—such a piece of cheap braggadocio as I had seen displayed by some of our own colonels. I was left in the care of two men to put the saddle on my horse and follow at a walk. My guards were frank, and in answer to my question told me that they belonged to General William E. Jones's brigade, that they had been captured in the fight just mentioned, and had escaped during the night from Kilpatrick who was more intent in overtaking larger bodies than in watching the few hundred he had taken. Between midnight and daybreak the colonel and about 150 men came together in the woods and fell in with General Fitzhugh Lee, who was then slipping out between two divisions of our cavalry.

About noon I was introduced to about thirty of those who had been sent back for horses to the division, and had shared my fate. We were with General Stuart's headquarters, as he was moving in the center of his brigades—they being pushed out in every direction, trying to keep a road clear for their infantry and artillery.

A young Virginian about my own age, but with much more suavity and self-complacency than I could claim, introduced himself to me and told me that he belonged to the "King and Queen" cavalry (1st Virginia, I think), and said that they knew my regiment well, and considered it a "rough one to deal with." He asked me if I remembered all the skirmishes we had as we advanced from New Kent Court House to the Chickahominy, which I did well, and then when we had become quite well acquainted, asked me if I would have any objections to exchanging saddles with him. I had not the least, as I never expected to sit on mine again, and when we stopped on the roadside to make the exchange I walked back into the ranks without my horse, as I saw no reason why I should bother leading him along for my captors to ride, if he should

ever get well. Fresh prisoners were added all the time, mostly cavalry, and we marched along through the mountains the entire day. Stuart and his staff rode in our midst—rather an imprudent thing, I thought, for many of the men observed him closely with reference to a future meeting. I know it was in my mind every time I looked at him, though I had no malice and nothing to complain of in regard to my treatment. Within a year he fell by the carbine of a cavalryman whose regiment was at this time well represented among the prisoners.

The day was a hard one for me, used to fatigue and fasting though I was. The roads were the roughest and narrowest that could be found, and I had eaten nothing since the previous day, having lost my haversack during the night. I was at last compelled to tell one of the guards that I was very hungry, and he apologized for having nothing to give me, but promised to see that I got something before we went much farther. He left the ranks soon and shortly afterward returned with some bread and butter, which he divided with me. Later in the afternoon foragers brought us in rations collected from the farm-houses.

Just before sunset, as we were going through a gap, a rapid exchange of shots was heard ahead of us, and both prisoners and captors became excited. A few moments later we were near enough to look out into the plain beyond; we saw the Confederates in front of us dismounting and deploying as skirmishers, and my heart bounded as I saw my own regiment drawn up for a charge about five hundred yards away! I began to cry like a child; I thought that I would be free again in about ten minutes, with my friends; that I would be armed and mounted as twenty-four hours before. The question, How did I know my regiment? naturally comes, and is as easily answered. I could distinguish the companies by the color of their horses, and knew the order of the squadrons in the line. The black horses of troop C and the light bays of H formed the first squadron, the sorrel horses of E and the dark bays of G formed the next, and so on. The troops changed squadron often to suit the seniority of the captains, and the squadrons changed positions in the regiment for the same reason, but the combination of companies before me now had been that of the regiment for a week at least.

A call was made for sharpshooters, and those who dismounted and presented themselves were supplied with cartridges and sent into the cornfield in front of us. But my regiment seemed disinclined to charge, and merely threw out skirmishers to meet them. Some of the Confederates enthusiastically cried, "My! won't the sharpshooters make it hot for that cavalry!"

Though the firing became brisk, it wearied me; I wanted the charge, because I was sure that a vigorous attack would send our guards fleeing without us in less than five minutes. One of them, a quiet, pleasant-faced man, as were many of the others, noticed my dejected look, came to me, and, swinging himself from his saddle to a fence-rail,



took a Testament from his pocket, and asked me if I objected to his reading a chapter aloud. I thankfully asked him to do so, as I had not had heart enough to read my own that day. He read a chapter in one of Paul's epistles, and when he had concluded remarked that he would feel fifty per cent. better if the country were at peace and he at home that night. I must add that while he was reading I held Quaker principles myself, for I was pained to think I was an enemy of that fair-minded Christian young man who, like myself, thought he was right in engaging in a career of destruction to life and property. But we were both reminded that it was war and not peace by the call of "More ammunition" for the sharp-shooters, and our guards had to supply it from their boxes, it being apparently scarce.

Now is the time for a charge, I thought. General Stuart had not more than three hundred men, encumbered by as many prisoners, and the regiment in front had five hundred in line. But while their commander hesitated, General Stuart, whose genius and courage had gotten him out of many a difficulty, proved himself equal to the present emergency. While his skirmishers were firing their last cartridges he made us fall in by fours, and marched us two or three times across the opening. We were mistaken in the twilight for Confederate infantry coming up, and then his whole column was moved along the edge of the corn-field, keeping the skirmishers between us and my regiment, which moved parallel with us, until darkness shut them out from my view.

The next morning Stuart's men were gone, and we were guarded toward the Potomac by Pickett's division. I regretted the change, the rank and file of the cavalry were so different from what I had expected to find the Southern soldiers. They were quiet, courteous, and considerate; they all seemed young, of light build with fair or sandy complexions predominant; and, better than all, they had more by far than the average share of intelligence. The infantry that took their place were nearer my conception of the Southern soldier. But I must not blame the poor fellows if they had not the kindness and elasticity of the cavalry. They were out of heart—a large part of their division had been left on the field on the 3d of July, and besides the commander of the division there was only one officer above the rank of captain left in it.

We were halted by the roadside often during the day to let Confederate troops hurry past us. In one of these halts General Longstreet was pointed out to me with evident pride by a staff-officer who had turned aside to make some courteous remarks to me. I told the officer as politely as I could that I thought they were badly beaten, and would hardly get across the Potomac. He laughed and said that they were not trying to get across,—that Baltimore was their objective point just then; from there, he explained, it was but a forced march to Washington, and once there they could conquer a peace in thirty days. His hopes amused me; I remembered that when retreating from the Chickahominy and from Chancellorsville I did not know anything of defeat, but thought I was marching to victory by another road.

The next time we were halted I was not so pleasantly entertained. I sat on a high bank watching the various regiments and batteries go by, when a haughty young officer rode up, looking at the prisoners' feet, as if he wanted a pair of boots. Several of the men concealed theirs by drawing them up, but I did not; the soles of mine were coming off, for two days' march over rough roads was something the contractor for cavalry boots had not contemplated. The officer pulled up in front of me, however, and said in an overbearing manner, "I want those spurs." I merely looked at them and nodded. "Hand them to me," he said sternly. "They were given to me for the United States service, not for rebel service," I said, stung by his manner. "Oh!" he scornfully remarked, "I suppose you know you are a prisoner?" "Yes, I have been nearly two days without food; that convinces me." "And when a soldier is taken, his horse, his arms, and equipments are his captor's?" "Yes, mine are all gone." "And his spurs, too?" "Yes, and his boots sometimes." "Hand me your spurs, then." "Take them, if you want them, I won't hand them to you." He took out his pistol and raised it, but controlling himself lowered it and moved away. Then he turned his horse and demanded them again. The same answer, and the same arguments were repeated; the pistol was pointed at me, but his soldierly qualities triumphed over his temper as before. There seemed no way out of the difficulty; he was determined to have the spurs, but too proud to dismount and unbuckle them, and I was too stubborn to yield. At last one of Pickett's men came up and took them off, and the officer rode away with them.

Before I left the spot I kicked off my boots, for they seemed made only to carry spurs, and went barefoot the rest of the way to Richmond. The prisoners who on the first day had numbered only about 300, mostly cavalry, were now increased to nearly as many thousands, as the men taken at Gettysburg were added to us. Besides these, fresh cavalry prisoners were brought in every day. From them we heard of the extent of the victory, and the fighting that was still in progress, and we were assured by them that neither we nor our guards could ever reach the Potomac. This helped to restore the self-respect that a soldier partly loses when his arms are taken from him, and which continued captivity almost entirely destroys.

We were marched past a handsome house which had attracted our attention on our way to Gettysburg by the number of United States flags and the gayly dressed ladies waving handkerchiefs to us. They were waving them as boldly to the Confederates now, and the stars and stripes had been transformed into the stars and bars.

Some of the newly captured were badly wounded, but had no attention given them, except such crude service as their fellow-prisoners could do for them. None of our surgeons were captured, and I suppose those of the enemy had plenty to do among their own. One poor fellow of the 5th New York Cavalry had seventeen wounds which he got from the 11th Virginia. He was cut and slashed at every angle,



and when we had gotten some bandages and patched him up he looked ludicrously odd.

Before we entered Williamsport a correspondent, whom the Confederates had decided to let go, took the names of those who chose to give them to him, that their friends might learn their fate from the papers. I gave him mine, and though it was printed in a leading Philadelphia paper, I was afterward mortified to learn that only one of all my friends in that city had seen it. A dozen others there with whom I had correspondence supposed I had been killed.

At Williamsport all was crowded and in confusion. The Confederates were throwing up weak defenses in expectation of an attack. Our cavalry had cut their way in and destroyed the only bridge that Lee had left in his rear. Some of the poor fellows that must always get left on such occasions cheered us by telling us how they did it. Three regiments charged in,—one fought to the right, another to the left, while the third, supplied with straw and turpentine, dashed at the bridge, set fire to it, then cut it loose from its moorings and let it float down the river, a burning wreck. "Score another for the cavalry," we cried.

My hopes rose with the river, which was a seething flood, boiling over its banks; it seemed impossible to get us across the Potomac now. Rigging up a rope ferry, and getting the prisoners across on flat-boats was the work of two or three days, and then they encamped us on a hill a few days more, waiting for their army to follow. I think they feared an advance by Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. The cavalry and flying artillery came from that direction; Imboden's men told us so, and I never gave up hope until we had passed Winchester. A brigade composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery under General Imboden guarded us from this point to Staunton, a distance of over 120 miles, I think. It seemed five hundred miles to me, for I was barefooted and the pike had been recently repaired.

The mode of marching us was now for the first time systematic. We numbered at least four thousand men, and were divided into divisions, marching by columns of fours. The cavalry and artillery marched *en masse* between the divisions, while the infantry marched in two files, one at each side of the column. Imboden's brigade did not seem to have seen much hard service, at least I thought so because their clothes were new, yet the general had a new suit of gray on, and certainly he had seen plenty of hard service. The men were as kind to us as could be expected; only one unpleasant affair came under my observation all the way. In the heat of a discussion a guard clubbed his musket and struck a wounded man on the head. I have no doubt that the latter had his tongue to blame for it; but he was a prisoner and a wounded man, and the guard was promptly placed under arrest.

I have said nothing so far of the commissary arrangements simply because there was nothing to be said. I do not now remember getting anything to eat until we crossed the Potomac, except from Stuart's cavalry the first day of my captivity.

But my memory must fail me, for I could not have lived unless I had gotten something occasionally. After we left Williamsport the arrangements were regular—in their meagerness, too regular. We got about a pint of flour every other day, and with it now and then a piece of rusty fitch. Some of the men tried to make bread of the flour as we camped, but the greater number stirred it up in water, and drank the paste, saying that "it stuck to their ribs longer" that way. We got an extra ration at Martinsburg, that, out of compliment to the ladies, I ought not to forget. As we marched through the town the whole populace turned out to greet us, not as enemies but as friends and sympathizers. They cried out to us, to cheer up—not to be downhearted—that we had won a great victory at Gettysburg, and though we were being marched to prison we were already avenged by the thousands of rebels that were left dead or prisoners in Pennsylvania. They appeared to be well posted by the Northern newspapers, and right in the teeth of the guards they upbraided the Confederates for theft and violence north of the Potomac. It must have been very galling to Imboden's command to be reviled that way by their countrywomen, but they bore it with cast-down heads, and made no reply. We could not have done it, I fear, had we been the guards, and in Pennsylvania. At last some of our men, in reply to questions on the subject, said they did not give us anything to eat. There was a sudden rush for the houses, and in a few seconds the street was lined with women with dishes of cake, bread, and everything they could lay hands on with so short a notice.

The sight of the food threw our column into disorder. Some men tried to break out of the ranks, and this being resisted, the women tried to break in. In the confusion that followed a few women were pushed back to the street-curb and fell down. The falls were, I think, accidental; but the prisoners became furious when they saw them fall, they struck at the guards right and left, and overpowered many of them, bearing them to the ground. It looked for the moment as if there would be a general fight, which must result in the death of many prisoners and the escape of others; but this was prevented by the prompt action of the cavalry and artillery, marching near the scene of the revolt. Then the general, or some one for him, promised the people and the prisoners that the latter would be halted outside the town to receive the contributions. In an open wood by the roadside we were halted, and the guards themselves soon brought us the coveted food. The sly rascals must have tossed the dainties up in the blankets as they brought them along so that every man of us at a single grab could get a sample of all they sent. I got one good handful only, but it was a mixture of ginger-bread, cookies, cake, corn-bread, and everything else that the people of Martinsburg ate. It was here that the Barbara Fritchie lived. After the battle of Antietam these women had laid planks on a torn up bridge for us, so that we could cross and drive Stuart's cavalry out of the town.

But notwithstanding this extra food at Martinsburg the low diet and the sharp stones soon told



on my strength. My feet were sore, and my stomach was faint beyond endurance, and the climax was reached one day when my sight left me, and I threw myself down on the roadside to die. The rallying cry of "A cavalry charge" had no more effect on me; I knew they could not approach us now, and I gave up in despair as soon as I found I was blind. The guards tried to make me get up, but I listened with indifference to their threats to shoot me. The rear-guard of each division passed me with the same result for their efforts to rouse me, until at last the rear-guard of all came up; the officer in command assured me that it was his duty to kill me rather than leave me behind, and though I believed him I could not move, and merely told him so. At last he told a man to "run me through" with his bayonet, but I suppose there was a saving sign that I did not see, for after a pause I heard him tell the man to stay with me until a wagon came along and I could be taken and given something to eat. I never saw that officer, but I hope God saw his act of forbearance and humanity and rewarded him for it. There have been miserable cowards in either army who bullied and mistreated unfortunate prisoners when they had the power to do so, but the true soldier never did, and I never saw anything but kindness shown to the prisoners that my regiment took, and I never experienced anything but kindness from the men who guarded me from Gettysburg to Staunton.

After a long rest I was placed in a wagon and taken to a house where I got a big slice of bread and butter, and in a short time sight and strength returned, and I was able to march with the column. I ought to add for my own credit that I did not fall out again, though faint and hungry often enough. The towns through which we passed on our way up the Shenandoah Valley were apprised of our coming, and manifested a different spirit, of course, from that exhibited at Martinsburg. Many insulted and upbraided us, but some of our men who excelled in nothing else were mighty in vituperation and abusive eloquence, and these

paid back with interest all the taunts we received, often, I am sorry to say, surpassing the bounds of self-respect and decency.

We usually encamped in large meadows, through which streams of good water ran, and were here allowed to wash, eat, and sleep while our guards were posted around the fences. At one of those halts, as we approached Staunton, a farmer with his wife drove up close to the fence, and after taking a critical survey of the crowd he said indignantly: "Forty thousand Yankee prisoners! Why, I would bet the best farm in the valley that there isn't a quarter of them here!"

The heralds everywhere had doubtless added a harmless cipher to our real number.

At length—about the 20th of July, I think—we arrived at Staunton, weary and sore. We had marched about fifteen miles a day since we left Williamsport. As we entered Staunton some showed their love to their enemies by supplying us with tracts, but I am not sure that their kindness was appreciated by the prisoners as generally as was the attention paid to our hungry stomachs by the people of Martinsburg. While waiting there for transportation to Richmond we were amused to note the esteem in which the people held the Confederate money. Those who brought wares into our camp for sale at first refused to sell at all except for Federal money. When the officers threatened to expel from the camp any who did that, they would ask to see the money before naming the price, and if it was Federal, the pie was a quarter, but if Confederate, it would cost a dollar. One young army sharper—not one of our guards and not a Virginian—must have made a small fortune by exchanging money with our men at the rate of about two for one. He told them that at Richmond the respective values were even, but when we were marched through that city we found it to be as ten to one.

Our marches ended here; we were placed in box, or gravel cars, and at a slightly increased rate of speed were taken to Richmond.



CONFEDERATES CAPTURED AT GETTYSBURG. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



# THE OPPOSING FORCES AT GETTYSBURG, PA.

July 1st-3d, 1863.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

## THE UNION ARMY.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—Major-General George G. Meade. Staff loss: w, 4.

*Command of the Provost Marshal General*, Brig.-Gen. Marsena R. Patrick: 93d N. Y., <sup>1</sup>Lieut.-Col. Benjamin C. Butler; 8th U. S., <sup>1</sup>Capt. Edwin W. H. Read; 2d Pa. Cav., Col. R. Butler Price; E and I, 6th Pa. Cav., Capt. James Starr; Detachments 1st, 2d, 5th and 6th, U. S. Cav.

*Guards and Orderlies*: Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Mann. *Artillery*, <sup>1</sup>Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. *U. S. Engineer Battalion*, <sup>1</sup>Capt. George H. Mendell.

FIRST ARMY CORPS, <sup>1</sup>Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday, Maj.-Gen. John Newton. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

*General Headquarters*: L, 1st Me. Cav., Capt. Constantine Taylor. Loss: k, 1; w, 2=3.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Solomon Meredith, Col. William W. Robinson: 19th Ind., Col. Samuel J. Williams; 24th Mich., Col. Henry A. Morrow (w), Capt. Albert M. Edwards; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fairchild (w), Maj. John Mansfield (w), Capt. George H. Otis; 6th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Rufus R. Dawes; 7th Wis., Col. William W. Robinson, Maj. Mark Finneum. Brigade loss: k, 162; w, 724; m, 267=1153. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler: 7th Ind., Col. Ira G. Grover; 76th N. Y., Maj. Andrew J. Grover (k), Capt. John E. Cook; 84th N. Y. (14th Militia), Col. Edward B. Fowler; 95th N. Y., Col. George H. Biddle (w), Maj. Edward Pye; 147th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis C. Miller (w), Maj. George Harney; 56th Pa., Col. J. William Hofmann. Brigade loss: k, 111; w, 498; m, 366=975.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson. Staff loss: w, 1.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Gabriel R. Paul (w), Col. Samuel H. Leonard (w), Col. Adrian R. Root (w and c), Col. Richard Coulter (w), Col. Peter Lyle, Col. Richard Coulter: 16th Me., Col. Charles W. Tilden (c), Maj. Archibald D. Leavitt; 13th Mass., Col. Samuel H. Leonard, Lieut.-Col. N. Walter Batchelder; 94th N. Y., Col. Adrian R. Root, Maj. Samuel A. Moffett; 104th N. Y., Col. Gilbert G. Prey; 107th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James MacThomson (w), Capt. Emanuel D. Roath. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 357; m, 633=1041. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter: 12th Mass., Col. James L. Bates (w), Lieut.-Col. David Allen, Jr.; 83d N. Y. (9th Militia), Lieut.-Col. Joseph A. Moesch; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock (c), Maj. Charles Northrup; 11th Pa., <sup>1</sup>Col. Richard Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines (w), Capt. John B. Overmyer; 88th Pa., Maj. Benezet F. Foust (w), Capt. Henry Whiteside; 90th Pa., Col. Peter Lyle, Maj. Alfred J. Sellers, Col. Peter Lyle. Brigade loss: k, 39; w, 255; m, 350=644.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday. Staff loss: w, 1.

*First Brigade*, Col. Chapman Biddle (w), Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Col. Chapman Biddle: 80th N. Y. (20th Militia), Col. Theodore R. Gates; 121st Pa., Maj. Alexander Biddle, Col. Chapman Biddle, Maj. Alexander Biddle; 142d Pa., Col. Robert P. Cummins (k), Lieut.-Col. Alfred B. McCalmont; 151st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F. McFarland (w), Capt. Walter L. Owens, Col. Harrison Allen. Brigade loss: k, 91; w, 548; m, 257=896. *Second Brigade*, Col. Roy Stone (w), Col. Langhorne Wister (w),

Col. Edmund L. Dana: 143d Pa., Col. Edmund L. Dana, Lieut.-Col. John D. Musser; 149th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Walton Dwight (w), Capt. James Glenn; 150th Pa., Col. Langhorne Wister, Lieut.-Col. Henry S. Huidekoper (w), Capt. Cornelius C. Widdis. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 462; m, 306=852. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George J. Stannard (w), Col. Francis V. Randall: 12th Vt., <sup>1</sup>Col. Asa P. Blunt; 13th Vt., Col. Francis V. Randall, Maj. Joseph J. Boynton, Lieut.-Col. William D. Munson; 14th Vt., Col. William T. Nichols; 15th Vt., <sup>1</sup>Col. Redfield Proctor; 16th Vt., Col. Wheelock G. Veazey. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 274; m, 32=351.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Col. Charles S. Wainwright: 2d Me., Capt. James A. Hall; 5th Me., Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens (w), Lieut. Edward N. Whittier; L, 1st N. Y. (E, 1st N. Y. attached), Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds (w), Lieut. George Breck; B, 1st Pa., Capt. James H. Cooper; B, 4th U. S., Lieut. James Stewart (w). Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 86; m, 11=106.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, <sup>1</sup>Maj.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock (w), Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon (w). Staff loss: w, 3.

*General Headquarters*: D and K, 6th N. Y. Cav., Capt. Riley Johnson. Loss: k, 1; w, 3=4.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell.

*First Brigade*, Col. Edward E. Cross (k), Col. H. Boyd McKeen: 5th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Charles E. Hapgood; 61st N. M., Lieut.-Col. K. Oscar Broady; 81st Pa., Col. H. Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Col. Amos Stroh; 148th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Robert McFarlane. Brigade loss: k, 57; w, 260; m, 13=330. *Second Brigade*, Col. Patrick Kelly: 28th Mass., Col. Richard Byrnes; 63d N. Y. (2 co's), Lieut.-Col. Richard C. Bentley (w), Capt. Thomas Touhy; 69th N. Y. (2 co's), Capt. Richard Moroney (w), Lieut. James J. Smith; 88th N. Y. (2 co's), Capt. Denis F. Burke; 116th Pa. (4 co's), Maj. St. Clair A. Mulholland. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 109; m, 62=198. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Samuel K. Zook (k), Lieut.-Col. John Fraser: 52d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. C. G. Freudenberg (w), Capt. William Scherrer; 57th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alfred B. Chapman; 66th N. Y., Col. Orlando H. Morris (w), Lieut.-Col. John S. Hammell (w), Maj. Peter Nelson; 140th Pa., Col. Richard P. Roberts (k), Lieut.-Col. John Fraser. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 227; m, 82=358. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. John R. Brooke (w): 27th Conn. (2 co's), Lieut.-Col. Henry C. Merwin (k), Maj. James H. Coburn; 2d Del., Col. William P. Bailly, Capt. Charles H. Christman; 64th N. Y., Col. Daniel G. Bingham (w), Maj. Leman W. Bradley; 53d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Richards McMichael; 145th Pa. (7 co's), Col. Hiram L. Brown (w), Capt. John W. Reynolds (w), Capt. Moses W. Oliver. Brigade loss: k, 53; w, 281; m, 49=383.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. William Harrow. Staff loss: w, 3.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Harrow, Col. Francis E. Heath: 19th Me., Col. Francis E. Heath, Lieut.-Col. Henry W. Cunningham; 15th Mass., Col. George H. Ward (k), Lieut.-Col. George C. Joslin; 1st Minn. (2d Co. Minn. S. S. attached), Col. William Colvill, Jr. (w), Capt. Nathan S. Messick (k), Capt. Henry C. Coates; 82d N. Y. (2d Militia), Lieut.-Col. James Huston (k), Capt. John

<sup>1</sup>At Taneytown and not engaged in the battle.

<sup>2</sup>See artillery brigades attached to army corps and the reserve.

<sup>3</sup>Maj.-Gen. John F. Reynolds of this corps was killed July 1st, while in command of the left wing of the army.

<sup>4</sup>Transferred on afternoon of July 1st to the First Brigade.

<sup>5</sup>Guarding trains and not engaged in the battle.

<sup>6</sup>After the death of General Reynolds General Hancock was assigned to the command of all the troops on the field

of battle, relieving General Howard, who had succeeded General Reynolds. General Gibbon of the Second Division assumed command of the corps. These assignments terminated on the evening of July 1. Similar changes in commanders occurred during the battle of the 2d, when General Hancock was put in command of the Third Corps, in addition to his own. He and General Gibbon were wounded on the 3d, and Brig.-Gen. William Hays was assigned to the command of the corps.



Darrow. Brigade loss: k, 147; w, 569; m, 48=764. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alexander S. Webb (w); 69th Pa., Col. Dennis O'Kane (m w), Capt. William Davis; 71st Pa., Col. Richard Penn Smith; 72d Pa., Col. DeWitt C. Baxter (w), Lieut.-Col. Theodore Hesser; 106th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William L. Curry. Brigade loss: k, 114; w, 337; m, 39=490. *Third Brigade*, Col. Norman J. Hall; 19th Mass., Col. Arthur F. Devereux; 20th Mass., Col. Paul J. Revere (m w), Lieut.-Col. George N. Macy (w), Capt. Henry L. Abbott; 7th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Amos E. Steele, Jr. (k), Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis; 42d N. Y., Col. James E. Mallon; 59th N. Y. (4 co's), Lieut.-Col. Max A. Thoman (m w), Capt. William McFadden. Brigade loss: k, 81; w, 282; m, 14=377. *Unattached*: 1st Co. Mass. Sharpshooters, Capt. William Plumer, Lieut. Emerson L. Bicknell. Loss: k, 2; w, 6=8.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

*First Brigade*, Col. Samuel S. Carroll; 14th Ind., Col. John Coons; 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Leonard W. Carpenter; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer; 7th W. Va., Lieut.-Col. Jonathan H. Lookwood. Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 166; m, 7=211. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas A. Smyth (w), Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce; 14th Conn., Maj. Theodore G. Ellis; 1st Del., Lieut.-Col. Edward P. Harris, Capt. Thomas B. Hizar (w), Lieut. William Smith (k), Lieut. John T. Dent; 12th N. J., Maj. John T. Hill; 10th N. Y. (battalion), Maj. George F. Hopper; 108th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 279; m, 26=366. *Third Brigade*, Col. George L. Willard (k), Col. Eliakim Sherrill (k), Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull; 39th N. Y. (4 co's), Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt (w); 111th N. Y., Col. Clinton D. MacDougall (w), Lieut.-Col. Isaac M. Lusk, Capt. Aaron P. Seeley; 125th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Levin Crandell; 126th N. Y., Col. Eliakim Sherrill, Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull. Brigade loss: k, 139; w, 542; m, 33=714.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Capt. John G. Hazard: B, 1st N. Y. (14th N. Y. Battery attached), Lieut. Albert S. Sheldon (w), Capt. James McKay Rorty (k), Lieut. Robert E. Rogers; A, 1st R. I., Capt. William A. Arnold; B, 1st R. I., Lieut. T. Fred. Brown (w), Lieut. Walter S. Perrin; I, 1st U. S., Lieut. George A. Woodruff (m w), Lieut. Tully McCrea; A, 4th U. S., Lieut. Alonzo H. Cushing (k), Sergt. Frederick Fuger. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 119; m, 3=149.

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles (w), Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. Staff loss: w, 2.

FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham (w and c), Col. Andrew H. Tappin; 57th Pa. (8 co's), Col. Peter Sides (w), Capt. Alanson H. Nelson; 63d Pa., Maj. John A. Danks; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tappin, Capt. Milton S. Davis; 105th Pa., Col. Calvin A. Craig; 114th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Frederick F. Cavada (c), Capt. Edward R. Bowen; 141st Pa., Col. Henry J. Madill. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 508; m, 171=740. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward, Col. Hiram Berdan; 20th Ind., Col. John Wheeler (k), Lieut.-Col. William C. L. Taylor; 3d Me., Col. Moses B. Lakeman; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker (w), Capt. Edwin Libby; 86th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin L. Higgins (w); 124th N. Y., Col. A. Van Horne Ellis (k), Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Cummins (w); 99th Pa., Maj. John W. Moore; 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Col. Hiram Berdan, Lieut.-Col. Casper Trepp; 2d U. S. Sharpshooters (8 co's), Maj. Homer R. Stoughton. Brigade loss: k, 129; w, 482; m, 170=781. *Third Brigade*, Col. P. Regis De Trobriand; 17th Me., Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Merrill; 3d Mich., Col. Byron R. Pierce (w), Lieut.-Col. Edwin S. Pierce; 5th Mich., Lieut.-Col. John Pulford (w); 40th N. Y., Col. Thomas W. Egan; 110th Pa. (6 co's), Lieut.-Col. David M. Jones (w), Maj. Isaac Rogers. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 394; m, 21=490.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.

Staff loss: k, 2; w, 9=11.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr; 1st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Clark B. Baldwin; 11th Mass., Lieut.-Col.

Porter D. Tripp; 16th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Waldo Merriam (w), Capt. Matthew Donovan; 12th N. H., Capt. John F. Langley; 11th N. J., Col. Robert McAllister (w), Capt. Luther Martin (w), Lieut. John Schoonover (w), Capt. William H. Lloyd (w), Capt. Samuel T. Sleeper, Lieut. John Schoonover; 26th Pa., Maj. Robert L. Bodine; 84th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Milton Opp. Brigade loss: k, 121; w, 604; m, 65=790. *Second Brigade*, Col. William R. Brewster; 70th N. Y., Col. J. Egbert Farnum; 71st N. Y., Col. Henry L. Potter; 72d N. Y., Col. John S. Austin (w), Lieut.-Col. John Leonard; 73d N. Y., Maj. Michael W. Burns; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Holt; 120th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Cornelius D. Westbrook (w), Maj. John R. Tappen. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 573; m, 75=778. *Third Brigade*, Col. George C. Burling; 2d N. H., Col. Edward L. Bailey (w); 5th N. J., Col. William J. Sewell (w), Capt. Thomas C. Godfrey, Capt. Henry H. Woolsey; 6th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson; 7th N. J., Col. Louis R. Francine (m w), Maj. Frederick Cooper; 8th N. J., Col. John Ramsey (w), Capt. John G. Langston; 115th Pa., Maj. John P. Dunne. Brigade loss: k, 59; w, 376; m, 78=513.

ARTILLERY BRIGADE, Capt. George E. Randolph (w), Capt. A. Judson Clark; 2d N. J., Capt. A. Judson Clark, Lieut. Robert Sims; D, 1st N. Y., Capt. George B. Winslow; 4th N. Y., Capt., James E. Smith; E, 1st R. I., Lieut. John K. Bucklyn (w), Lieut. Benjamin Freeborn; K, 4th U. S., Lieut. Francis W. Seeley (w), Lieut. Robert James. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 81; m, 17=106.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. George Sykes.

*General Headquarters*: D and E, 12th N. Y. Inf., Capt. Henry W. Rider; D and H, 17th Pa. Cav., Capt. William Thompson.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James Barnes.

*First Brigade*, Col. William S. Tilton; 18th Mass., Col. Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Sherwin, Jr.; 1st Mich., Col. Ira C. Abbott (w), Lieut.-Col. William A. Throop; 118th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James Gwyn. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 102; m, 11=125. *Second Brigade*, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer; 9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Guiney; 32d Mass., Col. G. L. Prescott; 4th Mich., Col. Harrison H. Jeffords (k), Lieut.-Col. George W. Lumbard; 62d Pa., Lieut.-Col. James C. Hull. Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 239; m, 121=427. *Third Brigade*, Col. Strong Vincent (m w), Col. James C. Rice; 20th Me., Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain; 16th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Norval E. Welch; 44th N. Y., Col. James C. Rice, Lieut.-Col. Freeman Conner; 83d Pa., Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward. Brigade loss: k, 88; w, 253; m, 11=352.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.

*First Brigade*, Col. Hannibal Day; 3d U. S. (6 co's), Capt. Henry W. Freedley (w), Capt. Richard G. Lay; 4th U. S. (4 co's), Capt. Julius W. Adams; 6th U. S. (5 co's), Capt. Levi C. Bootes; 12th U. S. (8 co's), Capt. Thomas S. Dunn; 14th U. S. (8 co's), Maj. Grotius R. Giddings. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 318; m, 18=382. *Second Brigade*, Col. Sidney Burbank; 2d U. S. (6 co's), Maj. Arthur T. Lee (w), Capt. Samuel A. McKee; 7th U. S. (4 co's), Capt. David P. Hancock; 10th U. S. (3 co's), Capt. William Clinton; 11th U. S. (6 co's), Maj. DeLancey Floyd-Jones; 17th U. S. (7 co's), Lieut.-Col. J. Durell Greene. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 342; m, 27=447. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Stephen H. Weed (k), Col. Kenner Garrard; 140th N. Y., Col. Patrick H. O'Rourke (k), Lieut.-Col. Louis Ernst; 146th N. Y., Col. Kenner Garrard, Lieut.-Col. David T. Jenkins; 91st Pa., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Sinex; 155th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John H. Cain. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 142; m, 18=200.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

*First Brigade*, Col. William McCandless; 1st Pa. Reserves, Col. William C. Talley; 2d Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George A. Woodward; 6th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Wellington H. Ent; 13th Pa. Reserves, Col. Charles F. Taylor (k), Maj. William R. Hartshorne. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 132; m, 3=155. *Third Brigade*, Col. Joseph W. Fisher; 5th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George Dare; 9th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. James McK. Snodgrass; 10th Pa. Reserves, Col. Adoniram J. Warner; 11th Pa. Re-

Guarding trains and not engaged in the battle.



serves, Col. Samuel M. Jackson; 12th Pa. Reserves, Col. Martin D. Hardin. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 49=55.

**ARTILLERY BRIGADE**, Capt. Augustus P. Martin: 3d Mass., Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott; C, 1st N. Y., Col. Almont Barnes; L, 1st Ohio, Capt. Frank C. Gibbs; D, 5th U. S., Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett (k), Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse; I, 5th U. S., Lieut. Malbone F. Watson (w), Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 33; m, 2=43.

**SIXTH ARMY CORPS**, Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick.

*General Headquarters*: L, 1st N. J., and H, 1st Pa. Cav., Capt. William S. Craft.

**FIRST DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright.

*Provost Guard*: 4th N. J. (3 co's), Capt. William R. Maxwell. *First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert: 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. William Henry, Jr.; 2d N. J., Lieut.-Col. Charles Wiebecke; 3d N. J., Lieut.-Col. Edward L. Campbell; 15th N. J., Col. William H. Penrose. Brigade loss: w, 11. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett: ☆ 5th Me., Col. Clark S. Edwards; 121st N. Y., Col. Emory Upton; 95th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward Carroll; 96th Pa., Maj. William H. Lessig. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 4=5. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell: 6th Me., Col. Hiram Burnham; 49th Pa. (4 co's), Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Hulings; 119th Pa., Col. Peter C. Ellmaker; 5th Wis., Col. Thomas S. Allen. Brigade loss: w, 2.

**SECOND DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe.

*Second Brigade*, Col. Lewis A. Grant: 2d Vt., Col. James H. Walbridge; 3d Vt., Col. Thomas O. Seaver; 4th Vt., Col. Charles B. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. John R. Lewis; 6th Vt., Col. Elisha L. Barney. Brigade loss: w, 1. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Neill: 7th Me. (6 co's), Lieut.-Col. Selden Connor; 33d N. Y. (detachment), Capt. Henry J. Gifford; 43d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John Wilson; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 77th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French; 61st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F. Smith. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 11; m, 2=15.

**THIRD DIVISION**, Maj.-Gen. John Newton, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler: 65th N. Y., Col. Joseph E. Hamblin; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross; 122d N. Y., Col. Silas Titus; 23d Pa., Lieut.-Col. John F. Glenn; 82d Pa., Col. Isaac C. Bassett. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 56; m, 3=74. *Second Brigade*, Col. Henry L. Eustis: 7th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. Harlow; 10th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Parsons; 37th Mass., Col. Oliver Edwards; 2d R. I., Col. Horatio Rogers, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 41; m, 25=69. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton, Col. David J. Nevin: 62d N. Y., Col. David J. Nevin, Lieut.-Col. Theodore B. Hamilton; 93d Pa., Maj. John I. Nevin; 98th Pa., Maj. John B. Kohler; 102d Pa., ☆ Col. John W. Patterson; 139th Pa., Col. Frederick H. Collier, Lieut.-Col. William H. Moody. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 51=53.

**ARTILLERY BRIGADE**, Col. Charles H. Tompkins: 1st Mass., Capt. William H. McCartney; 1st N. Y., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 3d N. Y., Capt. William A. Harn; C, 1st R. I., Capt. Richard Waterman; G, 1st R. I., Capt. George W. Adams; D, 2d U. S., Lieut. Edward B. Williston; G, 2d U. S., Lieut. John H. Butler; F, 5th U. S., Lieut. Leonard Martin. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 8=12.

**ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS**, † Maj.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Staff loss: w, 1.

*General Headquarters*: I and K, 1st Ind. Cav., Capt. Abram Sharra; 8th N. Y. (1 co.), Lieut. Hermann Foerster. Loss: m, 3.

**FIRST DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow (w), Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames. Staff loss: w, 1.

*First Brigade*, Col. Leopold von Gilsa: 41st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Detleo von Einsiedel; 54th N. Y., Maj. Stephen Kovacs (c), Lieut. Ernest Both; 68th N. Y., Col. Gotthilf Bourry; 153d Pa., Maj. John Frueauff. Brigade loss: k, 54; w, 310; m, 163=527. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-

Gen. Adelbert Ames, Col. Andrew L. Harris: 17th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Douglas Fowler (k), Maj. Allen G. Brady; 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah Williams (c), Capt. Nathaniel J. Manning, Lieut. William Maloney (w), Lieut. Israel White; 75th Ohio, Col. Andrew L. Harris, Capt. George B. Fox; 107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim Meyer, Capt. John M. Lutz. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 366; m, 344=778.

**SECOND DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr.

Staff loss: w, 1.

*First Brigade*, Col. Charles R. Coster: 134th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Allan H. Jackson; 154th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. D. B. Allen; 27th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Lorenz Cantador; 73d Pa., Capt. D. F. Kelley. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 228; m, 314=597. *Second Brigade*, Col. Orland Smith: 33d Mass., Col. Adin B. Underwood; 136th N. Y., Col. James Wood, Jr.; 55th Ohio, Col. Charles B. Gambee; 73d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Richard Long. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 278; m, 19=348.

**THIRD DIVISION**, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alex. Schimmelfennig, Col. George von Amsberg: 82d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Salomon; 45th N. Y., Col. George von Amsberg, Lieut.-Col. Adolphus Dobke; 157th N. Y., Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr.; 61st Ohio, Col. Stephen J. McGroarty; 74th Pa., Col. Adolph von Hartung (w), Lieut.-Col. Alexander von Mitzel (c), Capt. Gustav Schleiter, Capt. Henry Krauseneck. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 296; m, 453=807. *Second Brigade*, Col. W. Krzyzanowski: 58th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. August Otto, Capt. Emil Koenig; 119th N. Y., Col. John T. Lockman (w), Lieut.-Col. Edward F. Lloyd; 82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson (w), Lieut.-Col. David Thomson; 75th Pa., Col. Francis Mahler (w), Maj. August Ledig; 26th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Hans Boebel (w), Capt. John W. Fuchs. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 388; m, 206=669.

**ARTILLERY BRIGADE**, Maj. Thomas W. Osborn: I, 1st N. Y., Capt. Michael Wiedrich; 13th N. Y., Lieut. William Wheeler; I, 1st Ohio, Capt. Hubert Dilger; K, 1st Ohio, Capt. Lewis Heckman; G, 4th U. S., Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson (k), Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 53; m, 9=69.

**TWELFTH ARMY CORPS**, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum, ‡ Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.

*Provost Guard*: 10th Me. (4 co's), Capt. John D. Beardsley.

**FIRST DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger.

*First Brigade*, Col. Archibald L. McDougall: 5th Conn., Col. Warren W. Packer; 20th Conn., Lieut.-Col. William B. Wooster; 3d Md., Col. Joseph M. Sudsberg; 123d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James C. Rogers, Capt. Adolphus H. Tanner; 145th N. Y., Col. E. Livingston Price; 46th Pa., Col. James L. Selfridge. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 60; m, 8=80. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry H. Lockwood: 1st Md. Potomac Home Brigade, Col. William P. Maulsby; 1st Md. Eastern Shore, Col. James Wallace; 150th N. Y., Col. John H. Ketcham. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 121; m, 18=174. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, Col. Silas Colgrove: 27th Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove, Lieut.-Col. John R. Fessler; 2d Mass., Lieut.-Col. Charles R. Mudge (k), Maj. Charles F. Morse; 13th N. J., Col. Ezra A. Carman; 107th N. Y., Col. Nirom M. Crane; 3d Wis., Col. William Hawley. Brigade loss: k, 49; w, 225; m, 5=279.

**SECOND DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary.

*First Brigade*, Col. Charles Candy: 5th Ohio, Col. John H. Patrick; 7th Ohio, Col. William R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Capt. Wilbur F. Stevens (w), Capt. Edward Hayes; 66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Eugene Powell; 28th Pa., Capt. John Flynn; 147th Pa. (8 co's), Lieut.-Col. Arlo Pardee, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 117; m, 3=138. *Second Brigade*, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr., Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Kane, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.: 29th Pa., Col. William Rick-

☆ Also commanded Third Brigade, Third Division, July 3d. Guarding trains and not engaged in the battle.

† During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the arrival of General Hancock on the afternoon of July 1st, all the troops on the field of battle were

commanded by General Howard, General Schurz taking command of the Eleventh Corps, and General Schimmelfennig of the Third Division.

‡ General Slocum exercised command of the right wing during a part of the battle.



ards, Jr.; 109th Pa., Capt. F. L. Gimber; 111th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Walker, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Walker. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 66; m, 9=98. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George S. Greene: 60th N. Y., Col. Abel Godard; 78th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Herbert von Hammerstein; 102d N. Y., Col. James C. Lane (w), Capt. Lewis R. Stegman; 137th N. Y., Col. David Ireland; 149th N. Y., Col. Henry A. Barnum, Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Randall (w). Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 212; m, 24=303.

**ARTILLERY BRIGADE**, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg: M, 1st N. Y., Lieut. Charles E. Winegar; E, Pa., Lieut. Charles A. Atwell; F, 4th U. S., Lieut. Sylvanus T. Rugg; K, 5th U. S., Lieut. David H. Kinzie. Brigade loss: w, 9.

**CAVALRY CORPS**, Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. **FIRST DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. John Buford.

*First Brigade*, Col. William Gamble: 8th Ill., Maj. John L. Beveridge; 12th Ill. (4 co's) and 3d Ind. (6 co's), Col. George H. Chapman; 8th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William L. Markell. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 58; m, 28=99. *Second Brigade*, Col. Thomas C. Devin: 6th N. Y., Maj. Wm. E. Beardsley; 9th N. Y., Col. William Sackett; 17th Pa., Col. J. H. Kellogg; 3d W. Va. (2 co's), Capt. Seymour B. Conger. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 3; m, 23=28. *Reserve Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt: 6th Pa., Maj. James H. Haseltine; 1st U. S., Capt. Robert S. C. Lord; 2d U. S., Capt. T. F. Rodenbough; 5th U. S., Capt. Julius W. Mason; 6th U. S., Maj. Samuel H. Starr (w and e), Lieut. Louis H. Carpenter, Lieutenant Nicholas Nolan, Captain Ira W. Claflin. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 55; m, 223=291.

**SECOND DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg. *Headquarters Guard*: A, 1st Ohio, Capt. Noah Jones.

*First Brigade*, Col. John B. McIntosh: 1st Md., Lieut.-Col. James M. Deems; A, Purnell (Md.) Legion, Capt. Robert E. Duvall; 1st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Greely S. Curtis; 1st N. J., Maj. M. H. Beaumont; 1st Pa., Col. John P. Taylor; 3d Pa., Lieut.-Col. E. S. Jones; Section Battery H, 3d Pa. Art'y, Captain William D. Rank. Brigade loss: w, 26; m, 9=35. *Second Brigade*, Lt. Col. Pennock Huey: 2d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Otto Harhaus; 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Augustus Pruyn; 6th Ohio, Maj. William Stedman; 8th Pa., Capt. William A. Corrie. *Third Brigade*, Col. J. Irvin Gregg: 1st Me., Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Smith; 10th N. Y., Major M. Henry Avery; 4th Pa., Lieut.-Colonel William E. Doster; 16th Pa., Lieut.-Colonel John K. Robison. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 12; m, 3=21.

**THIRD DIVISION**, Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. *Headquarters Guard*: C, 1st Ohio, Capt. Samuel N. Stanford.

† At Westminster, etc., and not engaged in the battle.  
‡ With Huey's cavalry brigade, and not in the battle.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth (k), Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond: 5th N. Y., Maj. John Hammond; 18th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William P. Brinton; 1st Vt., Lieut.-Col. Addison W. Preston; 1st W. Va., Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond, Maj. Charles E. Capehart. Brigade loss: k, 21; w, 34; m, 43=98. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George A. Custer: 1st Mich., Col. Charles H. Town; 5th Mich., Col. Russell A. Alger; 6th Mich., Col. George Gray; 7th Mich., Col. William D. Mann. Brigade loss: k, 32; w, 147; m, 78=257.

**HORSE ARTILLERY**. *First Brigade*, Capt. James M. Robertson: 9th Mich., Capt. Jabez J. Daniels; 6th N. Y., Capt. Joseph W. Martin; B and L, 2d U. S., Lieut. Edward Heaton; M, 2d U. S., Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington; E, 4th U. S., Lieut. Samuel S. Elder. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 6=8. *Second Brigade*, Capt. John C. Tidball: E and G, 1st U. S., Capt. Alanson M. Randol; K, 1st U. S., Capt. William M. Graham; A, 2d U. S., Lieut. John H. Calef; C, 3d U. S., † Lieut. William D. Fuller. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 13=15.

**ARTILLERY RESERVE**, Brig.-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Capt. James M. Robertson.

*Headquarters Guard*: C, 32d Mass., Capt. Josiah C. Fuller.

*First Regular Brigade*, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom (w): H, 1st U. S., Lieut. Chandler P. Eakin (w), Lieut. Philip D. Mason; F and K, 3d U. S., Lieut. John G. Turnbull; C, 4th U. S., Lieut. Evan Thomas; C, 5th U. S., Lieut. Gulian V. Weir. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 53; m, 2=68. *First Volunteer Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. Freeman McGilvery: 5th Mass. (10th N. Y. attached), Capt. Charles A. Phillips; 9th Mass., Capt. John Bigelow (w), Lieut. Richard S. Milton; 15th N. Y., Capt. Patrick Hart (w); C and F, Pa., Capt. James Thompson (w). Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 71; m, 6=93. *Second Volunteer Brigade*, Capt. Elijah D. Taft: B, 1st Conn., † Capt. Albert F. Brooker; M, 1st Conn., † Capt. Franklin A. Pratt; 2d Conn., Capt. John W. Sterling; 5th N. Y., Capt. Elijah D. Taft. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 5; m, 2=8. *Third Volunteer Brigade*, Capt. James F. Huntington: 1st N. H., Capt. Frederick M. Edgell; H, 1st Ohio, Lieut. George W. Norton; F and G, 1st Pa., Capt. R. Bruce Ricketts; C, W. Va., Capt. Wallace Hill. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 24; m, 3=37. *Fourth Volunteer Brigade*, Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh: 6th Me., Lieut. Edwin B. Dow; A, Md., Capt. James H. Rigby; 1st N. J., Lieut. Augustin N. Parsons; G, 1st N. Y., Capt. Nelson Ames; K, 1st N. Y. (11th N. Y. attached), Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 34=36.

*Train Guard*: 4th N. J. (7 co's), Maj. Charles Ewing.

The total loss of the Union army was 3072 killed, 14,497 wounded, and 5434 captured or missing=23,003.

† At Taneytown and Westminster, and not engaged in the battle.

## THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA—General Robert E. Lee.

**FIRST ARMY CORPS**, Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet. **MCLAWS'S DIVISION**, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

*Kershaw's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw: 2d S. C., Col. J. D. Kennedy (w), Lieut.-Col. F. Gaillard; 3d S. C., Maj. R. C. Maffett, Col. J. D. Nance; 7th S. C., Col. D. Wyatt Aiken; 8th S. C., Col. J. W. Henagan; 15th S. C., Col. W. G. De Saussure (k), Maj. William M. Gist; 3d S. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 483; m, 32=630. *Semmes's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes (m w), Col. Goode Bryan: 10th Ga., Col. John B. Weems; 50th Ga., Col. W. R. Manning; 51st Ga., Col. E. Ball; 53d Ga., Col. James P. Simms. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 284; m, 91=430. *Barksdale's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale (m w), Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys: 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter; 17th Miss., Col. W. D. Holder, Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Col. T. M. Griffin, Lieut.-Col. W. H. Luse; 21st Miss., Col. B. G. Humphreys. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 550; m, 92=747. *Wofford's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William T. Wofford: 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 18th Ga., Lieut.-

Col. S. Z. Ruff; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. Luther J. Glenn; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. E. S. Barclay. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 192; m, 112=334. *Artillery Battalion*, Col. Henry C. Cabell: A, 1st N. C., Capt. B. C. Manly; Ga. Battery (Pulaski Art'y), Capt. J. C. Fraser (m w), Lieut. W. J. Furlong; Va. Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers), Capt. E. S. McCarthy; Ga. Battery (Troup Art'y), Capt. H. H. Carlton (w), Lieut. C. W. Motes. Battalion loss: k, 8; w, 29=37.

**PICKETT'S DIVISION**, Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett.

*Garnett's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Richard B. Garnett (k), Maj. Charles S. Peyton: 8th Va., Col. Eppa Hunton (w); 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Carrington (w); 19th Va., Col. Henry Gantt (w), Lieut.-Col. John T. Ellis (k); 28th Va., Col. R. C. Allen (k), Lieut.-Col. William Watts; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart (m w), Lieut.-Col. P. P. Slaughter. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 324; m, 539=941. *Armistead's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead (k), Col. W. R. Aylett: 9th Va., Maj. John C. Owens (k); 14th Va., Col.



James G. Hodges (k), Lieut.-Col. William White; 38th Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds (k), Lieut.-Col. P. B. Whittle; 53d Va., Col. W. R. Aylett (w); 57th Va., Col. John Bowie Magruder (k). Brigade loss: k, 88; w, 460; m, 643 = 1191. *Kemper's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper (w and e), Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr. (w); 1st Va., Col. Lewis B. Williams (w), Lieut.-Col. F. G. Skinner; 3d Va., Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr., Lieut.-Col. A. D. Callicote (k); 7th Va., Col. W. T. Patton (k), Lieut.-Col. C. C. Flowerree; 11th Va., Maj. Kirkwood Otey (w); 24th Va., Col. William R. Terry (w). Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 356; m, 317 = 731. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. James Dearing; Va. Battery (Fauquier Art'y), Capt. R. M. Stribling; Va. Battery (Hampden Art'y), Capt. W. H. Caskie; Va. Battery (Richmond Fayette Art'y), Capt. M. C. Macon; Va. Battery, Capt. Joseph G. Blount. Battalion loss: k, 8; w, 17 = 25.

HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood (w), Brig.-Gen. E. McIver Law.

*Law's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. E. McIver Law, Col. James L. Sheffield; 4th Ala., Lieut.-Col. L. H. Scruggs; 15th Ala., Col. William C. Oates, Capt. B. A. Hill; 44th Ala., Col. William F. Perry; 47th Ala., Col. James W. Jackson, Lieut.-Col. M. J. Bulger, (w and e), Maj. J. M. Campbell; 48th Ala., Col. James L. Sheffield, Capt. T. J. Eubanks. Brigade loss: k, 74; w, 276; m, 146 = 496. *Anderson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George T. Anderson (w), Lieut.-Col. William Luffman; 7th Ga., Col. W. W. White; 8th Ga., Col. John R. Towers; 9th Ga., Lieut.-Col. John C. Moulner (k), Maj. W. M. Jones (w), Capt. George Hillier; 11th Ga., Col. F. H. Little (w), Lieut.-Col. William Luffman, Maj. Henry D. McDaniel, Capt. William H. Mitchell; 59th Ga., Col. Jack Brown (w), Capt. M. G. Bass. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 512; m, 54 = 671. *Robertson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Jerome B. Robertson (w); 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning (w), Lieut.-Col. R. S. Taylor; 1st Tex., Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work; 4th Tex., Col. J. C. G. Key (w), Maj. J. P. Bane; 5th Tex., Col. R. M. Powell (m w), Lieut.-Col. K. Bryan (w), Maj. J. C. Rogers. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 393; m, 120 = 597. *Benning's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Benning; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. William T. Harris (k), Maj. W. S. Shepherd; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. Du Bose; 17th Ga., Col. W. C. Hodges; 20th Ga., Col. John A. Jones (k), Lieut.-Col. J. D. Waddell. Brigade loss: k, 76; w, 299; m, 122 = 497. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. M. W. Henry; N. C. Battery (Branch Art'y), Capt. A. C. Latham; S. C. Battery (German Art'y), Capt. William K. Bachman; S. C. Battery (Palmetto Light Art'y), Capt. Hugh R. Garden; N. C. Battery (Rowan Art'y), Capt. James Reilly. Battalion loss: k, 4; w, 23 = 27.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Col. J. B. Walton.

*Alexander's Battalion*, Col. E. Porter Alexander; La. Battery (Madison Light Art'y), Capt. George V. Moody; S. C. Battery (Brooks Art'y), Lieut. S. C. Gilbert; Va. Battery (Ashland Art'y), Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr. (w), Lieut. James Woolfolk; Va. Battery (Bedford Art'y), Capt. T. C. Jordan; Va. Battery, Capt. William W. Parker; Va. Battery, Capt. O. B. Taylor. Battalion loss: k, 19; w, 114; m, 6 = 139. *Washington (La.) Artillery*, Maj. B. F. Eshleman; 1st Co., Capt. C. W. Squires; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson; 3d Co., Capt. M. B. Miller; 4th Co., Capt. Joe Norcom (w), Lieut. H. A. Battles. Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 26; m, 16 = 45.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell. Staff loss: w, 1.

EARLY'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early.

*Hays's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Harry T. Hays; 5th La., Maj. Alexander Hart (w), Capt. T. H. Biscoe; 6th La., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Hanlon; 7th La., Col. D. B. Penn; 8th La., Col. T. D. Lewis (k), Lieut.-Col. A. de Blanc (w), Maj. G. A. Lester; 9th La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 201; m, 76 = 313. *Hoke's Brigade*, Col. Isaac E. Avery (m w), Col. A. C. Godwin; 6th N. C., Maj. S. McD. Tate; 21st N. C., Col. W. W. Kirkland; 57th N. C., Col. A. C. Godwin. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 216; m, 94 = 345. *Smith's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Smith; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 49th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. Cattlett Gibson; 52d Va., Lieut.-Col. James H. Skinner. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 113; m, 17 = 142. *Gordon's Bri-*

*gade*, Brig.-Gen. John B. Gordon; 13th Ga., Col. James M. Smith; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkinson; 31st Ga., Col. Clement A. Eyans; 38th Ga., Capt. William L. McLeod; 60th Ga., Capt. W. B. Jones; 61st Ga., Col. John H. Lamar. Brigade loss: k, 71; w, 270; m, 39 = 380. *Artillery Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. H. P. Jones; Va. Battery (Charlottesville Art'y), Capt. James McD. Carrington; Va. Battery (Courtney Art'y), Capt. W. A. Tanner; La. Battery (Guard Art'y), Capt. C. A. Green; Va. Battery (Staunton Art'y), Capt. A. W. Garber. Battalion loss: k, 2; w, 6 = 8.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson. Staff loss: w, 1; m, 1 = 2.

*Steuart's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart; 1st Md. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. James R. Herbert (w), Maj. W. W. Goldsborough (w), Capt. J. P. Crane; 1st N. C., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Brown; 3d N. C., Maj. W. C. Parsley; 10th Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va., Lieut.-Col. S. T. Walton; 37th Va., Maj. H. C. Wood. Brigade loss: k, 83; w, 409; m, 190 = 682. *Nicholls's Brigade*, Col. J. M. Williams; 1st La., Capt. E. D. Willett; 2d La., Lieut.-Col. R. E. Burke; 10th La., Maj. T. N. Powell; 14th La., Lieut.-Col. David Zable; 15th La., Maj. Andrew Brady. Brigade loss: k, 43; w, 309; m, 36 = 388. *Stonewall Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James A. Walker; 2d Va., Col. J. Q. A. Nadenbousch; 4th Va., Maj. William Terry; 5th Va., Col. J. H. S. Funk; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. D. M. Shriver; 33d Va., Capt. J. B. Golladay. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 208; m, 87 = 330. *Jones's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John M. Jones (w), Lieut.-Col. R. H. Duncan; 21st Va., Capt. W. P. Moseley; 25th Va., Col. J. C. Higginbotham (w), Lieut.-Col. J. A. Robinson; 42d Va., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Withers (w), Capt. S. H. Saunders; 44th Va., Maj. N. Cobb (w), Capt. T. R. Buckner; 48th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Duncan; Maj. Oscar White; 50th Va., Lieut.-Col. L. H. N. Salyer. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 302; m, 61 = 421. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. J. W. Latimer (m w), Capt. Charles I. Raine; 1st Md. Battery, Capt. William F. Dement; Va. Battery (Alleghany Art'y), Capt. J. C. Carpenter; Md. Battery (Chesapeake Art'y), Capt. William D. Brown (w); Va. (Lee) Battery, Capt. Charles I. Raine, Lieut. William W. Hardwicke. Battalion loss: k, 10; w, 40 = 50.

RODES'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Robert E. Rodes.

*Daniel's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Junius Daniel; 32d N. C., Col. E. C. Brabble; 43d N. C., Col. T. S. Kenan (w and e), Lieut.-Col. W. G. Lewis; 45th N. C., Lieut.-Col. S. H. Boyd (w and e), Maj. John R. Winston (w and e), Capt. A. H. Gallaway (w), Capt. J. A. Hopkins; 53d N. C., Col. W. A. Owens; 2d N. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. H. L. Andrews (k), Capt. Van Brown. Brigade loss: k, 165; w, 635; m, 116 = 916. *Iverson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Iverson; 5th N. C., Capt. Speight B. West (w), Capt. Benjamin Robinson (w); 12th N. C., Lieut.-Col. W. S. Davis; 20th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Nelson Slough (w), Capt. Lewis T. Hicks; 23d N. C., Col. D. H. Christie (m w), Capt. William H. Johnston. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 328; m, 308 = 820. *Doles's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George Doles; 4th Ga., Lieut.-Col. D. R. E. Winn (k), Maj. W. H. Willis; 12th Ga., Col. Edward Willis; 21st Ga., Col. John T. Mercer; 44th Ga., Col. S. P. Lumpkin (w), Maj. W. H. Peebles. Brigade loss: k, 24; w, 124; m, 31 = 179. *Ramseur's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur; 2d N. C., Maj. D. W. Hurtt (w), Capt. James T. Scales; 4th N. C., Col. Bryan Grimes; 14th N. C., Col. R. Tyler Bennett (w), Maj. Joseph H. Lambeth; 30th N. C., Col. Francis M. Parker (w), Maj. W. W. Sellers. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 122; m, 32 = 177. *O'Neal's Brigade*, Col. Edward A. O'Neal; 3d Ala., Col. C. A. Battle; 5th Ala., Col. J. M. Hall; 6th Ala., Col. J. N. Lightfoot (w), Capt. M. L. Bowie; 12th Ala., Col. S. B. Pickens; 26th Ala., Lieut.-Col. John C. Goodgame. Brigade loss: k, 73; w, 430; m, 193 = 696. *Artillery Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Carter; Ala. Battery (Jeff Davis Art'y), Capt. W. J. Reese; Va. Battery (King William Art'y), Capt. W. P. Carter; Va. Battery (Morris Art'y), Capt. R. C. M. Page (w); Va. Battery (Orange Art'y), Capt. C. W. Fry. Battalion loss: k, 6; w, 35; m, 24 = 65.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Col. J. Thompson Brown.

*Brown's Battalion*, Capt. Willis J. Dance; Va. Battery



(2d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. David Watson; Va. Battery (3d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. B. H. Smith, Jr.; Va. Battery (Powhatan Art'y), Lieut. John M. Cunningham; Va. Battery (Rockbridge Art'y), Capt. A. Graham; Va. Battery (Salem Art'y), Lieut. C. B. Griffin. Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 19=22. *Nelson's Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. William Nelson; Va. Battery (Amherst Art'y), Capt. T. J. Kirkpatrick; Va. Battery (Fluvanna Art'y), Capt. J. L. Massie; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Milledge, Jr. Battalion loss (not reported).

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.

ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson.

*Wilcox's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Hilary A. Herbert; 9th Ala., Capt. J. H. King (w); 10th Ala., Col. William H. Forney (w and c), Lieut.-Col. James E. Shelley; 11th Ala., Col. J. C. C. Sanders (w), Lieut.-Col. George E. Taylor; 14th Ala., Col. L. Pinckard (w), Lieut.-Col. James A. Broome. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 469; m, 257=777. *Mahone's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va., Col. George T. Rogers; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va., Col. Joseph H. Ham; 41st Va., Col. William A. Parham; 61st Va., Col. V. D. Groner. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 55; m, 39=102. *Wright's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose R. Wright, Col. William Gibson, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose R. Wright: 3d Ga., Col. E. J. Walker; 22d Ga., Col. Joseph Wasden (k), Capt. B. C. McCurry; 48th Ga., Col. William Gibson, Capt. M. R. Hall, Col. William Gibson (w and c); 2d Ga. Battalion, Maj. George W. Ross (m w), Capt. Charles J. Moffett. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 295; m, 333=668. *Perry's Brigade*, Col. David Lang: 2d Fla., Maj. W. R. Moore (w and c); 5th Fla., Capt. R. N. Gardner (w); 8th Fla., Col. David Lang. Brigade loss: k, 33; w, 217; m, 205=455. *Posey's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Carnot Posey: 12th Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor; 16th Miss., Col. Samuel E. Baker; 19th Miss., Col. N. H. Harris; 48th Miss., Col. Joseph M. Jayne. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 71=83. *Sumpter (Ga.) Artillery Battalion*, Maj. John Lane: Co. A, Capt. Hugh M. Ross; Co. B, Capt. George M. Patterson; Co. C, Capt. John T. Wingfield (w). Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 21; m, 6=30.

HETH'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth (w), Brig.-Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew (w). Staff loss: w, 2.

*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, Col. James K. Marshall (w and c); 11th N. C., Col. Collett Leventhorpe (w); 26th N. C., Col. Henry K. Burgwyn, Jr. (k), Capt. H. C. Albright; 47th N. C., Col. G. H. Fairbault (w); 52d N. C., Col. James K. Marshall, Lieut.-Col. Marcus A. Parks (w). Brigade loss: k, 190; w, 915=1105. *Second Brigade*, Col. J. M. Brockenbrough: 40th Va., Capt. T. E. Betts, Capt. R. B. Davis; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo; 55th Va., Col. W. S. Christian; 22d Va. Battalion, Maj. John S. Bowles. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 123=148. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James J. Archer (c), Col. B. D. Fry (w and c), Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard: 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry; 5th Ala. Battalion, Maj. A. S. Van de Graaff; 1st Tenn. (Prov. Army), Maj. Felix G. Buchanan; 7th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard; 14th Tenn., Capt. B. L. Phillips. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 144; m, 517=677. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph R. Davis: 2d Miss., Col. J. M. Stone (w); 11th Miss., Col. F. M. Greene; 42d Miss., Col. H. R. Miller; 55th N. C., Col. J. K. Connally (w). Brigade loss: k, 180; w, 717=897. *Artillery Battalion*, Lieut.-Col. John J. Garrett: La. Battery (Donaldsonville Art'y), Capt. Victor Maurin; Va. Battery (Huger Art'y), Capt. Joseph D. Moore; Va. Battery, Capt. John W. Lewis; Va. Battery (Norfolk Light Art'y Blues), Capt. C. R. Grandy. Battalion loss: w, 5; m, 17=22.

PENDER'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. William D. Pender (m w), Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane, Maj.-Gen. Isaac R. Trimble (w and c), Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 4=5.

*First Brigade*, Col. Abner Perrin: 1st S. C. (Prov. Army), Maj. C. W. McCreary; 1st S. C. (Rifles), Capt. William M. Hadden; 12th S. C., Col. John L. Miller; 13th S. C., Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman; 14th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Joseph N. Brown (w). Brigade loss: k, 100; w, 477=577. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane,

Col. C. M. Avery, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane (w), Col. C. M. Avery: 7th N. C., Capt. J. McLeod Turner (w and c), Capt. James G. Harris; 18th N. C., Col. John D. Barry; 28th N. C., Col. S. D. Lowe (w), Lieut.-Col. W. H. A. Speer; 33d N. C., Col. C. M. Avery; 37th N. C., Col. W. M. Barbour. Brigade loss: k, 41; w, 348; m, 271=660.

*Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Edward L. Thomas: 14th Ga., —; 35th Ga., —; 45th Ga., —; 49th Ga., Col. S. T. Player. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 136=152. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alfred M. Scales (w), Lieut.-Col. G. T. Gordon, Col. William Lee J. Lowrance: 13th N. C., Col. J. H. Hyman (w); 16th N. C., Capt. L. W. Stowe; 22d N. C., Col. James Conner; 34th N. C., Col. William Lee J. Lowrance (w), Lieut.-Col. G. T. Gordon; 38th N. C., Col. W. J. Hoke (w). Brigade loss: k, 102; w, 323; m, 110=535. *Artillery Battalion*, Maj. William T. Poague: Va. Battery (Albemarle Art'y), Capt. James W. Wyatt; N. C. Battery (Charlotte Art'y), Capt. Joseph Graham; Miss. Battery (Madison Light Art'y), Capt. George Ward; Va. Battery, Capt. J. V. Brooke. Battalion loss: k, 2; w, 24; m, 6=32.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Col. R. Lindsay Walker.

*McIntosh's Battalion*, Maj. D. G. McIntosh: Ala. Battery (Hardaway Art'y), Capt. W. B. Hurt; Va. Battery (Danville Art'y), Capt. R. S. Rice; Va. Battery (2d Rockbridge Art'y), Lieut. Samuel Wallace; Va. Battery, Capt. M. Johnson. Battalion loss: k, 7; w, 25=32. *Pegram's Battalion*, Maj. W. J. Pegram, Capt. E. B. Brunson: S. C. Battery (Pee Dee Art'y), Lieut. William E. Zimmerman; Va. Battery (Crenshaw), —; Va. Battery (Fredericksburg Art'y), Capt. E. A. Marye; Va. Battery, (Letcher Art'y), Capt. T. A. Brander; Va. Battery (Purcell Art'y), Capt. Joseph McGraw. Battalion loss: k, 10; w, 37; m, 1=48.

CAVALRY, Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart.

*Fitz Lee's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee: 1st Md. Battalion (serving with Ewell's corps), Maj. Harry Gilmor, Maj. Ridgely Brown; 1st Va., Col. James H. Drake; 2d Va., Col. T. T. Munford; 3d Va., Col. Thomas H. Owen; 4th Va., Col. Williams C. Wickham; 5th Va., Col. T. L. Rosser. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 16; m, 29=50. *Hampin's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton (w), Col. Lawrence S. Baker: 1st N. C., Col. Lawrence S. Baker; 1st S. C., —; 2d S. C., —; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, —; Jeff Davis Legion, —; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, —. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 58; m, 16=91. *W. H. F. Lee's Brigade*, Col. John R. Chambliss, Jr.: 2d N. C., —; 9th Va., Col. R. L. T. Beale; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; 13th Va., —. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 26; m, 13=41. *Jenkins's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Albert G. Jenkins (w), Col. M. J. Ferguson: 14th Va., —; 16th Va., —; 17th Va., Col. W. H. French; 34th Va. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. V. A. Witcher; 36th Va. Battalion, —; Va. Battery, Capt. Thomas E. Jackson. *Robertson's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Beverly H. Robertson (commanded his own and W. E. Jones's brigades): 4th N. C., Col. D. D. Ferebee; 5th N. C., —. *Jones's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William E. Jones: 6th Va., Maj. C. E. Flournoy; 7th Va., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Marshall; 11th Va., Col. L. L. Lomax; 35th Va. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. E. V. White. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 40; m, 6=58. *Stuart's Horse Artillery*, Maj. R. F. Beckham: Va. Battery, Capt. James Breathed; Va. Battery, Capt. R. P. Chew; Maryland Battery, Capt. W. H. Griffin; S. C. Battery, Capt. J. F. Hart; Va. Battery, Capt. W. M. McGregor; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman. *Imboden's Command*, Brig.-Gen. John D. Imboden: 18th Va. Cav., Col. George W. Imboden; 62d Va. (mounted infantry), Col. George H. Smith; Va. Partisan Rangers, Capt. John H. McNeill; Va. Battery, Capt. J. H. McClanahan.

According to the reports of brigade and other subordinate commanders the total loss of the Confederate Army was 2592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5150 captured or missing=20,451. Several of the reports indicate that many of the "missing" were killed or wounded. Rolls on file in the office of the Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, bear the names of 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates captured at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to 5th, inclusive. The number of wounded prisoners is reported by the medical director of Meade's army as 6802.



## RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES.

The consolidated morning reports of the Union Army for June 30th, 1863, give the numbers "actually available for line of battle," or the effective force, including officers and men, as follows:

COMMAND.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Total.
First Army Corps.....	67	619	9,403	10,089
Second Army Corps.....	82	551	12,363	12,996
Third Army Corps.....	.....	677	11,247	11,924
Fifth Army Corps.....	.....	555	11,954	12,500
Sixth Army Corps.....	124	1,039	14,516	15,679
Eleventh Army Corps.....	52	644	9,197	9,893
Twelfth Army Corps.....	.....	396	8,193	8,589
Cavalry Corps.....	12,653	491	.....	13,144
Artillery Reserve.....	.....	2,211	335	2,546
Aggregate .....	12,978	7,183	77,208	97,369

Between June 30th and July 3d, the reinforcements that joined the army may be estimated as follows:

Stannard's brigade to First Corps.....	2,500
Lockwood's brigade to Twelfth Corps.....	1,700
Duval's company Maryland cavalry to Gregg's cavalry division.....	60
Rank's Pennsylvania artillery to Gregg's cavalry division.....	50
Total reinforcements.....	4,310

This number, added to the strength as per returns of June 30th, makes a maximum of 101,679 effectives of all arms.

The severe marches following the roll-call of June 30th considerably reduced by sickness and straggling the strength of the commands, but a satisfactory computation of the shrinkage from these causes does not seem possible. It may have ranged from five to ten per cent.

The field returns of the infantry and artillery of the army corps, for July 4th, give the following effective figures:

First Corps (except one regiment detailed as wagon guard).....	5,430
Second Corps .....	6,923
Third Corps.....	6,130
Fifth Corps .....	9,553
Sixth Corps .....	12,832
Eleventh Corps .....	5,513
Twelfth Corps (except one battery on reconnaissance).....	9,757
Total .....	56,138

Adding to this the loss of 21,905 sustained by the commands mentioned, gives an approximate calculation of the strength of the seven army corps, viz., 78,043.

There are no field returns of the Cavalry Corps or the Artillery Reserve for July 4th. But by assuming, in round numbers, 78,000 as the maximum fighting strength of the seven army corps, and adding 13,000 for the Cavalry Corps, and 2500 for the Artillery Reserve (as shown by the return for June 30th), an aggregate of 93,500 is obtained.

The effective strength as reported by the seven army corps commanders at the council held on the evening of July 2d, was as follows: "About 9000, 12,500, 9000, 6000, 8500, 6000, 7000,—total 58,000.

Unfortunately the particular corps represented by these figures are not stated in the minutes of the council.

According to the returns of the Confederate Army for May 31st, 1863 (the latest immediately preceding the battle), the "effective total" of enlisted men was:

Infantry .....	54,356
Stuart's Cavalry.....	9,536
Artillery.....	4,460

Alexander's and Garnett's artillery battalions, consisting of ten batteries, are not included in the above figures. Their effective strength may, however, be put at 800 officers and men. There were also 6116 officers borne on the return as "present for duty," which, added to the foregoing, give an aggregate of 75,268 officers and men.


The accessions by organizations to the army between May 31st and July 3d, were as follows:

	<i>Estimated at not less than</i>
1st. Pettigrew's infantry brigade.....	2,000
2d. Jenkins's cavalry brigade.....	1,600
3d. Imboden's cavalry brigade.....	2,000
Total gain.....	5,600

The loss by organizations during the same period was:


1st. Corse's brigade and one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade left at Hanover Court House, Va.....	2,000
2d. Three regiments of Early's division left at Winchester, Va.....	1,000
3d. One regiment of Stuart's cavalry left in Virginia.....	350
Total loss (estimated).....	3,350

or a net gain of 2250, which, added to the strength on May 31st, of 75,268, makes a maximum in the campaign of 77,518. After making a liberal allowance for losses by sickness, straggling, guards to prisoners and casualties in the various encounters between June 1st and June 30th inclusive, it seems reasonable to conclude that *General Lee had at his command on the field of battle, from first to last, an army numbering at least 70,000 men of all arms.*




CONSECRATION OF THE GETTYSBURG CEMETERY, NOVEMBER 19, 1863—THE GATHERING THAT PRESIDENT LINCOLN ADDRESSED. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.





# BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR



BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS  
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